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A bstract
Over the last two decades the institutional structures across the OECD countries have 
changed dramatically, having a significant impact on labour market performance. This 
thesis seeks to make four contributions to our understanding of the implications and 
applications of regulations. This is done in two distinct ways: firstly, to focus on a specific 
policy change in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 , and secondly, to analyse (more generally) the 
disparities in policies across the OECD countries, in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
Chapter 1 seeks to contribute to the literature on tax credit policies, which have been a 
popular way to alleviate in-work poverty. The assumption is typically that the incidence 
is on the claimant workers. However, economic theory suggests no particular reason to 
believe that this should be the case. This chapter investigates the incidence of the Working 
Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) in the UK introduced in 1999, which unlike similar tax 
credit policies was paid through the wage packet, increasing the connection between the 
employer and worker with regard to the tax credit. Using two stage parametric and non- 
parametric censored regression methods I find compelling evidence to suggest that the 
firm discriminates by cutting the wage of claimant workers relative to similarly skilled 
non-claimant workers when looking at men and that there is a spill-over effect onto the 
wage for both men and women.
Chapter 2 then goes on to look more closely at the acclaimed relationship between tax 
credits and labour supply. One of the principle aims of the WFTC was to increase the 
participation of those with low labour market attachment. The literature to date con­
cludes that for lone mothers there was approximately a 5% point increase in employment. 
The differences-in-differences methodology that is typically used compare lone mother 
with single women without children. However, the characteristics of these groups are 
both observably and unobservably different, such that the identifying assumption may 
not be satisfied. I find that when I control for differential trends between people with 
and without children, the employment effect of WFTC falls significantly. Moreover, by 
looking at movements in the hour’s distribution, it is clear that any WFTC effect is solely
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borne on those working full-time (30 hours or more). Another concern is that I find that 
the policy did not induce people into the labour market from inactivity.
Chapter 3 seeks to explain why it is that in some OECD countries the male and female 
unemployment rates are very similar but in others (notably the ‘Mediterranean’ countries) 
the female unemployment rate is much higher than the male. The analysis shows that, 
in countries where there is a large gender gap in unemployment rates, there is a gender 
gap in both flows from employment into unemployment and from unemployment into 
employment. Overall it seems that differences in human capital accumulation between 
men and women interacted with labour market institutions is an important part of the 
explanation.
Chapter 4 looks at how the labour’s share of GDP in many OECD countries has declined 
over the last two decades. The little evidence that exists on this important issue is 
almost entirely macro-economic. This chapter uses cross-country panel data evidence 
from a group of ‘network industries’, where there have been substantial changes of public 
ownership and entry barrier. The results show that privatisation can explain a significant 
proportion of the fall of labour’s share in these industries, even when the endogeneity of 
the policy rules is accounted for using sociopolitical instrumental variables. The impact of 
privatisation has been somewhat offset by falling barriers which dampen profit margins.
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Introduction
Over the last two decades the institutional structures across the OECD countries have 
changed dramatically. In turn, these changes have had a significant impact on labour 
market performance. Some of the most striking changes can be seen when looking at union 
power, employment protection, public sector employment, minimum wages, the social 
security system, welfare related policies and legislation concerning sex discrimination. 
Not only have these changes altered employment incentives, composition and structure 
but they have also impacted on the way in which wages are set and the distribution of 
wage.
This thesis seeks to make four contributions to our understanding of the implications and 
applications of regulations. This is done in two distinct ways: firstly, to focus on the 
impacts of a specific policy change in the UK and secondly, to analyse (more generally) 
the disparities in policies and outcomes across the OECD countries.
In particular, Part 1 (comprising of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2) illustrates the impact of 
changes in generosity and methods of payments of Earned Income Tax Credit policies. In 
general, these "tax subsidy" policies are motivated by the desire to encourage participation 
and hours of work of certain groups in the economy, for example, lone parents and low 
income couples. In particular, by analysing the direct and indirect effects of policies of 
this kind, we increase our insight into a policy that has become increasingly popular 
across the OECD countries (Earned Income Tax Credits in the USA, Self Sufficiency 
Program in Canada and Working Families’ Tax Credit in the UK). In particular, we go 
beyond the existing literature to show that the impacts of such policies are not without 
externalities. Our empirical investigation is carried out using the changes in the UK in 
October 1999 when the government replaced the Family Credit (minimum hours based 
income supplement for families with children) with the Working Families’ Tax Credit 
(WFTC).
In Chapter 1 we examine who are the beneficiaries WFTC. In particular, we investigate
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whether there is evidence to suggest that tax credits are not fully incident on the employee 
who is eligible and claiming the tax credit. We use a simple general equilibrium model 
with perfect competition to show that under the assumption that the employer has formal 
knowledge, or at least awareness, of which of her employees are claiming the tax credit, 
she can share in the incidence of the tax credit by cutting the gross equilibrium wage 
of the claimant worker. This can be done without reducing the worker’s net equilibrium 
wage such that the worker is no worse off and, more likely, still better off from receiving 
the tax credit. Moreover, given the degree of substitution between the claimant and other 
workers, the model predicts that there will be a spillover effect which reduces the wage of 
both eligible and similarly skilled ineligible workers.
We highlight two very important factors, which may be specific to the country where the 
change in policy occurs and which will determine the strength of the effect in question. 
Firstly, the method by which the tax credit is paid will play a vital role, as it can alter 
the amount of information that the employer has about her employees’ eligibility circum­
stances. Secondly, institutional factors such as minimum wages impose a lower bound 
below which the employer cannot cut the wage. The empirical investigation using WFTC 
is interesting in its own right, but we regard it as particularly useful as it incorporates 
and exploits these two factors: the payment of WFTC through the wage packet and the 
introduction of the National Minimum Wage.
We then proceed to show that by using both a parametric and non-parametric two-stage 
censored regression based technique, this chapter finds strong evidence to suggest that, 
firstly, the firm discriminates by cutting the wage of the claimant worker relative to 
a similarly skilled non-claimant for men, such that the employer extracts a significant 
amount. Secondly, there is a "spillover" effect for both men and women such that as 
the average amount of WFTC and the fraction of employees claiming WFTC increases 
by industry (or by education group), the wages of similarly skilled claimants and non­
claimants fall.
These results have important academic and policy implications. In particular, they imply 
that there is a significant shift in the burden of tax credits, in line with the theory 
presented. This is of critical policy importance as we can no longer assume that it is 
the case that the person eligible for such tax credits is the sole beneficiary. These results 
are critical to our understanding of the consequences of the expansion, application and 
generosity of tax credits. Moreover, the way in which they are distributed may have 
unexpected consequences.
Chapter 2 then goes on to look more closely at the acclaimed relationship between labour 
supply and tax credits. The magnitude and the popularity of the introduction of WFTC
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induced a number of studies on the labour supply impact (Blundell et al (2005), Brewer 
et al (2005), Leigh (2005), Francesconi et al (2004), Gregg et al (2003)). Although the 
methodology and data varied, they all concluded that WFTC had a positive impact on 
the labour market employment of lone mothers. According to Brewer and Browne (2006), 
who composed an overview of the literature, the overall conclusion was that the generosity 
of the in-work credit system induced lone mothers to increase their participation in the 
labour market by 5 percentage points.
Most of the studies on WFTC use a methodology that evaluates the effect of WFTC by 
comparing the employment changes of lone mothers with single women without children, 
before and after the policy introduction. Since WFTC targets lone mothers but single 
women without children are unaffected by the policy, it is assumed that the effect of 
WFTC can be quantified by the relative increase in employment. However, it is not 
entirely convincing that the two groups satisfy the necessary assumption of having the 
same pre-policy trend in employment rates. Not only are the two groups observably and 
unobservably different but we also see that there is an increasing trend in the employment 
rate of lone mothers since the mid-1990s, while the level for single childless women has 
been high and has remained fairly flat over the same period. These concerns are reinforced 
when we look at the movements in the hours distribution and observe continuous increases 
in lone mothers working part-time and full-time. Moreover, there is no noticeable spike 
with the introduction of WFTC and then after 2000 the increases in employment flatten 
even though there were increases in the basic tax credit each year from 2000 to 2003.
In particular, this chapter addresses the concern of the suitability of the control group 
and to see how the results change when we control for group specific differential trends. 
Moreover, we look to see where, along the hours distribution, the change occurs. Overall, 
we find three key results: First, when we allow for differential trends, the effect of WFTC 
on employment falls to levels that are considerably lower than the literature’s estimate of 
5% points. Second, we find that this effect is borne solely on those working full time (30 
hours or more). Finally, the policy change had no effect on those who were inactive.
These results offer valuable insight into two key issues: Firstly, the effectiveness of policy 
and secondly, the design of the policy. In particular, they imply that the increase in 
participation was greatly exaggerated when we do not account for the differential trends 
between treatment and control groups. Moreover, the policy was not as well targeted as 
initially considered, given that any increase to employment was solely borne on those who 
work 30 or more hours, while those who were inactive were unaffected by the policy.
Part 2 of this thesis comprises of two chapters (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), which look 
at important empirical trends. In particular, Chapter 3 considers the gender gaps in
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unemployment rates across the OECD countries and Chapter 4 reflects on the cross­
country differences in the fall in labour’s share of GDP. These issues have not been 
addressed in the previous literature but with the help of disaggregated data, we provide 
potential explanations for why we observe cross-country disparities in gender gaps in 
unemployment rates and in the rise in the profit share, respectively.
Chapter 3 starts from the stand point that although there is an enormous literature on 
gender gaps in pay and a vast literature on gender gaps in labour force participation 
rates (see Altonji and Blank (1999) for an overall survey and Blau and Kahn (2003) for 
a recent international comparison), there is very little recent literature on gender gaps in 
unemployment rates. There was a literature on the subject in the US in the 1970s and 
early 1980s (see, for example, Barrett and Morgenstern (1974); Niemi (1974); Johnson 
(1983)) but few recent papers perhaps because the female and male unemployment rates 
in the US have converged. But this convergence has not happened in all OECD countries. 
We highlight that the highest gender gaps in unemployment rates are to be found in the 
Mediterranean countries (Spain, Greece, Italy and France). Next come the Benelux coun­
tries (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg), then the ‘Germanic’ countries (Germany, 
Austria and Switzerland), then the ‘Nordic’ countries (Sweden, Finland and Norway) 
and, finally the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries (US, UK, Ireland, Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand). In particular, in a number of the Mediterranean countries the ‘unemployment 
problem’ is largely a problem of female unemployment.
The aim of the chapter is to understand the cross-country variation in the gender gap 
in the unemployment rate. One should emphasize that the question we are interested 
in answering is not ‘why are women less likely to be in employment than men?’ (either 
measured as the employment-population ratio or the labour force participation rate) for 
which there are fairly obvious answers in terms of the allocation of domestic responsibilities 
and a large literature on the subject but the question ‘why, once they have decided they 
want a job, are women in some countries much less likely to be in employment than men?’.
We find that although human capital theory and institutions can explain a large part of 
the observed differences in the gender gaps in unemployment rates, they probably do not 
account for all of the disparity. In addition there is some evidence that attitudes towards 
male and female unemployment may be important in explaining the gap in countries 
where unemployment is high.
In Chapter 4 we look into the well-known phenomena of the rise in the profit share. It 
is a fact that the share of profits in national income in the Eurozone area and Japan 
are at their highest for 25 years and that after tax profits are at their highest share 
in the US for 75 years. While some economists argue that this is due to globalisation,
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others have attributed the fall in the labour share to deregulation in both labour and 
product markets. However, despite this interest in deregulation, the empirical work in 
the area is rather disappointing. Most authors work with aggregate data of one sort or 
another using cross-country panel regressions (Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003a,b), Nickell 
(2003)). However, the results tend to be rather fragile (see Baker et al (2003)). This 
fragility is mainly a consequence of there being many events occurring simultaneously 
at the macro-level and disentangling the impact of product market deregulation from 
these other events is a formidable task. A second problem with the existing literature 
on the macro-effects of regulatory change is that product market deregulation tend to be 
focused in particular sectors so a sector specific approach is more attractive. Although 
enlightening, the disadvantage of this very micro approach is that it is hard to generalise 
to other sectors or across the economy as a whole.
In this chapter we take an intermediate approach to looking at the relationship between 
deregulation and rising profit shares by using panel data from sectors across several OECD 
countries. These are the “network industries” that have seen the greatest degree of reg­
ulatory reform -  telecoms, post, gas, electricity, airlines, railways and roads. The timing 
of the reforms and the extent of reform vary significantly between countries. We exploit 
this differences as quantified in some new OECD data on public ownership and barriers 
to entry to explicitly test some key economic mechanisms.
We find that falling public ownership is associated with a higher wage bill share and this is 
driven by the positive effect of public ownership on employment. Thus strongly suggests 
that privatisation is an important reason for the falling wage bill share in the network 
industries in the OECD. These results are robust to a number of controls including adding 
a full set of fixed effects and using sociopolitical variable to tackle the endogeneity problem. 
Barriers to entry also appear to matter, in that higher barriers to entry are generally 
associated with lower labour share. This result is, however, less robust than the public 
ownership result. Moreover, these findings that privatisation tended to reduce labour’s 
share helps to answer the question of why labour’s share tended to fall in the OECD 
despite falling entry barriers (see Torrini (2005) or Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)). An 
alternative explanation may be that deregulation on the labour market side could reduce 
labour’s share through declines in worker bargaining power. However, in our analysis we 
do not find support for the labour market deregulation hypothesis.
Part I
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Chapter 1
The Incidence of an Earned 
Incom e Tax Credit: Evaluating 
the Im pact on W ages in the UK
1.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades there has been a huge expansion across many OECD countries 
in welfare to work programmes. Different approaches have been carried out to enhance the 
labour market attachment and earnings of the low skilled. The three (often conflicting) 
goals are to raise the standard of living, encourage work and self sufficiency and to keep 
government costs low.
A popular policy has been to use tax credits, for example, the Earned Income Tax Credit 
in the USA, the Self-Sufficiency Program in Canada and the Working Families’ Tax Credit 
(WFTC) in the UK. In general, these "tax subsidy" policies are motivated by the desire 
to encourage participation and hours of work of certain groups in the economy, for ex­
ample, lone parents and low income couples. These so-called "in-work benefits" aim to 
alleviate poverty at the lower end of the wage distribution, reduce income inequality and 
redistribute income by reducing the dispersion of earnings.
Given the prior aims and motivations of such policies, most of the literature to date 
focuses on estimating the labour supply response to changes in and/or introductions of 
tax credit policies (Eissa & Leibman (1996), Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999), Blundell et 
al (2005), Brewer et al (2005)). In particular, with regard to the WFTC, once the income
19
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and substitution effect are accounted for, the policy was said to have had a "more than 
average" impact on lone parents and women with unemployed partners1. It is however, 
typically assumed that the incidence of the tax credit is solely on the claimant worker 
(and therefore the claimant household).
This chapter will investigate whether there is evidence to suggest that tax credits are not 
fully incident on the employee who is eligible2 and claiming the tax credit. This can be 
with or without a boost to the economy’s overall labour supply. We use a simple general 
equilibrium model with perfect competition to show that under the assumption that the 
employer has formal knowledge, or at least awareness, of which of her employees are 
claiming a tax credit, she can share in the incidence of the tax credit by cutting the gross 
equilibrium wage of the claimant worker. This can be done without reducing the worker’s 
net equilibrium wage such that the worker is no worse off and, more likely, still better 
off from receiving the tax credit. Moreover, given the degree of substitution between the 
claimant and other workers, the model predicts that there will be a spillover effect which 
reduces the wage of both eligible and similarly skilled ineligible workers. The information 
assumption is still important in the spillover case because by knowing the fraction of 
eligible workers and the average amount claimed in the work-place, the employer can 
extract some of the tax credit by "averaging" out the effect.
In this chapter we highlight two very important factors, which may be specific to the 
country where the change in policy occurs. These factors will determine the strength 
of the effect in question. Firstly, the method by which the tax credit is paid will play 
a vital role, as it can alter the amount of information that the employer has about her 
employees’ eligibility circumstances. For example, the Working Families’ Tax Credit in 
the UK differed from its predecessor, Family Credit, in that WFTC was paid via the wage 
packet. The motivation for this change was to reduce the stigma attached to receiving 
tax credits in the form of a welfare benefit. However, using this method gave employers 
complete information on which employees were claiming and also how much WFTC they 
were receiving. Secondly, institutional factors such as minimum wages impose a lower 
bound below which the employer cannot cut the wage. This was the case in the UK 
with the introduction of the National Minimum Wage (NMW) in April 1999. This is also 
important because it implies that those at the lower end of the wage distribution are more 
likely to be protected by the national minimum from a cut in gross wage. Additionally 
(and perhaps more obviously), those at the top end of the wage distribution are unlikely 
to be affected because tax credits are less relevant to their household income, as they 
probably receive too little or they earn too much to be eligible. It is therefore those in
1See Blundell & Walker (2001).
2 Eligibility usually being contingent on having children, working a certain number of hours and having 
a household income below a certain threshold level.
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the middle of the wage distribution who are most likely to be affected.
The empirical investigation is carried out using the change in the UK in October 1999 
when the government replaced the Family Credit (a minimum working hours based credit 
for families with children) with the Working Families’ Tax Credit. The change in policy 
altered the eligibility criteria and it became more generous 3. Although focusing on this 
policy change is important in its own right because of this increase in generosity, it is made 
even more interesting by the fact that we incorporate and exploit two crucial changes in 
the UK: firstly, the National Minimum Wage (NMW) was introduced six months prior to 
the WFTC and secondly, the WFTC was paid via the wage packet. The introduction of 
the NMW plays a fundamental role in this analysis as it offers an interesting identification 
strategy by acting as an exogenous barrier below which the employer cannot cut the gross 
wage. In the analysis it is also used as a point of censoring when comparing the change 
in wages before 1999 to after the introduction of the tax credit.
The payment of the tax credit though the wage packet also plays a central role in the 
analysis. In the UK employers became responsible in April 2000 for paying the WFTC 
through the employees’ wage or salary. The eligible claimant would claim the approximate 
tax credit from the Inland Revenue, who would work out the amount of tax credit payable. 
The Inland Revenue would then notify the relevant employer of the amount of tax credit 
to be paid and when the tax credit is to start and finish4. Employers would pay the 
tax credit out of the tax and National Insurance contribution that they would otherwise 
have forwarded to the Inland Revenue5. Recent work in the USA by Leigh (2004) and 
Rothstein (2005) investigates the impact of increased labour supply resulting from changes 
in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), on the equilibrium wage. In the US however, 
the employer is not responsible for income tax filing on behalf of employees and so the 
EITC is not visible in the wage packet. In the UK, payment of WFTC through the wage 
packet made the employer responsible for the payment of the tax credit and so increased 
the connection between the wage paying firm and the claimant employee. This chapter 
exploits these differences to get a good measure of the effect of tax credits on wages.
We use two measures of WFTC: the first is the reported number of claimants and the 
second is the amount of WFTC, which is calculated using the eligibility criteria. This 
second measure is particularly useful as it allows us to distinguish between the effect of 
the change in generosity from Family Credit and the change in visibility (i.e. payment 
through the wage packet) on the wage. Using both a parametric and non-parametric two-
3 A more in-depth description will be given in a later section
4 It is important to note that this notification would not break down the various components of the 
credit or distinguish between the WFTC and disabled person’s tax.
5 The employer will lose the benefit of the time lag between marking these deductions and forwarding 
on the account office.
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stage censored regression based technique, this chapter finds strong evidence to suggest 
that, firstly, the firm discriminates by cutting the wage of the claimant worker relative to 
a similarly skilled non-claimant for men, such that the employer extracts 35%6. Secondly, 
there is a "spillover" effect for both men and women such that as the average amount 
of WFTC and the fraction of employees claiming WFTC increases by industry (or by 
education group), the wages of similarly skilled claimants and non-claimants fall. We 
find that the "spillover" effect by industry for men is approximately -0.2% and -0.3% for 
women and when looking by education group, the spillover effect for men is -0.1% and 
-0.7% for women7. Finally, as a robustness check we identify the workers for who the 
NMW binds and find that the tax credit does not have the same effect on their wages, 
indicating that the NMW protects them from a wage cut.
The analysis is extended to show that the size of the firm plays an important role in the 
size of the incidence transfer and as the size of the firm increases, the spillover effect is 
the principle effect. This is not particularly unusual when one considers that as the size 
of the firm increases, there is a higher chance that there are workers doing identical jobs, 
such that the employer would find it difficult to cut the gross wage of one worker and 
not the other on grounds of eligibility. She therefore shares the burden across all workers. 
Finally, we address the concern of selectivity in the "take-up" rates and the problem of 
previously ineligible workers altering their behaviour to become eligible. We tests the 
exogeneity of the WFTC variables using the Smith-Blundell (1986) procedure and find 
no evidence of endogeneity .
These results have important academic and policy implications. In particular, they imply 
that there is a significant shift in the burden of tax credits, in line with the theory 
presented. This is of critical policy importance as we can no longer assume that it is 
the case that the person eligible for such tax credits is the sole beneficiary. These results 
are critical to our understanding of the consequences of the expansion, application and 
generosity of tax credits. Moreover, the way in which they are distributed may have 
unexpected consequences.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 gives a brief overview of the 
past literature on tax credits. Section 1.3 introduces a general equilibrium model which 
explains how a tax credit can reduce the gross equilibrium wage. In Section 1.4 a short 
history and the main descriptive statistics are given for tax credit policy changes in the 
UK. Section 1.5 describes the empirical framework used to test the hypothesis proposed 
in Section 1.3. Section 1.6 describes the data and explains the main results. Section 1.7 
extends the analysis from Section 1.6 and highlights and deals with potential problems.
6 These figures are calculated using the change in weekly wages over the average weekly WFTC claim.
7These figures are evaluated at the average WFTC rate and average fraction of eligible in the sample.
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Section 1.8 discusses the implications of these results and suggests policy implications. 
Finally, Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
As mentioned in the introduction, much of the literature to date focuses on evaluating 
the participation effect of tax credit changes/introduction. One of the most well known 
papers is that of Eissa Sz Leibman (1996) where the authors examine the impact of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the USA, which included the expansion of the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC). They focus on the labour market participation and hours of work of 
single women with children and identify the change by comparing the change in the labour 
supply of single women with children and single women without children. They find that 
labour supply increases by 2.8%. Another prominent paper which focuses on the changes 
in labour supply of single women in the USA is that of Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999). 
They however, take a more general approach to looking at various policy changes in the 
US in the 1980s and 1990s that affect this group of women. They found that although 
benefit cuts, welfare time limit alterations, changes in training programs and childcare 
expansions had some impact on making women with children work, the largest share of 
the increase could be attributed to reforms in EITC. Blundell Sz Hoynes (2001) examine 
the labour market impact of in-work benefit reform in the UK and then compare it with 
the USA policy reform (i.e. EITC). They look at why the impact of similar reforms in 
the UK seem to be small relative to the USA (in terms of increasing employment rates). 
They conclude that it is attributed to the interactions with other means tested benefits in 
the UK, the importance of workless couples with kids, the level of income support given 
to non-working parents and the strength of the USA upturn in the 1990s.
In the UK work has been done to look at the labour supply impact of the Working Families’ 
Tax Credit (WFTC), which was introduced in October 1999 and then replaced by a new 
tax credit in April 2003 (Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit). Using a structural 
model of labour supply, Brewer et al (2005) find that although labour supply increased 
for lone mothers, the effect on other groups in the economy was minimal. Blundell et 
al (2005) and Leigh (2005) also look at the labour supply impact but instead using the 
difference-in-difference methodology and find similar results. These papers find a 3-5% 
increase in participation of lone mothers, no significant effect on married mothers and 
-0.5 to 0.75% change in father’s employment.
There are however, a growing number of papers that go beyond looking purely at partic­
ipation effects from tax subsidies. In particular, an interesting aspect is that of the effect
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on skill formation resulting from increased participation (Card, Michalopoulos h  Robins 
(2001), Heckman, Lochner & Cossa (2002)). The main question posed in these papers is 
whether tax credits create an incentive to invest in skills that are useful for the work place, 
and/or if skills are acquired as a by-product of being in the workplace. The effects on 
human capital are rather ambiguous and depend on the view taken as to whether learning 
is rivalrous to work or not. Heckman et al find that the entry effect of EITC is small, but 
the reduction in the average earnings amongst uneducated women can be as large as 18%. 
In the UK, Lydon & Walker (2004) also question whether the introduction of the WFTC 
promoted incentives to increase investment in on-the-job search and training in general 
skills. They look to see if factors such as these promoted wage growth and found that 
for people who were previously claiming Family Credit, WFTC’s predecessor, incentives 
are unchanged, but for those who became eligible for the tax credit and had not been 
previously eligible, there was a 2.7% wage progression.
More recently, literature in the US has emerged which looks at the incidence of tax credits. 
In particular, Leigh (2004) and Rothstein (2005) use different approaches to investigate 
the impact of changes in the EITC in the mid-1990s, to see if changes in labour supply 
had any impact on the equilibrium wage within the same skill group. Using variation 
across states in EITC supplements, Leigh (2004) generates cross-sectional variation in 
the average tax rate faced by women with children and finds that an increase of 10% in 
the generosity of EITC is associated with a 4% fall in wages of the high school drop-outs 
and a 2% fall in the wage of college graduates. In addition to the state variation, Leigh 
also uses variation across the wage distribution and still finds that increasing EITC is 
associated with a fall in hourly wage. The prime explanation for these results is that the 
increase in EITC generosity boosts labour supply as individuals respond to average falls in 
tax rates and not marginal tax rates. Rothstein uses variation across the wage distribution 
using the DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) approach in the implementations of the 
mid-1990s federal EITC expansion (in which maximum total credits, associated marginal 
total credits and associated marginal tax rates approximately doubled over a three year 
period) to identify the EITC’s effect on women’s aggregate labour supply and on the 
female wage schedule. He found that wage changes were insignificant given the rise in 
labour supply, but the wage of EITC eligible women grew at a slower rate than that of 
non-eligible women.
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The aim of this section is to show how, in a theoretical setting, it is possible for a tax credit 
to influence the equilibrium wage in a general equilibrium framework. The Proposition 
adapts the Harberger (1962) model of tax incidence8 to show that a change in the tax 
credit can lead to a shift in the burden of the tax credit from employee to employer. 
Moreover, the model shows that when allowing for heterogeneity between workers, there 
is an indirect effect which affects both eligible and non-eligible. The impact of this effect 
will depend on the elasticity of substitution between the eligible worker and ineligible 
worker and the fraction of eligible workers in the work place.
Before introducing the main proposition, let us consider a very simple economy in which 
workers are perfect substitutes and the law of one wage applies. We can show that it is 
only in "special'1 circumstances that the imposition of the tax credit does not alter the 
wage of the claimant. Moreover, it implies that it is not only the claimant (or claimant’s 
household) who is affected by the policy, but also other groups in the economy are affected.
Let workers comprise of either being eligible for a tax credit (group 1), N {, or ineligible 
for a tax credit (group 2), iV| > s is the subsidy rate. In equilibrium, at wage w, labour 
demand, N d, will equal labour supply:
N d(w(s)) = N ((w(s)( 1 +  s) + N}(w(s)) (1.1)
The effect of the subsidy on the gross wage is characterised by:
dinw = _________ Orjl_______________  ^
91n(l +  s) 0„! +  (1 _ e)i _ _ ! £ .
Where r)\ and 7)2 are the labour supply elasticities for the eligible and ineligible group, 
respectively, and r f  is the labour demand elasticity. The fraction of each group is repre­
sented by 6. See Appendix for the proof.
We can interpret this simple calculation, given that the expression lies between 0 and 1, 
as the fraction of the subsidy that shifts from worker to employer. The larger the supply
8 See Fullerton & Metcalf (2002) for a full review on tax incidence.
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elasticity of group 1, the more elastic the labour demand and/or the larger the fraction, 
then the bigger the shift. Only in special circumstances will the tax credit have no effect 
on the gross wage, for example, if labour demand elasticity is infinite or if labour supply 
was perfectly elastic.
The path breaking general equilibrium analysis of Harberger (1962) derives the burden 
of a tax on capital in one sector. Here, the procedure is adapted to show the general 
equilibrium effect of a tax credit on input compensation in a one sector model which 
uses two different types of labour (JVi, JV2) to produce one good (X). The heterogeneity 
of workers comes from the difference in being able to satisfy the eligibility criteria9. In 
the simple economy example, the incidence effect is the same for all workers, but here 
by differentiating workers, we can look to see how the effect differs for the eligible and 
ineligible groups.
P roposition  1.1 A change or an introduction of a tax credit under a general equilibrium 
setting, given that workers are not perfect substitutes, will result in a direct change in the 
gross wage of the eligible claimant group and an indirect effect on both groups.
Let it be the case that workers who are eligible for the tax credit, N \ , are paid the gross 
wage w\ and workers who are not eligible for the tax credit, N 2 , are paid the gross wage 
W2 - The subsidy rate is given by s and 9 is the fraction of eligible group. Another 
important feature here is the elasticity of substitution between the two groups, crx. The 
effect of the subsidy on the gross wage is given by:
dlnw i _  (1 6)ri1 ^  eligible claimant {group I ) (1.3)
d ln (l +  s) (1 -  6)r)\ +  9rf2 +  o x
d\n.W2 _  9r}1 ^  ineligible {group 2) (1.4)
d ln (l +  s) (1 -  9)7]\ -f 0r)% +  o x
The proof is given in the Appendix.
9We do not specify a particular functional form since by assuming the production function X  — 
FfJVijiNTa] we avoid the limitations of computational general equilibrium models. This can be any pro­
duction function with constant returns to scale. However, as noted by Fullerton & Metcalf (2002), using 
a log-linearisation method is only valid for small changes.
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This proposition suggests that when one accounts for heterogeneity amongst workers, 
based on the eligibility criteria, it causes the wage of claimant workers to be different 
from the ineligible workers and the subsidy affects the gross wage of both groups of 
workers. The strength of this impact will depend on: (1) The fraction of each group, 0 
and (2) the level of substitutability between the two groups, ox. The substitution effect is 
captured in the labour demand elasticity and the effect on the non-eligible group becomes 
smaller as the proportion of claimants falls10.
Since 6 is defined as the cost share, it is endogenous in terms of the population share. It 
is interesting to look at the cross-derivatives with respect to s and 0. This tells us what 
happens to wages when the share changes:
d2 In w\ V iivx  + ril)
d ln (l +  s)d9 ((1 -  0)r]l +  0J7J +  crx)2
d2 In W2 l i iv x + 'n i)
(1.5)
d ln (l +  s)d0 ((1 -  0)775 +  0*12 +  ax ) 2
(1.6)
The visibility of the tax credit may play an important role for the shift in incidence, 
such that the employer has some knowledge/information about which of her workers are 
eligible for the tax credit. The most simple and straightforward way in which this would 
be the case is when the tax credit is paid via the wage packet. Here the employer can 
see clearly if the worker is a claimant (and how much she is receiving). However, one 
can still maintain this assumption even in the event that the employer does not have full 
information. For example, if there exists some kind of "internal knowledge" of whether 
or not the employee is claiming tax credit (e.g. the employer may know if his employee 
has children), or it may be that there is statistical discrimination.
Finally, we may be interested to know how the results change when we consider a non­
competitive framework, for example a monopsony or a wage posting model. In his paper, 
Harberger (1962) addresses this issue when looking at the corporate sector. He adjusts 
his analysis to accommodate for potential monopoly power and concludes that the tax 
bites into monopoly profit as well as into the returns in capital (in the context of our 
model, this would be the wage). Overall, although it would be interesting to lay out a 
model and to see how in equilibrium the distributions of the two different types of labour
The simple economy case will be a special case here when w\ =  w% — w.
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and the relative prices of the labour will change, in the end the tax burden that is not 
directly borne by monopsony profits will be "determined by a mechanism that differs only 
in minute details from that which determines the incidence of the [corporation income 
tax] in the competitive case"11.
1.4 The Working Families’ Tax Credit
In the UK, since the 1980s, there has been a dramatic shift in the composition of the lowest 
decile of the income distribution from pensioners, to families of working age and lone 
parents in particular (Goodman (2001)). The Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC), 
introduced in October 1999, was designed to target low income families with an income 
supplement that was contingent on working. However, systems of support for families 
with dependent children in the UK have been around since 1971, when Family Income 
Support (FIS) was introduced. FIS entitled families with children and working more than 
24 hours per week, to an income supplement.
In 1988, FIS was renamed Family Credit (FC) with some structural reform and an increase 
in generosity. Namely, the hours requirement fell to 16 hours and a childcare disregard 
was introduced to encourage higher participation especially amongst mothers of young 
children. In October 1999, FC became WFTC and the government estimated twice as 
many families to be in receipt of WFTC as received by FC. Figure 1.1 shows how the 
number of claimants changed from 1988 to 200212. There were 1.1 million claims for 
WFTC in August 2000, which increased to 1.3 million claims in August 2001. This is 
almost 430,000 more than claimed under Family Credit in August 1999 .
Eligibility for WFTC was based on the family income being less then £92.90 per week, 
the presence of children, a minimum of 16 hours of work in the family per week and low 
household savings. Although not innovative, it was more generous and extended further 
up the income distribution. In particular, the marginal deduction rate fell from 70% to 
55% and there was a larger childcare subsidy. The maximum weekly rate of WFTC was 
made up of an adult credit for each child and a bonus if the claimant or their partner 
worked for 30 hours or more each week. An important aspect of the policy was that income 
from most other benefits, like housing benefit, child benefit and council tax benefit were 
not included in the calculation for the entitlement of WFTC. This, as argued in Blundell 
Sz Walker (2001), could potentially offset the work incentive effects of WFTC.
11 See Harberger (1962).
12 In April 2003, WFTC changed again to the Working Tax Credit.
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In terms of government spending on the program, by 2000 the government had spent 
£5 billion per year (which accounts for 1.5% of the government budget and 0.6% of the 
GDP). This was almost £2 billion more than that expected under FC. The huge increase 
in expenditure came from increased credit per child from £19.85 to £26; the threshold 
support increase from £80.65 to £92.90, and of course, the reduced taper. In addition, the 
childcare cost accounted for 70% of actual childcare cost (accounting for weekly childcare 
costs up to a maximum of £135 for one child and £200 for two or more children). The effect 
of these changes meant that those who were currently receiving the maximum payment 
would see a small increase in the level of their payment if they had children under the 
age of 11 years old. Those with net income between £80.65 and £92.90 would move from 
being on the taper to receiving full support. The others on the taper would see the taper 
rate fall from 70% to 55% and the largest cash gain would go to those who were previously 
just at the end of the taper. Figure 1.2 shows how the average claim changed over time. 
In addition, an encouraging sign of WFTC effectiveness was that its take-up rate by 2002 
was estimated to be 72-76% compared to 66-70% under FC. The take-up rate was highest 
for those entitled to the biggest awards. Also, the greater generosity of WFTC relative 
to FC meant that the take-up of WFTC was higher than would have been expected had 
FC simply continued unchanged.
As mentioned in the introduction, one key difference between FC and WFTC was that 
the payment was made through the wage packet. This was an attractive move because 
it became more convenient to distribute and it reduced the stigma attached to the tax 
credit for being a welfare benefit. In April 2000, the eligible claimant would claim the 
approximate tax credit from the Inland Revenue, who would work out the amount of 
tax credit payable. The Inland Revenue would then notify the relevant employer of the 
amount of tax credit to be paid and the employer would pay the tax credit out of the 
tax and National Insurance contribution that they would otherwise have forwarded to the 
Inland Revenue.
1.5 Empirical Framework
In this section we empirically test the theoretical hypothesis that a change in tax credit 
can lead to a shift in the incidence from worker to employer. In addition to a direct 
effect on claimants, we examine whether there exists an indirect (spillover) effect of the 
tax credit on the wage of both the claimant and similarly skilled ineligible (and/or non 
claimants), which becomes stronger when the fraction of claimant workers and/or the
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average tax credit amount increases within an industry (or within an education group)13. 
Finally, we use the empirical model to distinguish between the effect of the change in 
generosity of the WFTC and the change of its visibility on the wage. We propose both 
a parametric and non-parametric two stage censored regression model to estimate these 
effects. In addition, as a robustness check we extend the two stage analysis to identify 
those workers for who the NMW binds to see how WFTC affects their wages. Before 
explaining the methodology, let us begin by discussing the identification of some key 
variables.
We want to identify the effect of WFTC on the wages of "similar" people, where some 
are eligible for WFTC and some are not eligible. We define "similar" people as those 
who have the same predicted wage in the absence of WFTC. The idea is that we want to 
estimate the (log) wage, W*:
W* = /30 + fa W f + faW F TC i +  j3sFCGem + /34(W F TC  *0) + Ui (1.7)
Where W f is the counterfactual (log) wage we would have if there was no WFTC; W FTCi 
is the tax credit variable14 and FCGerii represents the change in the generosity of WFTC 
from Family Credit (FC). The spillover effect, (W F T C *9), is captured using the average 
WFTC in an industry (or education group), weighted by the fraction of claimants in that 
industry (education group) and u* is the error term. The main problems for identification 
are that we do not know the counterfactual wage and secondly, we may be concerned that 
U{ is correlated with W FTCi. Our task is therefore to construct some sort of predicted 
measure of the counterfactual wage, Wi, and to find an appropriate WFTC measure,
W FTCi. In other words, we want to ensure that: correl(wi,Ui) =  correl(WFTCi,Ui) =  
0. This section is devoted to explaining how this is done.
One of the key tasks is to construct a measure for WFTC. We identify the WFTC variable 
in two ways: (1) Using a simple indicator which identifies those who report claiming 
WFTC, we work out the probability of claiming WFTC and (2) using the eligibility 
criteria, we identify those who are eligible for WFTC and the amount for which they are 
entitled. In addition, this second measure enables us to distinguish between the change in 
generosity from Family Credit (FC) to WFTC and the change of visibility from payment 
as a welfare benefit to payment through the wage packet. We do this by calculating the
13 We use two measures of spillover: Industry and education groups. We discuss these later in this 
section.
14 The construction of this variable will be discussed in more detail later in this section.
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amount of FC a person would be eligible for, given that it was still in operation and 
then by taking the difference from the amount of WFTC, we work out the increase in 
generosity. However, since eligibility does not imply take-up, it is good to estimate using 
both methods.
The receipt of WFTC differs across households for four main reasons: (1) hourly wages, 
(2) hours worked, (3) household income and (4) presence of children. These four factors 
not only determine eligibility, but will also determine the amount received. The outcome 
variable under investigation is the hourly wage variable and so the variation in the latter 
three factors (hours worked, household income and presence of children) can be used to 
evaluate the change in hourly wage that is due to the change in tax credit policy. Typically, 
the literature on tax credits ignores the different sources of variation and the analysis is 
conducted by comparing people with children to those without (Eissa & Leibman (1996), 
Blundell et al (2005)). We use the variation from all three factors to conduct the analysis, 
but we are assuming that people do not alter their behaviour (significantly enough) in 
hours of work, for example, to make the criteria endogenous. We discuss this in more 
detail later in this section15.
By comparing eligible with non-eligible workers who have the same pre-WFTC wage, we 
do not have the standard treatment and control group because of the potential spillover 
effects discussed in Section 1.3. Instead, as it will become clear later in this section, we 
use a cross-sectional wage structure before WFTC (as the predicted wage variable) and 
then add in the wage growth and policy change to see what happens to the eligible and 
non-eligible with the same predicted wage. Essentially, we use a predicted wage measure 
which is some function of characteristics, a WFTC variable which is also some function 
of characteristics and then we identify the effect through a particular functional form. 
For example, suppose that two people have the same predicted wage before WFTC is 
introduced. They both have children and a low household income, but one person (or one 
household) works too few hours to be eligible for WFTC. Here we compare their relative 
before and after wage changes.
Typically the literature on tax credit analysis only focuses on women since, as noted in 
Eissa (1995), they axe usually the largest group of taxpayers eligible for WFTC and they 
are the group most relevant for studying whether WFTC reduces welfare dependency. 
However, for the purpose of our analysis, it seems reasonable to look at both women and 
men. The institutional structure of WFTC specifies that either parent can claim the tax 
credit in their wage packet. Given that in a coupled household it is more likely that the
15We are not concerned by presence of children since, at least in the short run, this will not be altered. 
In addition we use predicted weekly wages to work out household income (this will become clear in the 
next section).
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male member of the household will be in work, it is therefore more likely that he will be 
the tax credit claimant. It therefore not justified to drop men from our analysis.
1.5.1 T h e role o f  th e  N ation a l M inim um  W age:
In the same year as the WFTC was introduced, the UK had another important introduc­
tion: National Minimum Wage (NMW). For the first time, the government introduced a 
national minimum in April 1999 of £3.60 for adults (aged 22 years and above) and £3.00 
for those aged 18 - 21 years16. Since this policy was introduced only six months before 
the introduction of the WFTC, we may pose the question: Is this a nuisance or an aid 
for the following analysis?
We argue that the NMW plays a fundamental role in the evaluation method and is 
something that should not be ignored in any analysis on WFTC. In the following analysis 
it is used for both identification and as a censoring point. It offers an unusual source of 
variation because it is a floor below which the employer cannot cut the wage. Although 
it has the strongest effect on those at the lower end of the wage distribution, as WFTC 
does, the NMW will protect those with the lowest wages from a wage cut (i.e. the part 
of the wage distribution where the employer is set to gain the most in incidence). This 
has a very interesting implication that it is those in the middle of the wage distribution 
who lose the most, since those at the upper end of the wage distribution will either not 
be eligible to claim or will receive so little that either they don’t claim or it is not in the 
employer’s interest to cut their wage.
1.5.2 T h e "W FTC  (LFS)" Indicator:
The UK’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS), which is discussed in more detail in the 
next section, contains information on the types of family related benefits that are claimed. 
From Spring 2000, information on WFTC claim is reported17. This is a useful variable 
as it helps to identify reported claimants, however take-up of the tax credit is likely to be 
correlated with the amount of WFTC to be claimed and other individual, household and 
job characteristics. For this reason we use the probability of claiming WFTC instead of 
actual claim in a probit model, such that:
16 Although there were Wage councils abolished in 1993
17It is important to note that this is reported claim and not government reported actual claim.
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Pr(ClaimW  F TC  = 1\X, W FTCamount) = $(i9'Xi +  7 W FTCamounti) (1.8)
Where $(.) denotes the standard cumulative distribution function of the standard normal, 
Xi is a 1 xK  vector of conditioning variables18 and we use the predicted WFTC amount.
In addition, to make the analysis more rigorous and to account for the individual level of 
importance of WFTC (relative to household income), a "WFTC Rate" is calculated using 
the policy eligibility criteria. The nature of this variable allows us to distinguish between 
the two important changes with regard to the WFTC, namely the change in generosity 
and change in visibility.
1.5.3 C alculation  o f  th e  "W FTC  R ate" variable:
W F T C  R ate  The wage change analysis becomes complicated when measuring the 
amount of WFTC as WFTC is computed using household income rather than the indi­
vidual wage. One possible way of tackling this is to use the data to match earners in 
the household and then to estimate the amount of WFTC the household is entitled to 
claim using the eligibility criteria. This variable is then used in the regression framework. 
The (per week) WFTC has 3 main parts19: (1) A basic credit of £59.00 (one for each 
family), (2) A 30 hour tax credit bonus of £11.45 (where the worker works at least 30 
hours per week) and (3) A tax credit for each child in the eligible household of £26.00. 
In addition, the criteria also specified that the household should have low savings. The 
LFS does not report data on savings and so we cannot use it in constructing the WFTC 
variable. However, here this is not a big problem since only 3.6% of couples and 2.7% of 
lone parents reports having savings over £5,000 and for those on maximum awards, no 
one reports having savings over £5,0002°.
The payable WFTC is based on each component added together to make a maximum 
credit. If net household income (H H Inc ) is above £92.90 per week, the maximum WFTC 
is reduced. There will be a reduction of £0.55 for each pound over £92.90. If the net 
income is below £92.90, the maximum WFTC is payable.
In general, the "WFTC" variable is calculated as follows:
18The controls include: Age, Education, Region, Ethnicity, Experience (plus higher orders), Tenure 
(plus higher orders), Marital Status, Number of Children, Firm Size, Public Ownership, Occupation 
Type, Industry Type, Full-time Status.
19 Figures are given for April 2001.
20Working Families’ Tax Credit Statistics, Inland Revenue Quarterly Enquiry (2002).
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o Gross WFTC = £ 59.00(if hours=> 16) + £  11.45(if hours=>30) + £26.00 per child 
(given hours=> 16)
_ f (HHInc-£92.90(per week))*55% if HHinc=>£92.90o Reduced WFTC = < [ [
I 0 otherwise
o WFTC = Gross WFTC - Reduced WFTC
It is important to note that when we calculate household weekly income, we use the 
predicted wage (and not actual wage) of the earner in the sample21 using wage data from 
before 1999. The weekly wage of the earner in the sample is calculated by multiplying 
the predicted hourly wage with hours worked and then the total household weekly income 
will include the weekly wage of other members of the household. Since WFTC affects the 
wage through the household income, we cannot put actual weekly wages into calculating 
the WFTC  variable as it would be endogenous and this is why we use the predicted 
household income.
In addition to this, instead of using this WFTC  variable in the wage analysis that follows, 
we use the rate of WFTC (WFTCRate). Since wages are used to calculate the WFTC 
variable, they are endogenous when used as a regressor in any analysis where wage is 
the dependent variable. It is the case that WFTC  will increase as wages (or household 
income) decreases. The WFTC Rate, on the other hand, is a non-linear variable which 
weights household WFTC  by (predicted) weekly wages.
o WFTC Rate =
FC G enerosity  The change in tax credit criteria in 1999 meant that WFTC was more 
generous compared with FC for three main reason: (1) The threshold increased from 
£86.65 (per week), (2) Credit for each child increased from £19.85, (3) The taper fell from 
70%22. By constructing a counterfactual FC variable using this criteria when WFTC was 
in operation, we can calculate the change in generosity of the policy, such that:
o FC Generosity =
This will allow us to distinguish between the two effects on wages: change in generosity 
and change in visibility.
21 The earner referred to here is the female worker when we restrict the analysis to just women and 
likewise, it is the male workers when we restrict the analysis to men.
22In 1998-99 the last year of Family Credit, the basic rate was £52.30 and the 30 hour bonus was £11.05.
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1.5.4 Spillover Effect
The theory suggests that as the elasticity of substitution increases between eligible and 
ineligible workers and/or as the fraction of eligible increases, then there is a stronger 
spillover on to the wages of all "similar" workers. We measure spillover in two ways: (1) 
by industry and (2) by education group. When we use the WFTC claim variable, this 
is simply the fraction of claimants by industry (education group) and when using the 
WFTC rate variable this is the average rate in the industry (education group) weighted 
by the fraction of eligible in the industry (education group). Tables 1.1a and 1.1b shows 
these figures.
1.5.5 T w o-Stage Em pirical S trategy
The two components to the empirical strategy are as follows:
(1) The wage is estimated before the imposition of NMW (i.e. predicted wages are cal­
culated using data before 1999)
(2) The predictions from stage 1 are used to compare the before and after effect of WFTC 
from 2000 to 2003.
Finally, we extend the analysis to identify the workers with a binding NMW to see how 
the tax credit affects their wage outcomes.
1.5.5.1 Stage One: Predicted Wage
Using a linear regression method on the log wage before 1999, W®, we estimate the ex­
pected log wage. This is done by controlling for individual, family and job characteristics 
in the vector Xi, where X{ is a 1 xK  vector of conditioning variables23. The aim of this 
exercise is to predict the wage as closely as possible to the earned wage without the NMW 
and WFTC.
The expected wage, W{, is calculated such that:
23The controls include: Age, Education, Region, Ethnicity, Experience (plus higher orders), Tenure 
(plus higher orders), Marital Status, Number of Children, Firm Size, Public Ownership, Occupation 
Type, Industry Type, Full-time Status.
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E  (log wage\X)i = a'Xi = Wi (1.9)
Is th e re  a  P rob lem  of Sam ple Selection? The predicted wage variable is key to our 
analysis. We make the assumption that the relative rates of return, a, on the vector X  
remain the same in the post-WFTC period (2000-2003). This is not to say that the rates 
of return are unchanged throughout, but we are assuming that if there are changes in 
the rates of return, they will be the same for both eligible and non-eligible workers with 
the same predicted wage. This is a less restrictive assumption, however it relies on the 
supposition that an increase in labour supply does not change the composition of each 
group. If, for example, a change in tax credit increases participation by drawing in people 
from unemployment or inactivity, one may argue that the returns to skill for the eligible 
group fall relative to the non-eligible and so, in effect the average "predicted" wage falls. 
Although it is difficult to solve this problem of sample selection, we argue in this section 
that the analysis is free from these selection issues.
Firstly, we use a dataset24 with an extremely detailed education variable (which proxies 
for skill) and so we do not have the issue of selection on observables. It can be seen from 
the descriptive statistics in Table 1.1c that the proportion of eligible with no education 
does not increase for the eligible group relative to the ineligible after 1999. Secondly, the 
introduction of the NMW imposes a lower bound below which the employer cannot cut 
the gross wage. In essence, this means that a huge influx of lower skilled workers will not 
impact the wage as severely as it would have done without a minimum wage. Finally, in 
the particular case of WFTC, there is evidence to suggest that participation only increased 
for lone mothers. Recent work by Blundell et al (2005) finds that although there was a 
3% increase in participation for lone parents (where the sample of lone fathers is very 
small), there was no effect on married mothers and a -0.5% effect on married fathers. In 
effect, this suggests that the increase in participation is only an issue for a sub-sample of 
eligible workers. In the analysis that follows, we look separately at men and women and 
for each, the effect on the sub-samples of married and single parents.
1.5.5 .2 Stage Two: E stim ating  th e  W age C hange
Let us consider the situation in which we have two groups of people: (1) Those eligible 
for (and/or claiming) WFTC and (2) those not eligible (and/or not claiming). The model
24 The Quarterly Labour Force Survey.
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predicts that the employer can gain by cutting the gross wage of the eligible (claimant). 
In addition, the model in Section 1.3 predicts that as the elasticity of substitution between 
eligible and ineligible workers increases, the aggregate effect on the wages of all people in 
the same skill group will become stronger.
In the absence of the NMW, we would therefore want to estimate the following wage 
equation(s):
(1 )W? = 80 +  <5i Wi +  S2 Pr (C laimW FTC)i +  S30ind +  S40edu +  £i
(2)W* =  70 +  7 iWi +  72W FTCratei +  73FCGeni +  i 4(W  FTCrateind * 0ind)
+ j5(W FTCrateedu * 0edu) +  t/4
Where w captures the predicted wage before the policy changes of 1999 are introduced 
and equation (1) and (2) use the different measures of WFTC, Pr(C7aim W FTC )i and 
W FTC ratei, respectively. In equation (2) we also include a measure of the change in gen­
erosity from FC to WFTC, FCGen. The spillover, 0md and 0edu, measures the fraction of 
claimants (eligible) in each industry and education group, respectively. When using the 
WFTC rate variable, we use these fractions to weight the average WFTC rate in each in­
dustry, W FTCratetnd, and average WFTC rate in each education group, W F TC rateedu, 
respectively.
For simplicity, we will use a general expression in the rest of this section:
W* =  0 o +  0 1W i + 02TCi + P3(TCin i*6ini) + 0 i (TCedu*eedu) + u i (1.10) 
st.TC  = {Pr(C laim W FTC )i,(W FTC ratei,FC G eni)}
Where TC  is the tax credit variable, which represents two different measures: Pr (Claim  
W FTC) and W FTCrate  (including the change in generosity variable, FCGeni and where 
(TC  * 0) is a measure of the "Spillover" effect. This is estimated by taking the average
WFTC, TC, in each industry (education group) and then weighting it by the fraction of 
WFTC eligible workers, 0, in that industry (education group)25.
25 When using the WFTC (LFS) we only use the fraction of claimants in each industry and education 
group, respectively.
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However, the imposition of the NMW in April 1999 distorts the actual wage from the 
predicted wage for those who the NMW binds. Figure 1.3 represents this distortion. 
It highlights that for those with a binding NMW, there exists a "Gap" between actual 
and predicted wage. For those who are unaffected by the NMW (i.e. those who were 
previously earning above the national minimum), no "Gap” exists between the actual 
wage and the predicted wages. This imposition has two main roles. Firstly, it acts as a 
point of censor and secondly, it can be used as an identification restriction.
This imposition implies that we have a censored regression model where the censoring 
point in 1999 is £3.60, the NMW26. At this point we have a positive probability mass at 
the NMW. Essentially:
TTr f  ^ min 1^  Wi — ^mm /1 1 \
Wi = \ 1ir*  .........  C1-11)W* if W* > WT
In essence if W* denotes the actual (log) wage where E(\ogwage\X)i = aX i =  w, we 
only observe W* when W* > wm\n and so we can define observed (log) wages, Wi , as:
Wi = max(wmin, W*) (1.12)
In the context of our model this implies:
Wi =  max(wmin, P0 + fi^Wi +  (32TCi +  ^ 3(TC * 6) +  n )  (1.13)
Figure 1.4 gives a clear representation of the type of effects we would expect.
S tan d ard  C ensored Tobit M odel A model that is directly relevant here is the Tobit 
model (Tobin, 1956). We can re-write the above as :
26The NMW changes between 1999 and 2003 and we adjust the censoring point accordingly.
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Wi -  Wmin =  max(0, (ft, +  PiWi +  /32TCi +  /33{TC * 0) +  Ui) -  wmin) (1.14)
To estimate (3 we assume W* given the covaxiates has a homoskedastic normal distribution 
(i.e. u\x ~  Normal(0,cr2)). Since the model is in log transformation, the assumption 
is more plausible but is still quite strong. We compare these Tobit estimates with a 
non-parametric alternative in the following section. The advantages of a non-parametric 
estimator, according to Berg (1998), are that it is robust to non-normality of the error 
terms and it is robust to heteroskedasticity (which is common in most cross-sectional 
datasets).
C ensored Least A bsolute D eviation: Powell’s E stim ato r An alternative way to 
estimate the model, without imposing a structure on the distribution of u is to use Powell’s 
(1984) censored least absolute deviation (LAD) estimator. Powell’s estimator is restricted
to a linear functional form and he shows that the median function qsoifliWi, TC *, (T C *6))
is equal to the function max(u;min,ft) +  fi\Wi +  P2TCi +  P3(TC  * 0) +  u*), such that:
qBO(Wi\wi,T C i,( fc * 0 ) )
= max(tymin, qsoiPo + P im  +  fi2TCi +  P3{TC * 6) +  Ui\wi, TCi, {TC * 0))
= max(u7min, ft, +  +  fi2TCi +  P3(TC * 0)) (1.15)
Where q$o denotes the median of the distribution conditional on covariates and the median 
distribution of Ui is assumed to be zero. The censored LAD objective is to consistently 
estimate (3 by the parameter vector that minimises:
N
y .^_A\Wj -  max(wmin,P0 +  PiWi +  P2TCi +  P3{TC*0)) \  (1.16)
The consistency of this estimator does not require knowledge of the distribution of the u , 
nor is it assumed that the distribution is homoskedastic, only that it has median 027.
27As pointed out by Deaton (1997), a useful property of quantiles is that they are preserved under 
monotone transformations. Here, since we have a set of positive observations, and we take the logarithms,
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Identification w ith  th e  N M W  The NMW offers an interesting variation which allows 
us to test the hypothesis that if the employer is restrained by an exogenous barrier to cut 
the gross wage, she cannot cut the wage below the predicted wage. In the event that a 
NMW binds, the implication is that for those who have a predicted wage below the NMW, 
there no negative tax credit effect. Given that we have some workers with a predicted 
wage above the NMW and some with a predicted wage below the NMW, we test this by 
identifying each group to see how WFTC affected each separately in an extended Tobit 
model.
Since we want to estimate:
W* = (3o +  +  faTCi +  fo(TC *0) + Ui (1.17)
Where we assume that the error is normally distributed (i.e. u\x ~  Normal(0,cr2)) and, 
as before, a censored model. The introduction of the NMW in April 1999 imposed the 
restriction on observed wages to be:
Wi = max(wmin, W?) =  wmin 4- max(0, W* -  wmin) (1.18)
The average wage, given the tax credit and predicted wage, is given by:
■ E[Wi\wu TCi}
= Wmin +  -E[max(0, W* -  wmin)\wi, TCJ =  0. P r(W* < wmin)
+  (1 -  Pr (Wi < Wm\n)E[W* -  Wmin | W^ * > Wmin, Wi, TCi]
= (1 -  P r{W* < wmin)[—wmin +  E[W*\W* > wmia,W i,TCi]] (1.19)
Since we assume a standard normal, this can be re-written as:
the median of the logarithm of the median of the untransformed data.
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E[Wi\wi,TCi]
=  * (f o +0lWi * g) -  + e [w *\w * > Wmin, wu p a t
To work out the final term, we use the truncated normal distribution 28. Therefore, if 
u\x ~  Normal(0, cr2), then:
E[ui\wi, TCi, Ui > tnmin Pq Pi W{ P2TCi P3(TC * 0)]
^min fig PiTCj 0a(TC*Q) ^
(1.21)
 ^ ^^ wmin~Pn~Pl wi 2 ^3(TC*6) ^
Substituting this into the wage equation, W%, we get29:
w* =  ™min- P r{W* <  Wmin) +  (1 -  Pr(W 7 <  Wmin))(/?o +  P \w i +  @2T C i +  P s{T C  * 0)
^ P(\~0 \wi~PiTCj— P^{TC*9) ^
) (1-22)
 ^ wmin 0Q &lwi (32TCt 03(TC*6) ^
And so the equation that we estimate is:
Wi = P0 + P1wi + p2TCi -^P3(T C * e)
+ Pr(Wt* < wmin)(wmin- p 1wi - p 2TCi - p 3(T C *e))
 ^ ^ ^ m in  ~  Pp ~  P \w i ~  ~  P z f i 'C  *   ^ ^  2 3 )
28We suppose that 2 ~  Normal(0,1), then for any constant c, f?(z|z >  c) =  ■ v and 0(.) is the
* \W
standard normal denisty of 2 given 2 > c is 4>(z)/[l — <3?(c)], 2 > c, and then intergrating z(f>{z) from c to 
00.
29-ixru r> /ti/-*  ^ \ 1 *<t 00 4“ P^TCi *t" /^(TC * 6) — Wmin x AWhere Pr(VVj <  wm\n) =  1 — $ ( —------    —--------- ----------- ). We use the general nota-<7
tion for simplicity.
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Essentially this equation uses the data on everyone to estimate the equation in Section 
1.5.3. In addition, by using the probability of the predicted wage being below the mini­
mum wage, we can use this equation to see how the tax credit will affect those for who 
the NMW binds. Basically this is a robustness check on our estimates as we make the 
assumption that the NMW acts as a exogenous barrier and so we would expect that the 
tax credit will have no effect or less of an effect.
1.5 .6  Standard Error C orrection  o f  th e  P red icted  R egressor
It is not immediately clear how to deal with the standard errors since we use cross-sectional 
data, Wi is constructed using data from a different dataset (i.e. different period to that of 
the Second Stage). It is not automatically clear how to correct the standard errors since 
the Wi is neither a straightforward generated regressor, nor a regressor generated from a 
"Split Sample" as described by Angrist and Krueger (1994).
After much deliberation, we find that the simplest way to ensure the robustness of the 
standard errors is to conduct what we call a Two Stage Bootstrap: The resampling 
method of bootstrapping is applied first to the data which generates Wi and then to the 
final regression(s) in Stage 2.
1.6 D ata & Results
The empirical investigation is done using the UK’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
The LFS is a repeated cross-section quarterly survey and it has information on individuals, 
households and families. This includes, information on employment, earnings and a vari­
ety of control variables needed to estimate the (log) wage equation in the first stage. The 
constructed data set uses data from 15 quarterly LFSs: from 1997 quarter 4 (December- 
Febuary) to 2003 quarter 1 (March-May), inclusive30. The sample includes people who 
are aged between 21 and 60 years old31. People in full-time education, sick/disabled or 
on a government training programme are removed from the sample. In addition, obser­
vations of gross wages below £2 and above £60 are excluded. The resulting sample size, 
after pooling all 15 quarters, is 366,317.
30 Although data is available beyond this period, WFTC is replaced in April 2003 by the Working Tax 
Credit.
31 We use data on people over 21 to avoid the problem of having two different minimum wages.
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The LFS does contain information on benefit receipt32 but it does not indicate how much 
WFTC the reported claimant receives. In addition to using the dummy variable that 
indicates receipt in the analysis that follows, data on household income, hours worked, 
presence of children (i.e. the eligibility criteria) is used to ’'roughly1' estimate the amount 
of benefit received (or, at least, how much she is eligible for).
Tables 1.1c presents the descriptive statistics for eligible and for those who are not eligible, 
before and after 1999. However, it is important to note that these are unmatched and only 
give the group averages. There are a similar proportion of white workers in the sample 
(around 93-96%) and the number working in the public sector is roughly 27% for both 
groups. The non-eligible and eligible tend to have the same mean age of 35-38 years and 
the tenure is fairly similar at around 33 months for the ineligible and 26 months for the 
eligible. Also, the proportion each group being married is around 60%. There axe some 
noticeable differences between the two groups. In particular, the mean hourly wage for 
the eligible group is £6.00 and for the non-eligible group it is £8.24 and the proportion 
with no qualifications in the non-eligible group is 12% versus 18% in the eligible group. 
The number of hours worked is around 36 hours in the non-eligible group compared with 
28 hours in the eligible group and (as expected) the eligible have a higher probability of 
children.
The summary statistics indicate that the eligible group are not identical to the ineligible. 
This is not a surprise and although we are not solely comparing people with children to 
those without (as identification comes from various sources of the eligibility criteria), one 
would expect differences in characteristics. However, for the purpose of this analysis, the 
most important thing is that the composition of the groups do not change. It can be 
seen from Table 1.1c that there is almost no change in the summary statistics for the 
eligible and ineligible before and after 1999 (the year that both the NMW and WFTC 
where introduced). As described in the empirical framework, workers are matched on 
their predicted wages before 1999 and then the change in gross wage is assessed after the 
introduction of WFTC. As a means of checking that the WFTC variables are represen­
tative, Figure 1.5 uses the WFTC indicator variable to show that as the predicted wage 
increases, the fraction of claimants fall. In the same way, Figures 1.6 and 1.7 show that as 
the amount of WFTC (rate) falls and as the fraction of eligible people falls, the predicted 
wage increases, respectively.
Another pressing issue is that when using the "WFTC Rate" variable, not all assumed 
eligible are actual claimants. To ensure that this sample of eligible workers is represen­
tative of the actual group of claimants, Figure 1.8 and Figure 1.9 compare the fraction
32This includes: Family Credit (pre-October 1999), WFTC, Maternity Allowance and Guardian Al­
lowance.
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of recipient families by gross weekly earnings with that of those in the sample. It can be 
seen that the patterns are fairly similar and so it is probable that the wage distribution 
is well represented.
1.6.1 R esu lts
In this section we present the OLS, Tobit and Censored LAD results on log wages for 
men and women, respectively. In addition, we look separately at the results for single 
men, married men, single women and married women. The regression results in Tables 
1.2a and 1.2b estimate the equations in Section 1.5.3 using the probability of claiming 
WFTC, Pr (Claim W F T C ), and the WFTC Rate variable, W F TC rate , respectively. We 
end this section by presenting the results in Tables 3a and 3b for when the NMW is used 
for identification. This is essentially used as a robustness check for the previous results.
1.6.1.1 Men
The regressions are first performed for men, with the output displayed in Table 1.2a. 
This table and Table 1.2b, report the marginal effects of WFTC and the spillover effect 
on the actual (log) wage, W /, between 2000 and 2003. There are three striking results to 
come out of the analysis on men. The first interesting result is that a WFTC claimant has 
approximately a 20% fall in his gross wage relative to a similarly skilled non-claimant (non 
eligible) who has the same predicted wage. From Panel B, when we use the WFTC Rate, 
the results are confirmed. Here the results tell us that as the rate of WFTC increases 
for the eligible worker, the gross wage falls 24% relative to a similarly skilled non eligible 
worker. When we evaluate this at the average weekly wage and average weekly WFTC, 
this implies that there is a 35% shift in incidence from the eligible worker to the employer. 
The results become weaker when we look at lone fathers but since the number of lone 
fathers, claiming WFTC is very small (Blundell et al, 2005), we would expect this effect.
The second salient result is that there is a strong and negative spillover effect when we 
look by industry and by education group. When using the WFTC rate variable in Panel 
B, which has the advantage of telling us the amount the worker is eligible for, this result 
is essentially telling us is that as the fraction of men eligible for WFTC increases in an 
industry (in an education group), there is a wage fall for all similar workers by about 6% 
(15%). This is approximately -0.2% (-0.1%) when evaluated at the average WFTC rate, 
which is weighted by the fraction of total eligible.
Finally, in Panel B where we include a measure which controls for the change in the tax
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credit generosity from Family Credit to WFTC, there does not seem to be any significant 
effect. In essence, this implies that the effect on the gross wages is a result of the change 
in payment method (i.e. the payment through the wage packet).
1.6.1.2 Women
As noted earlier, it is traditional to focus on women when looking at the participation 
effects of tax credits. However, when looking at the wage impact the reasoning for this 
is less obvious since men are at least, if not more, likely to claim the tax credit in their 
wage packet. In particular in a coupled household, it is more likely that it is the male 
household member who will be in the labour force and so he is more likely to be the 
claimant. The results in Table 1.2b offer interesting insights and confirm this hypothesis. 
When using the probability of claiming WFTC variable in Panel A, the results indicate 
that the direct effect of WFTC is negative only for lone mothers and a positive effect 
on married women33. However, these results are not very stable and when we replace 
the claim variable with the WFTC rate variable in Panel B, the effect on both groups is 
insignificant. It is not entirely obvious why the downward direct effect should be stronger 
for men than women. One explanation may be that women have a lower average wage than 
men and they work, on average, fewer hours and so the potential incidence from WFTC 
are smaller. Alternatively, it may be that women are more likely to be "protected” from 
a wage (growth) cut because of the NMW barrier.
The result that is fascinating for women is the strong and negative spillover effect, by 
industry and education groups. This is the case when all women are grouped together, 
as with men. The result is essentially telling us that as the fraction of claimant women 
increases in the work place, there is a bigger wage fall for everyone in the same skill group 
(i.e. those with the same predicted wage). This is coherent with the theory laid out in 
Section 1.3 where the proposition implies that, given the elasticity of substitution, the 
shift in the burden of the tax incidence increases with the fraction of eligible (claimants). 
When comparing the results from the three different estimation techniques, the story 
remains coherent but the order of magnitude of the coefficients fall when we use the 
Censored LAD. The results from the WFTC Rate variable in Panel B confirm this and 
imply that as the fraction of women eligible for WFTC increases in an industry (in an 
education group), there is a wage fall for all similar workers by about 9% (4%). This 
is approximately -0.3% (-0.7%) when evaluated at the average WFTC rate, which is 
weighted by the fraction of total eligible.
33When using the Censored LAD measure.
CHAPTER 1. The Incidence of an Earned Income Tax Credit 46
1.6.1.3 NM W  Identification
Tables 3a and 3b run an OLS regression using the probability of claiming WFTC variable 
and WFTC rate variable, respectively. By using the NMW for identification purposes, 
we are essentially running a robustness check to ensure that the eligible workers with a 
predicted wage below the minimum wage are "protected" from any wage cut resulting from 
the introduction of the NMW. We identify whether a worker has a positive probability 
of having a predicted wage below the NMW and interact it with the WFTC variable. 
In addition, we control for the potential selectivity bias associated with this probability 
(using the truncated normal distribution). Although the results in Table 1.3b, which uses 
the WFTC rate variable are insignificant, in Table 1.3a it is clear that the WFTC claim 
does not affect the workers for who the NMW binds in the same way as those for who the 
NMW doesn’t bind. Moreover, the results seem to indicate that there is a wage increase 
for claimant workers (above their predicted wage).
1.7 Extensions
In this section, we try to broaden the analysis to investigate some interesting questions. 
First, does the size of the firm have any impact on the share in incidence between workers 
and firms? Second, is the WFTC variable endogenous?
1.7.1 F irm  Size
There is a large literature relating the size of the firm to wages. Brown & Medoff (1989) 
conclude that one of the main reasons why wages are higher in larger firms is that they 
hire higher quality workers. So far we have assumed a competitive model and so we would 
expect that the hourly wages would be the same in all firms, otherwise we would need 
a model with rents. We try to investigate this proposition by applying the methodology 
from Section 1.5 to compare (1) Small sized firms (employing 1-19 workers), (2) Medium 
sized firms (20-49 workers) and (3) Large sized firms (more than 50 workers).
Tables 1.4a and 1.4b report the OLS, Tobit and Censored LAD estimates for each firm size 
category using the probability of claiming WFTC, Pr (Claim W F TC ), and the WFTC 
Rate variable, W FTCrate, respectively for men and women. The main consistent result 
coming from this analysis is that as the size of the firm increases, the degree of "spillover" 
by industry also increases. This seems quite reasonable given that larger firms have more
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uniformity in wage contracts across workers as there are more people doing identical jobs 
and receiving the same hourly wage rate. It would be harder for the employer to only 
cut the gross wage of those claiming WFTC and to leave the wage of the non-claimants 
unchanged. Instead, the higher industry spillover effect reflects that the burden of the 
tax credit is shared across all workers and that as the fraction of claimants increases, 
the size of the cut also increases. The "direct" effect results and the "spillover" effect 
by education group are, however, inconclusive. We may have expected that the direct 
effect would be stronger in smaller firms, where contracts are more individualistic and so 
it becomes "easier" for the employers to discriminate compared to large firms in which 
there are many workers with the same characteristics and differentiated only by eligibility.
1.7.2 E ndogeneity  o f  th e  W F T C  Variable
The estimation technique used to derive the WFTC rate variable uses the eligibility 
criteria to estimate the amount of WFTC a worker is eligible for, given his predicted 
wages. In the analysis we compare the results from using this variable to the WFTC 
claim variable obtained from the LFS. This LFS indicator variable is the number of 
reported claimants. Since not all (predicted) eligible people are actual claimants, we 
have two main concerns:(l) Sample selection in the "take up"/claim of WFTC and (2) 
Problems with "switchers" and new entrants to WFTC which may distort the sample. 
Neither of these issues would be a problem if the WFTC dummy variable was exogenous. 
In this section, we first discuss these two issues and then try to test the endogeneity of 
the WFTC dummy variable using the Smith-Blundell (1986) procedure.
1.7.2.1 Sample Selection in the Take-up Rate
A well known phenomena in any analysis on tax credits is that the take-up rate is not 
100% and there is often selectivity associated with who claims. In Brewer (2003) a full 
literature review is given on the work done to explain non-take up. The main explanations 
given for why eligible people do not claim their tax credit are that there are distortions in 
the budget constraint; stigma costs associated with receipt and/or costs of time to proceed 
with the claim (relative to the gain). Although we know that the WFTC recipients will 
be a select group in general, the two-stage method used in this chapter should control 
for this by comparing people with the same pre-WFTC wage. However, we may still be 
concerned by the sample selection associated with which of the eligible workers actually 
claim. Assuming that the calculated number of eligible, using the method in Section 1.5.3, 
are the correct number of eligible and that those who report claiming WFTC in the LFS
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do actually claim WFTC, we could try to set up a sample selection model to correct for 
it. However, in order to do this we need some sort of instrument which would determine 
take-up but not be in the wage equation and it is not entirely obvious what instrument 
should be used.
1.7.2.2 Entrants, Switchers Sz Other Compositional Changes
Throughout the chapter we assume that the composition of claimants and non-eligible 
(and/or non-claimant) remain the same. This is not to say that we assume that the labour 
supply remained unaltered, given that one of the main aims of the policy is to encour­
age participation. Instead we were assuming that the average observed and unobserved 
characteristics in each sub-group remains the same.
However, the entry of previously unemployed or inactive workers may threaten the com­
positions and/or change in behaviour (modification of characteristics) of a previously 
ineligible worker to become eligible. For example, the variation for eligibility comes from 
the presence of children, a low household income and a minimum working hours require­
ment of 16 hours. Although in the short-run it may be difficult for a worker to adjust 
the former two factors to become eligible, she can (possibly) alter the household hours of 
work to maximise a gain from WFTC or moreover, to even secure eligibility.
According to Battistin and Rettore (2003) if there is an entry effect, stronger conditions for 
identification are needed. One way to test to see if entry/switching alter the compositions 
would be by using a panel dataset, such as the Five Quarter (LFS) Longitudinal Dataset. 
Using a panel data set framework, we can estimate the wage growth of workers, controlling 
for the factors that determine eligibility as well as all the other controls used in the 
analysis. We expect that the wage growth will be low for those receiving WFTC but who 
were not previously. However, there is one main problem here: we only have quarter 4 
1998 to quarter 4 1999 which would give us data before the introduction of the NMW and 
WFTC and data afterwards and so the sample size is too small to give us any credible 
results.
1.7.2.3 Endogeneity Test for the W FTC  Variable: Smith-Blundell Procedure
Given that it is not entirely obvious how we can "solve" the two problems mentioned 
above, we instead test to see if the WFTC variable is endogenous. If the WFTC variable 
is not endogenous, the two problems would not be an issue.
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If it is the case that the LFS WFTC claim variable, W F T C 1 , is endogenous in the 
censored regression model, such that:
Wi =  max(wmin,/30 +  0 lW, + p2WFTC( + 03(WFTC * e )  + m) (1.24) 
Where WFTC- = ao +  cc\Wi +  OL2 HHInci 4- c*3Hoursi + a^Childreui 4- Vi
In the W F TC ( equation we know that the latter three explanatory variables are part 
of the eligibility criteria and since both household income, H H Inc , and hours worked, 
Hours, are potentially endogenous, for identification we assume that the presence of 
children, Children, is exogenous. For identification we need the rank condition <24 ^  0.
In this section we use a two-step procedure proposed by Smith and Blundell (1986) that 
will deliver a simple test for the endogeneity of the WFTC variable. Under bivariate 
nomality of (u , v) we can write:
Ui =  4>Vi +  e* (1-25)
Where <p =  t]/t2, t] = C ov(u ,v),r2 = Var(v), and e is independent of v with zero mean 
normal distribution and variance, say r 2. Further, because (u,v) are independent of Wi,e 
is independent of (Wi,v). Thus plugging this into the Tobit gives:
Wi = max(wm\n, P0 4- 0 xWi 4- /?2Wr-FTC'/ -f 0z(W F TC  * 6) 4- <f>Vi 4- e*) (1.26)
where e|Wi,v ~  Normal(0, r 2). It follows that, if we knew v we could estimate all coeffi­
cients by standard censored Tobit. Since we don’t, we follow the Smith-Blundell procedure 
such that: (a) Estimate the reduced form of TC  by OLS; this step gives a .  Define the 
reduced-form OLS residual as Vi =  WFTC- — ao — a\Wi — a 2 HHInci — a$HourSi — 
a^Childreni. (b) Estimate a standard Tobit of Wi on Wi, W F T C  I  and Vi.
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Table 1.5 shows that since is insignificant, there is little evidence to suggest that the 
WFTC variable is endogenous in the equation34.
1.8 Discussion &; Policy Implications
The main aim of this chapter was to analyse the impact of a tax credit on wages in a 
general equilibrium framework. By using this set-up, we could encapsulate the effect on 
the economy as a whole and not solely on the claimant. Moreover, we accounted for 
how changes in the design of the policy altered modelling assumptions. For example, 
the WFTC was not only more generous than Family Credit (its predecessor), but it was 
paid through the wage packet and this in turn altered the amount of information to the 
employer.
The results presented in Section 1.6 imply that there was a significant shift in the burden 
of tax credits, in line with the theory presented. This is of critical policy importance 
as we can no longer assume that it is the case that the person eligible for such a tax 
credit is the sole beneficiary. When calculating the share of incidence using the weekly 
wage and average weekly WFTC amount, we find that for men almost 35% incidence is 
shifted to the employer. In terms of spillover effect onto the wage of both eligible and 
similarly skilled ineligible, as the amount of WFTC (weighted by the fraction of eligible) 
rises in an industry and/or education group, there is a -0.2% fall in the wage (given the 
predicted wage) by industry and -0.1% fall by education group for men. For women, 
the spillover effect is -0.3% by industry and -0.7% by education group. Moreover, the 
increase in generosity does not explain the shift in incidence, indicating that the change 
in payment method played an important role. Finally, it is not clear why there is no 
significant direct effect on women. One possible explanation may be that women have a 
lower average wage than men and they work, on average, fewer hours and so the potential 
incidence from WFTC are smaller. Alternatively, it may be that women are more likely 
to be "protected" from a wage (growth) cut because of the NMW barrier.
These results are important in their own right since they highlight the consequences of 
the expansion, application and generosity of tax credits. However, in the case of the UK, 
they are important with respect to the new changes in tax credit policy. In April 2003 the 
government’s new tax credit (Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit) was introduced. 
Essentially, the new system divides the old WFTC into these two parts. Child tax Credit 
is paid to low income families with children, regardless of whether the parents are in
34Under 0 =  0,e =  u, normality of v plays no role: as a test for endogeneity of W F TC 1, the Smith- 
Blundell approach is valid without any distributional assumptions on the reduced form of W F T C 1.
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work. The Working Tax Credit, on the other hand, works in a similar way to WFTC (i.e. 
contingent on working a minimum of 16 hours and earning below a certain threshold) but 
unlike WFTC, the Working Tax Credit is not just restricted to those with children. The 
idea is to make work pay for non-parents as well as parents. For the purpose of future 
research, investigating these changes would be interesting.
In addition, it may be interesting to look closer at the institutional role with regard to 
extracting tax credit incidence. In the case of minimum wages, it has been discussed that 
they act as a barrier such that they reduce the power of the employer to cut the gross 
wage. Perhaps looking at the public versus private sector and/or unionised versus non­
unionised firms can help to shed some more light on whether institutions either prevent 
or encourage the employer to extract the tax credit incidence.
1.9 Conclusion
The increased use of tax credits as a method of "in work benefits" has raised a great 
deal of popular interest in the UK and in many other countries where they have been 
initiated. The move to integrate the social security system within the tax system was 
favoured as a means to reward people who axe in work and to "make work pay"35. This 
chapter focuses on looking at the indirect consequences of such a policy by focusing on 
the effect on gross equilibrium wages in the UK following the introduction of the Working 
Families’ Tax Credit in October 1999. There is evidence to suggest that the employer 
does share in the incidence of the tax credit by cutting the wage of claimant workers 
relative to non-claimants and through a spillover effect on all (similarly skilled) workers.
1.10 Bibliography
35 Statement made by Chancellor Gordon Brown, 1998.
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1.11 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1a: Claimants/Eligibility by Industry
No. of 
Eligible
Average 
WFTC Rate
No. of 
Claimants
Agriculture & Fishing 174 0.37 66
1.1% 0 .8%
Energy & Water 57 0.2 58
0.3% 0.7%
Manufacturing 1585 0.28 1052
9.6% 12.8%
Construction 507 0.28 254
3.1% 3.1%
Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants 5369 0.64 2274
32.7% 27.7%
Transport & Communication 776 0.33 519
4.7% 6.3%
Banking, Finance, Insurance 1576 0.37 871
9.6% 10.6%
Public Admin, Education & Health 5331 0.44 2675
32.4% 32.5%
Other Services 1068 0.61 455
6.5% 5.5%
Table 1.1b: Claimants/Eligible by Education Group
No. of 
Eligible
Average
WFTC
Rate
No. of 
Claimants
High 572 0.01 405
3.4% 4.9%
Medium 5181 0.13 2893
31.6% 35.3%
Low 7818 0.23 3603
47.7% 43.9%
No Qualifications 2828 0.11 1291
17.2% 15.8%
Notes.
1. These figures show the averages by combining men and women. In the analysis we use the averages for 
each group separately
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Table 1.1c: Descriptive Statistics
Ineligible Eligible
Before
1999
After
1999
Before
1999
After
1999
Age 38.67 39.32 35.34 34.53
[11.91] [11.83] [8.94] [9.18]
White 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.92
[0.18] [0.19] [0.25] [0.27]
No Qualifications 0.12 0.10 0.18 0.17
[0.32] [0.30] [0.38] [0.37]
Public Sector 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.25
[0.44] [0.45] [0.44] [0.43]
Married 0.62 0.61 0.65 0.54
[0.48] [0.48] [0.47] [0.49]
Hours of Work 36.82 36.78 28.05 25.23
[13.58] [13.73] [14.44] [12.97]
Hourly Wage 8.24 8.88 6.68 6.01
[5.21] [5.55] [4.58] [3.58]
Tenure 33.69 33.31 25.71 27.62
[29.04] [27.88] [25.78] [25.69]
Experience 92.62 95.64 78.48 55.89
[98.02] [100.25] [85.15] [58.31]
% in Small Firms 25% 24% 36% 40%
% in Medium
Firms 17% 17% 19% 21%
% in Large Firms 56% 56% 44% 38%
Observations 79288 234693 9111 21973
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Table 1.2a: Stage Two Regression Results 
(Men)
A - WFTC (LFS)
ALL SINGLE MARRIED
OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS Tobit C-LAD
Predicted wage 0.976 0.98 0.973 0.927 0.933 0.922 1.012 1.015 1.007
[0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.004]** [0.005]** [0.006]**
Pr(Claim WFTC) -0.157 -0.186 -0.203 -0.072 -0.079 -0.138 -0.129 -0.172 -0.177
[0.020]** [0.022]** [0.029]** [0.039] [0.039]* [0.046]** [0.030]** [0.031]** [0.036]**
Spillover (Education) -0.055 -0.051 -0.058 0.087 0.093 0.098 -0.125 -0.122 -0.144
[0.009]** [0.010]** [0.011]** [0.017]** [0.015]** [0.018]** [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.014]**
Spillover (Industry) -0.056 -0.058 -0.051 -0.138 -0.14 -0.125 -0.023 -0.026 -0.029
[0.011]** [0.010]** [0.012]** [0.015]** [0.019]** [0.020]** [0.013] [0.013]* [0.015]*
Constant 0.046 0.018 0.023 0.13 0.352 0.123 -0.053 0.365 -0.04
[0.015]** ro.0121 T0.0131+ [0.022]** ro.0021** ro.0201** ro.oisi** [0.0011** [0.0171*
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 89992 89992 89740 30261 30261 30158 59731 59731 59671
B -  WFTC Rate
ALL SINGLE MARRIED
OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS Tobit C-LAD
Predicted wage 0.977 0.981 0.971 0.932 0.938 0.922 1.012 1.015 1.003
[0.003]** [0.004]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.006]**
WFTC rate -0.114 -0.175 -0.248 -0.072 -0.099 -0.12 -0.106 -0.187 -0.242
[0.026]** [0.033]** [0.045]** [0.054] [0.054]+ [0.065]+ [0.037]** [0.038]** [0.059]**
FC Generosity -0.001 0.063 0.108 0.19 0.235 0.005 -0.136 -0.068 -0.053
[0.078] [0.096] [0.114] [0.139] [0.110]* [0.164] [0.120] [0.120] [0.151]
Spillover (Education) -0.107 -0.101 -0.148 0.277 0.286 0.228 -0.261 -0.257 -0.325
[0.031]** [0.033]** [0.035]** [0.049]** [0.057]** [0.055]** [0.042]** [0.044]** [0.046]**
Spillover (Industry) -0.057 -0.061 -0.057 -0.161 -0.164 -0.15 -0.011 -0.014 -0.017
[0.013]** [0.012]** [0.017]** [0.025]** [0.028]** [0.027]** [0.018] [0.018] [0.021]
Constant 0.009 0 0.033 0.113 0.352 0.122 -0.044 -0.078 -0.028
[0.0161 [0.012] [0.0131* [0.0221** [0.0021** [0.021]** [0.0191* [0.0011** [0.0181
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 89994 89994 89710 30261 30261 30159 59733 59733 59632
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Table 1.2b: Stage Two Regression Results 
(Women)
A - WFTC (LFS)
ALL SINGLE MARRIED
OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS Tobit C-LAD
Predicted wage 0.991 1.007 1.021 0.939 0.952 0.957 1.021 1.037 1.054
(0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.005]**
Pr(Claim WFTC) 0.071 0.065 0.027 0.018 0.011 -0.041 0.092 0.09 0.059
[0.009]** [0.007]** [0.010]** [0.011] [0.012] [0.011]** [0.016]** [0.015]** [0.021]**
Spillover (Education) -0.041 -0.025 -0.026 0.059 0.074 0.084 -0.107 -0.092 -0.096
[0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.012]** [0.011]** [0.013]** [0.011]** [0.004]** [0.011]**
Spillover (Industry) -0.085 -0.09 -0.042 -0.055 -0.057 -0.026 -0.105 -0.111 -0.052
[0.008]** [0.006]** [0.009]** [0.012]** [0.015]** [0.013]* [0.012]** [0.015]** [0.011]**
Constant 0.01 -0.025 -0.111 0.106 0.069 0.052 -0.057 0.341 -0.129
ro.0211 ro.0121* ro.0121** ro.0201** [0.0021** [0.0161** [0.021]** [0.0061** [0.0141**
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 82278 82278 81244 30272 30272 29913 52006 52006 51388
B  - WFTC Rate
ALL SINGLE MARRIED
OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS Tobit C-LAD
Predicted wage 0.991 1.005 1.018 0.94 0.952 0.952 1.022 1.037 1.053
[0.003]** [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.005]**
WFTC rate 0.069 0.052 0.009 0.052 0.032 -0.012 0.071 0.057 0.02
[0.010]** [0.009]** [0.011] [0.012]** [0.016]* [0.015] [0.014]** [0.015]** [0.014]
FC Generosity -0.072 -0.02 0.025 -0.077 -0.02 -0.006 -0.077 -0.032 0.018
[0.033]* [0.032] [0.040] [0.050] [0.056] [0.060] [0.050] [0.058] [0.050]
Spillover (Education) -0.048 -0.029 -0.043 0.092 0.11 0.101 -0.128 -0.11 -0.124
[0.012]** [0.014]* [0.013]** [0.021]** [0.023]** [0.021]** [0.014]** [0.017]** [0.016]**
Spillover (Industry) -0.138 -0.148 -0.092 -0.081 -0.088 -0.058 -0.173 -0.187 -0.114
[0.013]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.021]** [0.018]** [0.022]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.017]**
Constant -0.026 -0.024 -0.074 0.105 0.073 0.074 -0.071 -0.104 -0.162
[0.0201 ro.oo9i** ro.oin** [0.0191** [0.0021** [0.0171** [0.0201** ro.oni** [0.0131**
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 82283 82283 81253 30272 30272 29922 52011 52011 51376
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Table 1.3a: NMW Identification Results 
(WFTC (LFS))
WFTC (LFS)
All Single Married
Predicted wage 1.061 1.018 1.066
[0.005]** [0.009]** [0.007]**
Pr(Claim WFTC) -0.012 -0.075 0.043
[0.016] [0.019]** [0.029]
Spillover (Education) 0.008 0.14 -0.074
[0.008] [0.013]** [0.010]**
Spillover (Industry) -0.072 -0.028 -0.093
[0.008]** [0.014]* [0.011]**
Pr(W*<Wmin) 2.908 2.685 2.56
[0.078]** [0.114]** [0.113]**
# • ) 0.966 0.973 0.722
[0.050]** [0.073]** [0.069]**
Pr(W*<wmin)’,‘Predicted wage -2.392 -2.244 -2.034
[0.071]** [0.104]** [0.101]**
Pr( W *<wmin) * Pr (Claim WFTC) 0.162 0.249 -0.051
[0.050]** [0.058]** [0.100]
Pr(W*<wmin)*Spillove
(Education) 0.225 0.024 0.27
[0.053]** [0.077] [0.075]**
Pr(W*<wmin)*Spillove (Industry) -0.537 -0.373 -0.542
[0.066]** [0.092]** [0.093]**
Constant -0.171 -0.107 -0.15
T0.0151** T0.0241** [0.0191**
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 185592 63887 121705
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Table 1.3b: NMW Identification Results 
(WFTC Rate)
WFTC Rate
All Single Married
Predicted wage 1.068 1.025 1.075
[0.005]** [0.009]** [0.007]**
WFTC rate -0.034 -0 .111 0.026
[0.019]+ [0.028]** [0.026]
FC Generosity -0.096 0.098 -0.246
[0.057]+ [0.089] [0.075]**
Spillover (Education) 0.051 0.281 -0.088
[0.015]** [0.023]** [0.019]**
Spillover (Industry) -0.124 -0.051 -0.163
[0.015]** [0.025]* [0.019]**
Pr(W*<Wmin) 2.933 2.722 2.58
[0.082]** [0.119]** [0.116]**
< K ) 1.035 1.003 0.853
[0.050]** [0.073]** [0.067]**
Pr(W*<wmin)*Predicted wage -2.44 -2.269 -2.141
[0.072]** [0.105]** [0.100]**
Pr(W*<wmin)*WFTC rate -0.003 0.18 -0.191
[0.047] [0.064]** [0.072]**
Pr(W*<wmin)*FC Generosity 0.842 0.27 1.304
[0.181]** [0.253] [0.266]**
Pr(W*<wmin)* Spillove 
(Education) 0.22 -0.194 0.487
[0.106]* [0.150] [0.150]**
Pr(W*<wmjn)*Spillove (Industry) -0.622 -0.516 -0.548
[0.099]** [0.139]** [0.140]**
Constant -0.197 -0.121 -0.186
T0.0151** ro.0241** [0.0191**
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 185592 63887 121705
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Table 1.4a: Stage Two Regression Results -  FIRM SIZE
(Men)
A -W F TC  (LFS)
SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS Tobit C-LAD
Predicted wage 0.882 0.892 0.89 0.98 0.983 0.981 1.025 1.027 1.016
[0.008]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.007]**
Pr(Claim WFTC) -0.225 -0.277 -0.334 -0.113 -0.122 -0.072 -0.11 -0.113 -0.097
[0.026]** [0.041]** [0.042]** [0.058] [0.067]+ [0.066] [0.049]* [0.050]* [0.058]+
Spillover (Education) 0.002 0.011 0.019 -0.022 -0.019 -0.067 -0.047 -0.046 -0.056
[0.023] [0.030] [0.024] [0.026] [0.022] [0.027J* [0.014]** [0.013]** [0.016]**
Spillover (Industry) -0.019 -0.026 -0.042 -0.007 -0.008 0.02 -0.087 •0.088 -0.085
[0.023] [0.020] [0.026] [0.021] [0.026] [0.028] [0.015]** [0.013]** [0.018]**
Constant 0.241 0.391 0.167 0.048 0.041 0.02 -0.103 -0.116 -0.101
ro.0291** ro.oisi** ro.o26i** [0.031] ro .003]** ro.0301 ro.oi9i** ro.oni** ro.o2 i r *
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20191 20191 20096 14321 14321 14283 44272 44272 44245
B -W FTC  Rate
SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS Tobit C-LAD
Predicted wage 0.868 0.879 0.867 0.982 0.985 0.983 1.037 1.039 1.026
[0.008]** [0.008]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.012]** [0.010]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.008]**
WFTC rate -0.132 -0.199 -0.246 -0.093 -0.138 -0.261 -0.189 -0.203 -0.502
[0.031]** [0.048]** [0.052]** [0.103] [0.124] [0.117]* [0.163] [0.151] [0.179]**
FC Generosity -0.203 -0.153 -0.151 0.024 0.062 0.277 0.374 0.384 0.684
[0.111] [0.159] [0.152] [0.297] [0.309] [0.272] [0.296] [0.251] [0.345]*
Spillover (Education) -0.166 -0.154 -0.286 -0.05 -0.05 -0.152 0.026 0.029 0.005
[0.086] [0.067]* [0.074]** [0.081] [0.076] [0.077]* [0.047] [0.044] [0.054]
Spillover (Industry) -0.051 -0.056 -0.063 0.025 0.023 0.068 -0.094 -0.096 -0.104
[0.031] [0.036] [0.034]+ [0.038] [0.033] [0.036]+ [0.022]** [0.026]** [0.027]**
Constant 0.28 0.255 0.24 0.035 0.353 0.004 -0.157 0.353 -0.148
ro.0291** ro.oo3i** [0.0271** ro.0321 ro.oo3i** ro.0291 [0.0231** [0.0191** [0.0231**
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20191 20191 20072 14322 14322 14282 44273 44273 44242
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Table 1.4b: Stage Two Regression Results- FIRM SIZE 
(Women)
A -  WFTC (LFS)
SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS Tobit C-LAD
Predicted wage 0.95 0.981 0.991 1.019 1.033 1.049 1.02 1.027 1.04
[0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.010]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.006]**
Proclaim WFTC) 0.052 0.04 0.008 0.081 0.081 0.034 0.08 0.079 0.028
[0.016]** [0.010]** [0.016] [0.022]** [0.023]** [0.024] [0.017]** [0.019]** [0.017]
Spillover (Education) -0.058 -0.035 -0.066 0.041 0.058 0.058 -0.048 -0.04 -0.033
[0.017]** [0.019]+ [0.017]** [0.019]* [0.023]* [0.023]* [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.013]*
Spillover (Industry) 0.042 0.034 0.087 -0.035 -0.039 -0.007 -0.183 -0.183 -0.123
[0.018]* [0.017]* [0.017]** [0.019] [0.023]+ [0.023] [0.013]** [0.011]** [0.013]**
Constant 0.075 0.008 -0.03 -0.062 -0.097 -0.146 -0.028 0.325 -0.145
ro.0291** T0.0231 ro.o2u ro.0261* r0.0231** [0.0281** ro.0301 [0.0021** [0.0191**
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22961 22961 22458 15484 15484 15292 35087 35087 34971
B -W FTC  Rate
SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS Tobit C-LAD
Predicted wage 0.958 0.986 0.995 1.008 1.021 1.036 1.014 1.021 1.035
[0.008]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.007]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
WFTC rate 0.049 0.025 -0.025 0.047 0.039 0.001 0.089 0.084 0.022
[0.014]** [0.023] [0.016] [0.024]* [0.024] [0.024] [0.022]** [0.021]** [0.022]
FC Generosity -0.005 0.076 0.141 -0.063 -0.031 0.026 -0.098 -0.079 -0.021
[0.059] [0.082] [0.065]* [0.085] [0.068] [0.086] [0.072] [0.072] [0.071]
Spillover (Education) -0.067 -0.04 -0.084 0.029 0.051 0.031 -0.054 -0.043 -0.046
[0.022]** [0.029] [0.025]** [0.029] [0.029]+ [0.030] [0.019]** [0.021]* [0.019]*
Spillover (Industry) -0.02 -0.041 0.004 -0.048 -0.055 -0.023 -0.268 -0.27 -0.189
[0.025] [0.025]+ [0.027] [0.035] [0.036] [0.035] [0.019]** [0.020]** [0.020]**
Constant 0.064 0.006 -0.065 -0.032 0.329 -0.108 -0.066 -0.082 -0.137
[0.0261* [0.0021** [0.0221** [0.0191 ro.oo4i** ro.0251** [0.0251** [0.0181** [0.0171**
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22962 22962 22428 15484 15484 15297 35091 35091 34970
CHAPTER 1. The Incidence o f an Earned Income Tax Credit
Table 1.5: Test of Exogeneity 
(Smith-Blundell Procedure)
Smith-Blundell: 
Stage 2
Predicted wage 
WFTC Dummy 
Spillover 
Residual 
Constant
0.999
[0 .002]**
-0.065
[0.014]**
-0.073
[0.006]**
0.014
[0.015]
-0.019
ro.oo5i**
Observations 183224
Censored 7352
Uncensored 175872
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Figure 1.1: FC/WFTC Recipients By Family Type, May 1988-Nov 2002
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Notes.
1. Working Families’ Tax Credit Statistics, Inland Revenue Quarterly Enquiry (2003) 
Figure 1.2: Average FC/WFTC Awarded By Family Type, May 1988- Nov 2002
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1. Working Families’ Tax Credit Statistics, Inland Revenue Quarterly Enquiry (2003)
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Figure 1.3: Distortion between Actual & Predicted Wages after the Introduction of the
NMW
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Figure 1.4: Spillover Effect
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Figure 1.5: Fraction Claiming WFTC By Predicted Wage
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Figure 1.6: Average WFTC Rate By Hourly Predicted Wage
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Figure 1.7: Fraction Eligible for WFTC By Predicted Hourly Wage
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Figure 1.8: Fraction of Recipient Earning Brackets (Gross Weekly) -  All Cases
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Figure 1.9: Fraction of Recipient Earning Brackets (Gross Weekly) -  Lone Parents
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1.12 Appendix l.A : Proofs for Section 1.1.3
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1.12.1 P ro o f 1
Let labour demand equal labour supply:
N d(w(s)) =  Nf(w(s)( 1 +  s)) +  Nf(w(s)) 
Differentiate with respect to s:
w
W
dNd dw 
dw ' ds 
dNd dw 
dw ' ds 
dNd 1 dw 
dw w ds
dNf dw dNf  
dw ds dw 
\dw
i  +  l1 +  gl
w ' ds
dNf  dw
'WJt d w '  ds 
dNf  dNf  dw 
dw dw ds
w dNf
1 dNf  dw 
* J ^  dw ' ds
N d' dw
w dNf 1 dw 
N d' dw w ' ds
Since:
N d = Nf  +  Nf
Re-write the above results:
1 t1 +  5l
dsw
w dNd 1 dw 
N d' dw w ds 
w dNd 1 dw 
N d' dw w' ds Nf  -|- N f 'N f ' dw
w dNf + w 1 dw
Nf  w dNf
Nf  + Nf  dw Nf  +  N f ' dw w ds 
[1 +  s] dw
1 -I---------- .-7j—w ds +
Nf w dNf
Nf  + N f  N f  dw
Let:
6 = N_l_
(1.27)
And so:
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w 8 N d 
N d '  dw
J _  dw    n 9 N (  t t > [ l + s ]  [  1  . _ 1 _  d w ~\ .  / - i   g \  w  J L _  dw
' w ' d s  ’ dw ’ N (  [ [ 1 + s ]  t o " ds  J  '  '  /  dw  '  N 2 '  w ’ F s
d  1  d ln w  _  
• ’  l + s ' 3 1 n ( l + s )
[l +  t o t ]  +  (1 -  ^ I - I T J - T O I  ( &  -  * *  - 11 -  * ) & )  a t e  =
dlnw  dr]*
a in (i +  .)
(1.29)
d  In w 6r)\
91n(l +  s) ^ ? +  (i (1.30)
1.12.2 P ro o f 2: P rop osition
Assume a general equilibrium model with two types of labour i. Where i = 1,2.
Labour is the only factor of production and labour demand for each factor is given by:
N({w\,W 2 ) and N!j;{w\,W2 )
The production of one good, X, occurs in a constant return to scale environment:
X  = F[N1,N2\
The model is developed using equations of change (i.e. using the log-linearisation method 
of Jones (1965)). Fully differentiate to get:
dX = FVj .dN\ +  Fn2 AN2
Where is the marginal product for i = 1,2.Divide through by X :
dX  FNl.Ni dNx , FN2.N2 dN2
~X ~  X  '~n T  X  ’~N^ V '61)
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Let 0 be the factor share for group and w\ be the factor payment (gross wage) for group 
1 such that:
X
By profit maximising:
wi =  Px Fni (1.32)
Let (1 — 0) be the factor share for group 2 and w2 be the factor payment (gross wage) for 
group 2 such that:
a-fl) = ( g ) *
By profit maximising:
w2 =  Px Fn2 (1.33)
And so:
d X  _  a  dN i , a \  dN*
X  = 0Ni + ( l -  0)N2 
The elasticity of substitution between the two groups can be given by:
<*(%)/(%) 
*x  * * (S )/(S )
Where the differentiation in the numerator is:
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N2.dNi -  N i.dN2 N2 dNi dN2 “ ‘
 jv | W ,=  Iv T  “  w T  =  1 ■ 2
And so (with a similar differentiation to the denominator):
N i - N 2o x  =  —------— (1.34)
W 2 — W \
N\ -  N2 =  crx{w2 — w\) 
So far, the resulting system of equations are given by:
N \ - N 2 =  ax{w2 - w \ )  (1)
X  = 0Nl + ( 1 -  6)N2 (2)
Assuming constant returns to scale the value of output in each industry must equal the 
factor payment:
p x X  =  w\N\  +  w2N2
w2N2 =  p x X  — w\Ni  
P x X  w\N\w2 = N2 n 2
(3)
dw2 = - d Wlj ±
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dw2 dw\ N\W\
W2 W\ N 2 W2
“ N iW i/p xX  
'2 W1N2W2/ p x X
W2  =  -  ( I “ 1 (135)
Substitute into (1) :
N i - N 2 = <7X { -  ( f T # )  Wl ~ W l) (1.36)
Turning now to the labour supply of each group. It is here that the tax credit is incor­
porated because the tax is placed on the worker rather than on the employer (such that 
the gross wage for group 1 is iui and the net wage is u;i(l -I- s)) and for group 2 the gross 
and the net wage is W2 -
The labour supply for group 1 is given by:
Wf(ii>i(l +  s)) = > N i = r){ [l +  wi] (4)
The labour supply for group 2 is given by:
N ((w2) = »  N2 = r)2w2 (4’)
Using (1)
[l + lUi] -  T]S2W2 =  <TX(W2 ~  Wl )
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Since
This implies
For group 2:
W2 = ~  Wl
Vi [ l  +  Wl] +  ( y 4 t f )  Wl =  ~ Y Z ~ e Wi 
(1 -  6)vi +  [(1 -  % 1 +  Srii +  (7x}wi =  0
dlnwi  (1 — 0)77?
W t  =  --------------  = ----------- -------- -—  ---------
d ln (l + s) (1 -  0)77f +  6r)% +  a x
d\nw2 0^ 7?
w o  — -------------------------= ------------------------------=---------------------
d  ln(l +  s) (1 -  0)77f +  6r)32 +  a x
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Appendix l.B: Additional Tables & Figures
Table 1.A1: National Minimum Wage (Archived Rates)
Aged 22 years & older
1st April 1999 to 30th September 2000 
1st October 2000 to 30th September 
2001
1st October 2001 to 30th September 
2002
1st October 2002 to 30th September 
2003
£3.60
£3.70
£4.10
£4.20
Aged 18-21 years, 
inclusive
1st April 1999 to 30th September 2000 
1st October 2000 to 30th September 
2001
1st October 2001 to 30th September 
2002
1st October 2002 to 30th September 
2003
£3.00
£3.20
£3.50
£3.60
Notes.
1. Source- HM Revenue & Customs: National Minimum Wage
Table 1.A2: Working Families’ Tax Credit Rates & Thresholds, 1999-2003
1999- 2000- 2001- 2002-
GO 01 02 03
Basic Tax Rate
£per
week 52.3 53.15 59 62.5
30 Horn Tax Credit
£per
week 11.05 11.25 11.45 11.65
Per Child Credit
£per
week 20.9 25.6 26 26.45
Reduction
Income Threshold
£per
week 90 91.45 92.9 94.5
Income Taper 55% 55% 55% 55%
Minimum Award
£per
week 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Notes.
1. Source - Working Families’ Tax Credit Statistics, Inland Revenue Summary Statistics (Feb 2003)
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Figure 1.A1: Average Earning Index For the Whole Economy
<L>
C/3 0.85
Notes.
1. Source - Office of National Statistics
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Chapter 2
Before Leaving the W orking 
Fam ilies’ Tax Credit To Lie, 
A nother Look at Labour Supply
2.1 Introduction
In October 1999, the Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) was introduced in the United 
Kingdom with the intension to "make work pay" for families with children and to en­
courage labour market participation amongst the low skilled. This minimum hours based 
income supplement was not an innovative policy but it was much more generous compared 
with it’s predecessor (Family Credit) and it extended further up the wage distribution. 
Spending on WFTC corresponded to £6.3 billion in 2002/03 compared with only £2.3 
billion under Family Credit in 1998/9. Eligibility for WFTC was contingent on working a 
minimum of 16 hours in the household, the presence of children, having a "low" household 
income1 and having financial assets below £8,000. Although the amount of WFTC varied 
a great deal with the number and age of children, on average a lone parent household 
received £91.98 in 2002, compared with £59.48 in 1998 and coupled households received, 
on average £80.79 in 2002, compared with £59.15 in 1998.
The magnitude and the popularity of this tax credit policy induced a number of studies 
on the labour supply impact of WFTC (Blundell et al (2005), Brewer et al (2005), Leigh 
(2005), Francesconi et al (2004), Gregg et al (2003)). Although the methodology and data
1 Given the October 1999 criteria, families with a net income below £92.90 would recieve the maximum 
amount of WFTC and it would then be tapered at 55%.
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used varied, they all concluded that WFTC had a positive impact on the labour market 
employment of lone parents. According to Brewer and Browne (2006), who composed an 
overview of the literature, the overall conclusion was that the generosity of the in-work 
credit system induced lone mothers to increase their participation in the labour market by 
5 percentage points. When looking at couples with children (in a two-earner household) 
there was a negative effect of WFTC.
The literature focuses its attention on looking at the labour market impact of WFTC on 
lone parents as they were one of the biggest beneficiaries of the tax credit policy. The 
government targeted this group in particular as it became apparent that there was a 
shift in the composition of the lowest decile of the income distribution from pensioners 
to families of working age and lone parents in particular (Goodman (2001)). Figure 2.1 
highlights the differences in income between different family types. Moreover, by looking 
at the cross country employment rates of lone mothers in Figure 2.2, it is clear that the 
UK has one of the lowest.
Besides Brewer et al (2005), all of the studies on WFTC have used the differences-in- 
differences (DID) methodology to evaluate WFTC using single women without children 
as the control group for the treatment group of lone mothers. This technique relies on the 
assumption that the comparison group is a sufficiently close match, such that after taking 
the DID the remaining effect can be considered as the impact of the policy alone on the 
treated group2. However, using single women without children as the comparison group is 
not entirely convincing, not only because they are obviously observably and unobservably 
different, but also when one looks closely at the pre-trend differences between the two 
groups. Figure 2.3 plots the employment rates of single women without children and lone 
mothers and we can see that there is an increasing trend in the employment rate of lone 
mothers since the mid-1990s, while the level for single childless women has been high 
and has remained fairly flat over the same period. In particular, over the period 1996 
to 19993 employment rates increase by 6.5% for lone mothers and only 1.6% for single 
childless women. From this we may be concerned that the labour supply estimates are 
somewhat upward biased. Moreover, there is no noticeable spike with the introduction of 
WFTC and after 2000, increases in employment flatten even though there were increases 
in the basic tax credit each year from 2000 to 2003. The changes in the basic rate are 
shown in Figure 2.4. In particular, on introduction in 1999, the basic rate was £52.30 
and this increased to £65.50 by April 2002, however employment rates for lone mothers
2Even when using structural model (Brewer et al (2005)) the same assumptions innately apply, since 
the models are used to simulate the impact of WFTC using data from before the introduction of WFTC. 
The analysis is done on the assumption that levels of the utility cost of receiving in-work support are 
constant and, in particular, no attempt is made to estimate the impact of other changes (besides tax and 
benefits) affect parents.
3the period frequently used as the "pre-treatment period".
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only increased by 0.8%.
Another question that one may ask is whether the policy induced people to work a certain 
number of hours or to alter the number of hours they worked. Since WFTC was contingent 
on working at least 16 hours, we may expect there to be a spike at the 16 hours point. 
In addition, since the policy offered a bonus if the claimant worked 30 hours or more, 
we may expect some change here. If we look at Figure 2.5a we notice that there is a 
small increase around this mark for lone mothers after the policy introduction, while the 
hours distribution for single women with no children in Figure 2.5b remains relatively 
unchanged. In addition there seems to be a small increase at the 30 hour point. However, 
the changes in the distribution are very small and continuous4. This continuous movement 
of working 16 or more hours can be seen more clearly in Figures 2.6b and 2.6c, which show 
the employment rate of those working 16-29 hours and 30 or more hours, respectively. 
This again highlights important differences in the treatment and control groups.
The aim of this chapter is to address the concern of the suitability of the control group 
and to see how the results change when we control for group specific differential trends. 
Moreover, we look to see where (along the hours distribution) the change occurs and 
from which labour market states do lone mothers enter into employment. Overall, we 
find three key results: First, when we allow for differential trends, the effect of WFTC 
on employment falls to 1.7% points, considerably lower than the literature’s estimate of 
5% points. Second, we find that this effect is borne solely on those working full time 
(30 hours or more). Finally, the policy change had no effect on those who were inactive. 
We extend our analysis to look more closely at the movements in the relative rates of 
return of important covariates between 1993 and 2003. In particular we focus on the 
child (treatment) covariates, which confirms the fall in the relative difference between 
having children and not having children on the probability of entering into employment.
These results offer valuable insight into two key issues: Firstly, the effectiveness of policy 
and secondly, the design of the policy. In particular, they imply that the increase in 
participation was greatly exaggerated when the differential trends between treatment and 
control groups are not accounted for. Moreover, the policy was not as well targeted as 
initially considered, given that any increase to employment was solely borne on those who 
work 30 or more hours, while those who were inactive were unaffected by the policy.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 gives a brief description 
of the tax credit reform, Section 2.3 discusses the difference-in-difference methodology 
and describes initial concerns with regard to both the treatment and control groups. 
In Section 2.4 we discuss the data and main descriptive statistics of the treatment and
4See Table A l, which shows more clearly the movements in the hours distribution over time.
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control groups. Section 2.5 provides the empirical framework of the basic specification 
and trend specific specification for employment and hours. In Section 2.6 we continue our 
evaluation by looking at the movements in coefficients over time. Section 2.7 discusses 
the implications of these results and tries to understand why we observe the increases in 
lone parent employment rates before WFTC. Finally, Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 The Structure of the W FTC Reform
Since the early 1970s systems of support for working families with dependent children 
have operated in the UK. Although there were some structural reforms over the years, 
the eligibility criteria was generally based on the family income being below a certain 
level, the presence of children and a low household savings rate. The introduction of 
the Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) in October 1999 was modelled on the US 
tax credit system, the Earned Income Tax Credit. There were two distinctive features 
between its predecessor, Family Credit (FC), and WFTC. Firstly, it was much more 
generous. The four ways in which the generosity of WFTC exceeded FC where that: 
there was an increase in the credit for children under 11 years old from £12.35 to £14.85 
per child; there was an increase in the threshold from £79 to £92.90 per week; there was a 
reduction in the taper from 70% to 55% and a childcare credit of 70% of actual childcare 
costs up to £150 per week. Figure 2.7 shows these relative changes. It can be seen that 
those who would gain the most were those people who were just at the end of the taper 
under FC, as they were previously ineligible and now eligible. In addition, those with a 
net income between £79 and £92.90 move from being on the taper to receiving maximum 
support and those who remain on the taper following the introduction of WFTC see their 
withdrawal rate fall from 70% to 55%.
Secondly, while Family Credit was paid directly as a cash benefit, WFTC it was paid 
through the wage packet by the employer (who were reimbursed by the Inland Revenue). 
This was an attractive move because it became more convenient to distribute and it 
reduced the stigma attached to the tax credit for being a welfare benefit. In April 2000, 
the eligible claimant would claim the approximate tax credit from the Inland Revenue, 
who would work out the amount of tax credit payable. The Inland Revenue would then 
notify the relevant employer of the amount of tax credit to be paid and the employer 
would pay the tax credit out of the tax and National Insurance contribution that they 
would otherwise have forwarded to the Inland Revenue.
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2.3 Difference-in-difference Estim ation
2.3.1 T h e T reatm ent Group: Lone M others
The number of lone parents increased from 0.5 million in the early 1970s to 1.5 million by 
1997, representing 25% of all families with children (see McKnight (2005)). However, this 
rise in the number of lone parents was coupled by a fall in their employment rate from 
50% to 40% over a similar period. Although some of these changes could be attributed to 
changes in composition and to demographic factors, there was a need for active support 
for this group. The number of workless households rose to 3.2 million by 1997, accounting 
for 18% of the working age households and around a quarter were lone parent households 
(see Gregg Sz Harkness (2003)).
The introduction of WFTC was designed to tackle the lack of work incentive amongst this 
group. The tax credit policy offered a financial incentive for parents to find and remain 
in employment for over 16 hours a week. The structure of the tax credit was such that 
it incorporated a basic tax credit of £62.50 (in 2002/3) for those working more than 16 
hours, plus an additional supplement per child (£26.45 for children aged under 16 and 
£27.20 for those aged 16-18). Overall WFTC increased the average benefit payable to 
lone parents from £58 a week in 1997 to £92 by 2002. By 2002, 737,000 lone parents 
received WFTC compared with only 341,400 receiving Family Credit in 1997.
Figure 2.8 shows how WFTC changed the budget constraint of a lone mother with one 
child. The reform clearly unambiguously enhances the probability of participation as the 
financial returns to working more than 16 hours are greater after the reform. However, 
the complexity of the budget constraint and the interaction with other taxes and benefits 
imply that the overall impact of WFTC on the labour participation of lone mothers is 
not entirely obvious. Blundell et al (2000) highlight the was a potential problem that 
the increase in net income was small below 25 hours of work due to the interaction of 
WFTC and Housing Benefit. For higher hour levels, the reduction in the WFTC taper 
starts to increase the returns to working. For those already working, the labour supply 
response to the introduction of WFTC was less clear because the marginal tax rate is 
unambiguously reduced at all hours under the reform, though even with WFTC it remains 
high (70%). This increased the price of non-market time, causing individuals to consume 
less non-market time and therefore increase their hours of work (standard substitution 
effect). The income effect would be negative, however (assuming that non-market time is 
a normal good).
The second cause for concern arises when we look at the evolution of the lone mother
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employment rates at more than zero hours in Figure 2.9. It can be seen that between 1992 
and 2002 the employment rate has increased from 42% to 53% and there is no obvious spike 
after October 1999, which would allow us to attribute the increase in labour supply to be 
due to the change in tax credit policy. Moreover, the basic tax credit increased every year 
after its introduction and yet the increases in employment stop in 2000. In particular, the 
basic rate of WFTC at introduction was £52.30 and by 2003, when WFTC was replaced 
by the Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit, the rate stood at £62.50. Several 
authors have acknowledged this trend but while some have dismissed it as a temporary 
phenomena which would not have continued after 1998 (Leigh (2005), Blundell et al 
(2005)), others claim it was an "anticipation" effect (Francesconi et al (2004)). Neither 
claims are entirely convincing, in particular there is little evidence (or financial gain) to 
suggest that lone mothers would benefit from entering into employment almost 2 years 
prior to the introduction of WFTC. We discuss this in more detail in Section 2.7.
Finally, there were various tax and benefits reforms in the late 1990s that targeted lone 
mothers and it is, therefore, difficult to say if these policies had more or less impact on the 
employment rate of lone mothers compared with WFTC. As Gregg and Harkness (2003) 
point out, the introduction of other policies directed at the low skilled and/or families 
with children also impacted the employment rates of lone mothers. Moreover, given the 
timing of these policies it is not possible to disentangle the effects to see if the policies 
were jointly or separately significant. In particular the two polices most relevant policies, 
which targeted low skilled groups to enter the labour market, were the National Minimum 
Wage and the New Deal for Lone Parents. The National Minimum Wage was introduced 
in April 1999, six months prior to WFTC to reduce the growing dispersion in wages in the 
UK (Dickens and Manning (2002)). The New Deal for Lone Parents, introduced in 1998, 
offered job-search assistance5 to lone parents in receipt of Income Support with children 
under 16 6.
Overall, the concern is that it is not clear that WFTC had an unambiguous effect of 
increasing the employment of lone mothers. In particular, we need to be sure that the 
methodology used can control for sine complexities. In the analysis that follows we 
will concentrate on the first two concerns, since trying to disentangle WFTC from other 
policies in the same period is difficult, if not impossible.
5 Where the lone parent would meet a personal advisor every two weeks and receive advice on job 
vacancies, in-work benefit, childcare arrangement, training and job serch techniques.
6The government also launged New Deal programs for young people (18-24), those aged over 25 who 
had been unemployed for more than six months, those in couples whose partner had been unemployed for 
more than six months, people aged over 50 and those who were disabled.
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2.3 .2  T h e C ontrol Group: Single W om en w ith o u t C hildren
The evaluation problem is to identify the effect of WFTC on the employment of lone 
mothers. Following Eissa and Leibman (1996), who evaluate the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) in the US, all of the literature (with the exception of Brewer et al (2005)), 
evaluates WFTC using the differences-in-differences methodology.
The simple idea of the differences-in-differences (DID) estimator is to measure the growth 
in the outcome variable of the treated compared with the non-treated. The estimator 
compares the pre-programme period, to, and post-programme period, t\ :
_  t  _  t  _  c  _ c  
a = (Ytl - Y t0 ) -  (Ytl - Y t0 ) (2.1)
_ T  _ C
Where Y  and Y  are the mean outcome for the treatment and control groups, respec­
tively. However an important assumption (relevant for our evaluation) that must hold is 
that the macro effect must have the same impact across the treatment and control groups. 
If there are differential impacts it must be that the two groups have some characteristics 
that distinguish them and make them react differently to common macro shocks.
It is therefore of key importance what control group is chosen. The control group must be 
as similar to the treatment group as possible in all dimensions other than that of eligibility. 
Most of the literature (Blundell et al (2005), Leigh (2005), Francesconi et al (2004), Gregg 
et al (2003)) use people without children as a comparison group when evaluating WFTC. 
In particular, the changing employment outcome of lone mothers is compared with single, 
childless women. The assumption made, as pointed out by Eissa et al (1996), is that DID 
controls for any contemporaneous shocks to labour force participation of single women 
with children through the changes in participation for the control group.
However by looking at Figure 2.3, we can see that this comparison group violates the DID 
condition of having the same underlying trend in the pre-treatment period. We can see 
that while the employment of single women without children is high and has remained 
steady, the employment rate of lone mothers has been steadily increasing. Table 2.1, which 
gives the descriptive statistics of these two groups in the period before the introduction, 
reinforces this concern. One important distinction is that 22% of single women are highly 
qualified compared with only 6% of lone mothers, where as only 5% of single women have 
no qualifications, compared with 13% of lone mothers7.
7 More description of the descriptive statistics are given in Section 4.
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One possibility may be that low educated single childless women would be a better com­
parison group for lone mothers. However, by close inspection of the movements in the 
employment rates of low educated single childless women, we find that the trends are 
very similar to that of all single childless women. In Figures 2.A1 and 2.A2 we plot the 
employment rates for low educated single childless women against lone mothers and low 
educated lone mothers, respectively, and find little similarity in pre-WFTC trends.
There are two obvious concerns which must be addressed: (1) the differential trend, 
which is probably common to all people with children and (2) the big differentials in 
observable characteristics. In the analysis that follows we tackle these issues using the 
DID methodology and by close inspection of changes in covariates over time.
2.4 Data
The empirical investigation is done using the UK’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
The LFS is a representative survey of households in the UK, with sample sizes of around 
60,000 per quarter and information on individuals, households and families. We use 
data from 1993 quarter 1 (March-May) to 2003 quarter 1 (March-May), inclusive. The 
dataset contains information on hours of work, labour market activity and a variety of 
control variables needed for the analysis. In particular, the region of residence, age, 
highest qualification, ethnicity, the presence of children, the number of children and the 
age of the youngest child in the household8. The sample is restricted to single women 
aged between 18 and 60 years old. Women in full-time education, sick/disabled or on 
government training programmed are removed from the sample. The resulting sample 
size, after pooling all 41 quarters, is approximately 366,500.
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for single women without children in the first 
column and for lone mothers in the second column. There are some clear differences 
between the two groups. Lone mothers tend to be on average younger than single women 
without children (24.2 years versus 27.7 years), they axe more likely to be non-white (7% 
versus 4%). A particular cause for concern is that lone mothers are less educated, a higher 
proportion have no qualifications (13% versus 5%) and a smaller proportion are highly 
qualified (6% versus 22%). Another worrying distinction is the observable differences in 
the employment behaviour if the two groups. Lone mothers axe likely to work on average
24.4 hours of week compared with single childless women who work on average 35.8 hours 
a week. Compared with single childless women, lone mothers have a higher probability of
8 The variable used to work out the age of the youngest child in the family is only available from Spring 
1995. However, it is possible to construct it from other variables, as we do here.
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being unemployed and inactive (10% versus 7.9% and 34.1% versus 8.5%, respectively). 
Overall, lone mothers axe less likely to be employed, 48.8% relative to 82.8% of single 
childless women. When looking at the hours distribution, lone mothers have a higher 
probability of working part-time: there are 15.7% of lone mothers working between 0-15 
hours compared with only 9% of single childless women and 11.4% working 16-29 hours 
compared with only 7.2% of single childless women. Finally, only 22.3% of lone mothers 
work more than 30 hours compared with 66.7% of single childless women.
2.5 Evaluation I
2.5.1 B asic  A n a ly sis
The DID approach is commonly used in the literature to evaluate tax credit programmes 
(see Eissa and Leibman (1996), Blundell et al (2005), Francesconi et al (2004), Leigh 
(2004)). In addition, it is recognised that it is important to control for demographic char­
acteristics, such that the simple DID analysis is extended to a regression based method. 
As highlighted by Eissa et al (1996), this method reduces the residual variance of the 
regression and leads to a more efficient estimate.
Following Eissa et al (1996), we estimate the a probit equation:
P r(empu =  1) =  ®(/30 +  +  /?2t +  /33K ID i +  /34Postl999t +  7 (K ID  * Postl999)it)
(2.2)
Where emp is a dummy equal to one if a women reported working at least one hour. 
The vector of X characteristics includes the region of residence, age (and higher order 
age squared and age cubed), highest qualification, ethnicity, the presence of children, 
the number of children and the age of the youngest child in the household. Following 
Blundell et al (2005) we use a real deseasonalised GDP series, t, to control for the general 
economic conditions and so it can be interpreted as acting as a general time trend; we also 
include seasonal controls. The time trend and the individual characteristics will control 
for the observable differences in the characteristics of the treatment and control group 
that affect the level of employment. The K ID  variable simply denotes a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if the individual is a lone mother and zero otherwise. Unobservable 
differences are expected to be picked up here and we would expect that the coefficient, 
/?3, will be negative if lone mothers have a lower employment rate than single childless
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women, even after controlling for children9. The Postl999 is a dummy equal to one for any 
quarter after Spring 2000. The coefficient, /?4, reflects the change in employment for both 
treatment and control groups post-WFTC introduction until Spring 200310. Finally, we 
construct a variable that will capture the treatment effect by interacting the post-WFTC, 
Post\999, variable with an indicator for the presence of children, K ID . We are therefore 
implicitly testing that 7 , the coefficient on the interaction term between Postl999 and 
K ID  is greater than zero. Our regression results in what follows are obtained from using 
data from the first quarter of 1993 to the first quarter of 2003. To allow for the individuals 
to adapt to the introduction of WFTC, we drop observations from Summer 1999 to Spring 
2000, as done by Blundell et al (2005).
Table 2.2 presents the marginal effects of the above specifications. Column 1 shows the 
results for those aged 18 years and over and column 2 presents the results for those aged 
21 or over. The estimate of the treatment effect in column 1 suggests that WFTC raised 
employment by 3.6% points. This result is identical to that of Blundell et al (2005) who 
run a similar specification using LFS data from 1996 to 2002, inclusive. When looking at 
those aged over 21, the result is stronger at 4.2% points. These results are significant at 
the 1% level and comply with the results in the literature, which average at 5% points11.
The other covariates in this regression strongly suggest that having children are an impor­
tant factor in determining the probability of working. For example, having three or more 
children reduces the probability of working by 39% relative to those with no children. In 
addition, having children under the age of 5 years reduces the probability of working by 
22%. Finally, the probability of working monotonically falls as the level of qualifications 
fall and non-whites are less likely to work.
However the specification used here makes two very big assumptions. Firstly, it assumes 
that the coefficient on the child dummy variable remains constant before the introduction 
of WFTC. Secondly, it assumes that the coefficients on other key covariates remain the 
same before and after the introduction of WFTC. In other words, we do not allow for 
any relative changes in the rates of return of covariates between lone mothers and single 
women without children. In effect, a violation of these two assumptions would lead to the 
interaction term (between the child dummy variable and the post WFTC period) picking 
up the effect of these changes in the coefficients and would bias our estimates of treatment 
effect.
In the analysis that follows we look carefully at both of these possibilities. In addition,
9 In the analysis we break out this KID category even further by using the number of children. The . 
omitted category is no children and we include the categories: 1 child, 2 children and 3 or more children.
10In April 2003, WFTC was replaced by The Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit.
11 See Brewer et al (2006) for more details.
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we look closely to see who is affected by the policy change. More specifically, we look to 
see where along the hours distribution the strongest impact of WFTC lies. We also look 
at the impact of WFTC on different labour market states to see if lone mothers are being 
drawn from inactivity and/or if they are increasing overall participation (with increases 
in unemployment).
2.5.2 C ontrolling for D ifferential Trends
In Section 2.3.1, we looked at the time-series movements in the employment rates of lone 
mothers relative to single childless mothers and it was clear that there were differential 
trends in employment rates. The traditional DID analysis fails to allow for these differ­
ences. We therefore extend our DID analysis to allow for the possibility of differential 
trends between women with children and those without children:
Pr (empu =  1) =  DiF/3^Postl999t-\-y(KID*Postl999)it)
(2.3)
We allow for differential trends between our control and treatment groups by interacting 
the K ID  with the time trend, t. It can be seen that without controlling for this difference, 
the treatment effect would be biased upwards:
E[7 |X,.] =  7  + % (*  +  *:') > 7  (2.4)
Where (k +  k') represents the average number of periods between the post-WFTC and 
pre-WFTC period observations12.
The results presented in Table 2.3 show that once we control for differential trends for 
women with children and women without children, the impact of WFTC on employment 
fall to 1.7-1.8% points. All other covariates give a quantitatively similar picture as Table 
2.2, when we do not include the differential trend.
These results are of paramount importance as they imply that the effectiveness of WFTC 
have been exaggerated. The acclaimed increase of 5% points in employment induced 
by WFTC is very much reflective of the changes in the trend of lone mothers increased
12Prancesconi et al (2004) also control for differential trends, however they use the British Household 
Panel Survey which is annual data and so quarterly changes cannot be incorporated.
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attachment to the labour market. In Section 2.6 we look closer at the effect of the presence 
of children on employment over the period 1993 to 2003.
2.5.3 H ours D istr ib u tion  Effect
Another important concern relates to our understanding of which part of the hours dis­
tribution was affected by the introduction of WFTC. Given that there was a 16 hour 
minimum work requirement for WFTC, one would expect that the impact of WFTC falls 
on those working at least 16 hours. We look closer at this possibility by looking at the 
employment probability to work less than 16 hours (0-15 hours); to work part-time (16-29 
hours) and to work full-time (30 hours or more).
We run the same specification as we did for employment in Section 2.5.2 and the results 
are reported in Table 2.4. The first column of each group of hours reports the results 
without controls for differential trends. As one might expect, there are no significant 
effects on those working less than 16 hours (the hours threshold), there is a 3.8% points 
increase in the probability of working between 16 and 29 hours and there is a 1.8% points 
increase in the probability of working more than 30 hours.
When we control for the differential trends, the only treatment effect that remains sig­
nificant is on those working more than 30 hours. We find that there is a 1.3% points 
effect on working full-time, at the 10% significance level. This is a very interesting result 
as it is consistent with the predictions laid out in Section 2.3.1, which reported that the 
net income increase from WFTC was small below 25 hours of work due to interactions of 
WFTC with other taxes and benefits.
These results questions whether the policy was designed well. Given that the policy 
targeted those with no labour market attachment, one would expect that this group 
would be more attracted to working part-time. In addition one might expect that those 
who chose to work 30 hours were probably those in work before and may have simply 
increased their number of hours of work. In the next section we look to see whether 
WFTC induced an increase into employment by those previously inactive.
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2.6 Evaluation II
2.6.1 C hanges in  C oefficients over tim e
The results in the previous section imply that once we control for the differential trends 
between single childless women and lone mothers, the effect of WFTC falls from 4.2% to 
1.7% points, moreover by looking along the hours distribution we find that the impact is 
solely attributed to those working full-time.
These results raise questions relating to how the child (treatment) coefficient has changed 
over period 1993 to 2003. In conjunction with this, it is also important to look closer at 
the movements of the other (relative) covariates over the same time period. By doing so 
we can increase our insight into exactly how people have been affected by the introduction 
of WFTC.
2.6.1.1 Child Coefficient
To observe how the relative employment probabilities for those with children versus no 
children changed between 1993 and 2003 we run the following equation for each year:
Pr(empit =  1) =  $ (^ ot +  X't/31( + 03tK ID it) (2.5)
The movements in the coefficient on the presence of children over the period 1993-2003 
in Table 2.5, clearly implies a closing gap between women with children to those without 
children. This is shown very clearly in Figure 2.10 which plots the coefficient. The initial 
gap in employment probability between lone mothers and single women without children 
is -36%. The coefficient starts falling from 1994 and then after a small a blip in 1998, 
it continues to fall to -0.27. One may argue that this reflects an anticipated WFTC 
effect. However, there is no reason to believe that almost 2 years before the introduction, 
people would react to the policy as it would mean giving up a number of entitled benefits. 
Another pressing concern is that there were increases to WFTC in 2001 and 2002, above 
the rate of inflation, and yet the child coefficient flattens in 2000. We discuss these issues 
in more detail in Section 2.7.
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2.6.1.2 Other Covariates
To look at the changes in other covariates, we estimate the following:
P r{empit =  1) =  +  X 't/3lt +  fa K ID *  +  St (K ID  * X )it) (2.6)
In Tables 2.6 to 2.8, we look at the effect of the age of children, the number of children and 
the relative returns to education between lone mothers and single women, respectively. 
Firstly, in Table 2.6 (and more clearly in Figure 2.11) when looking at the different age 
of children, we find that the biggest increases are for those with children aged 0 to 5 
years old. Although, over the 10 years there is continuous growth, the biggest increase 
happens between 1998-2000 and then stagnates. Again, it is puzzling that the impact 
occurs before the introduction of WFTC.
Table 2.7 (and Figure 2.12) look at the effect of the number of children. There seems 
to be an increase over time for all number of children groups, however, the largest spike 
is for those with only one or two children. This may due to the fact that both WFTC 
and it’s predecessor, Family Credit, only offer small supplements per extra child in the 
household, reducing the incentive to work. In particular if there are two or more children 
in the household who are aged less than 5.
Finally, in Table 2.8 (and Figure 2.13) we look at the changes in the relative returns to 
qualifications/education for the lone mother group. By holding highest education as the 
control group, there seems to have been little systematic (relative) change between the 
different education groups.
2.6 .2  H ours o f  W ork
Another question of interest is to ask what happened to the hours distribution before and 
after the introduction of WFTC? Figures 2.6a, 2.6b and 2.6c show the average fraction 
of people working 0-15 hours, 16-29 hours and 30 hours or more, respectively. It is clear 
that, while the distributions have remained constant from 1993 to 2003 for single childless 
women, fewer lone mothers are working less than 16 hours and there has been a significant 
increase in those working between 16 and 29 hours. This change does not show up in 
our analysis of WFTC, which from Figure 2.6b is obvious, because the increase has been 
continuous since 1993 and there is no noticeable spike in October 1999. The average 
number of lone mothers working 30 hours or more has remained fairly constant since
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1996, with only slight increases during the WFTC introduction period. This corresponds 
with the small increases we observe in the regression results.
Changes in  Coefficients When we look at the change in the child coefficient for each 
group of hours (0-15 hours, 16-29 hours and 30 or more hours), the patterns correspond 
well to the patterns seen in Figures 2.6a-2.6c. In particular, looking at Figure 2.14a we 
can see that although the relative effect of working 0-15 hours has been higher for lone 
mothers than for single childless women, the coefficient falls after 1995 and then falls 
again after 2000. In Figure 2.14b we can see that effect of being a lone mother on working 
between 16 hours and 29 hours is always relatively higher than for single women, however 
this is a continuously growing pattern, with no acceleration in October 1990. Finally, 
Figure 2.14c looks at the change in the child dummy on working more than 30 hours. 
Here the pattern seems quite similar to the overall employment pattern in Figure 2.10. 
We can see that, although single childless women are always more likely to work full-time, 
the relative difference (after 1995) is falling and after 1998 the gap closes significantly. 
However, after 2001 the gap begins to widen again. If the increase in probability for lone 
mothers to work more than 30 hours was due to WFTC, one may question its long term 
effectiveness. See Appendix Tables 2.A2a-2.A2d, Tables 2.A3a-2.A3d and Tables 2.A4a- 
2.A4d for the annual child coefficient and changes in other covariates for those working 
0-15 hours, 16-29 hours and 30 or more hours, respectively.
2.6 .3  L abour M arket S tates
In Table 2.9 we look at the effect of WFTC on entering other labour market states. The 
results imply that when we control for trends, the probability of entering unemployment 
falls 1.7% points. One may interpret this result in many ways. On the one hand, we would 
expect that WFTC increases all labour market participation. Thus, it not only increase 
employment but, given labour market friction, it also increases job search. On the other 
hand, we may expect that the unemployment is falling because people are accepting job 
offers less reluctantly and/or searching with more intensity for a job.
When looking at the effect of WFTC on inactivity, there seems to be no significant effect. 
This is very interesting as it suggests that women who were entering work were not coming 
from inactivity but from unemployment or that they were already in employment and now 
simply increasing the number of hours worked.
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Changes in Coefficients Further analysis in Figures 2.15a and 2.15b, which looks at 
the time series movement of the presence of children coefficient for those unemployed and 
inactive, respectively, suggests that unemployment for lone mothers, relative to single 
childless women has been increasing substantially since 1993, fall between 1998 to 2000 
and then increases again after 2001. This is analogous to the employment story and 
suggests that female participation increased throughout the 1990s. The dip in 1998 may 
be explained by other labour market policies introduced, such as the New Deal for Lone 
Mothers, which assisted lone mothers to search more effectively for jobs and required that 
their welfare receipt became contingent on the search.
Looking at Figure 2.15b, which plots the time series changes in the presence of children 
coefficient, implies that inactivity rates of lone mothers relative to single childless women 
was falling consistently during the 1990s but by 2000 the rate remained constant at 25%.
See Appendix Tables 2.A5a-2.A5d and Tables 2.A6a-2.A6d for the annual child coefficient 
and changes in other covariates for those unemployed and those inactive, respectively.
2.7 W hy did the Child Coefficient Increase?
One of the key point made in this chapter is that once we control for the group specific 
trend, the effectiveness of WFTC falls. We have shown that over the period 1993 to 1999, 
before the introduction of WFTC, the employment rate of lone mothers increased by 7.8% 
points and that the relative employment probability of lone mothers to single childless 
women (Cetus paribus) have increased from -0.38 to -0.27 over the same period. It is 
important to understand why we observe this increasing trend and to ask if this trend 
would have continued in the absence of WFTC.
By 1992, the number of lone mothers increased fivefold since the 1970s to just under 
500,000. However, some of this change was related to changes in attitude. For example, 
in 1971, a third of couples who conceived outside marriage then had a "shot-gun" wedding, 
whereas in 1991, less than 1 in 10 did so. Moreover, for teenagers who conceived outside 
marriage, almost a half married in 1971 compared with only 1 in 20 199113. Other 
characteristic changes included that fewer single mothers were in their teens in the 1990s 
compared with the 1980s. Overall composition changes and changes in attitudes towards 
lone mothers explains some of the observed changes in employment.
One argument proposed to explain the increasing trend in employment rates for lone
13See "Single lone mothers: Problems, Prospects and policies" by Louie Burghes with Mark Brown 
(1995).
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mothers was that WFTC was anticipated (See Francesconi et al (2004)). In the March 
1998 Budget speech, the New Labour Government announced the introduction of WFTC 
and other reforms targeted to "make work pay" for low income families with children. 
However, there are three important reasons to question the plausibility that lone mothers 
would react to this announcement that was made almost two years prior to the actual 
policy change. Firstly, we observe increases in employment for lone mothers before 1998. 
Secondly, there were no financial incentives (and more likely income losses) to enter the 
labour market before the introduction of WFTC. Finally, there were other policy changes 
between 1998 and 1999 that affected lone mothers. We discuss each separately.
There have been a huge number of policies over the last two decades motivated towards 
helping lone mothers, and more generally women and/or the low skilled, into employment. 
From the introduction of the Equal Pay Legislation in 1970 to the increased flexibility in 
the labour market, which promoted part-time work. In addition, the improved nature and 
quality of non-parental care also promoted work amongst this group of women. Moreover, 
the 1994 change to Family Credit, which made it more generous and introduced a bonus 
amount for working 30 hour or more, also increased participation (See Duncan (1996)). 
All of these changes took place before 1998.
A report published by M. Nobles et al (1998) looks at the period 1993 tol997 and shows 
that there was an increase in the number of lone parents moving from Income Support, in 
part due to changes in Family Credit. They observed that of the lone mothers observed 
on Income Support in July 1993, only 20% remained on Income Support for the whole 
period. In particular, young lone mothers (aged 25 or under) were most likely to come off 
Income Support and they tended to be better qualified. In their qualitative analysis they 
observed a positive orientation towards work amongst lone mothers and that most women 
had worked (at least for some time) since they first had children. The main reasons given 
for not working were related to childcare (because of the marginal nature of the work they 
undertake: short-term, low paid, with unsocial hours) and the loss of benefits. Neither of 
which were addressed until after WFTC was introduced.
Secondly, the interactions between Housing Benefit, Income Support and Child Support 
(as well as Income Tax and National Insurance Contribution) imply that lone mothers 
would have incurred a great deal of additional costs, if they were not previously in the 
labour market, to enter the labour market with the anticipation of future payment. In par­
ticular, Blundell and Walker (2001) show that although in-work benefits (before WFTC) 
provided some financial incentives to work, the combined effect of the 55% reduction rate 
together with the impact of Housing Benefit and the personal tax rates and National 
Insurance Contributions in the UK resulted in implicit tax rates close to 100%. The
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WFTC increased incentives by increasing the generosity and the reduction rate. It also 
incorporated a new childcare credit of 70% of eligible childcare costs up to a limit of £100 
(and £150 for two children). None of these additional benefits were available until after 
October 1999.
It is important to point out that although WFTC was more active towards "making 
work pay", the interactions with other benefits, which strongly offset the effectiveness of 
the increased generosity of WFTC meant that most of the gainers were concentrated in 
the middle or top of the hours distribution for single parent households. For example, 
Housing Benefit was computed after WFTC and so WFTC was counted as income in 
determining Housing Benefit entitlement and hence overall income. The results in this 
chapter highlight this effect.
Thirdly, the introduction of the New Deal for Lone Parents in 1998 and the National 
Minimum Wage in 1999, which targeted low income people and, in particular, families 
with children, imply that they played an important role in increasing employment amongst 
this group in the pre-WFTC period. In which case, it was not an anticipation to WFTC 
that increased employment after 1998 but a reaction to the range of policies around at 
that time. It is of critical importance to encapsulate these policies into the analysis 
to avoid overestimating the true effect of WFTC. Besides Gregg and Harkness (2004), 
the literature discount the importance of these policies and any post-1998 increase in 
employment is attributed to WFTC.
Finally, it is important to question whether the increase in employment observed before 
October 1999 would have continued in the absence of WFTC. Given the interaction of 
different policy introductions, the effect of WFTC is not easy to disentangle, making this 
a tough question to answer. There were, however, increases in the generosity of WFTC 
between 2000 and 2002 and changes in income tax and National Insurance rules (such 
that a 10% income tax band was introduced and the 2% National Insurance entry fee was 
abolished), which meant that there should have been improved incentives for part-time 
workers and low earning workers. In projections done by Gregg and Harkness (2004), they 
found that the effects, although moderate on the lone mother working14, the increase in 
net income should have been very good. However, in actual fact we observe that over that 
period, employment flattens and the child coefficient is stable. Although this may shed 
some light on the lack of effectiveness of WFTC, the effects may have been dampened 
due to increase in Income Support over the same period and the Housing Benefit loss.
Overall, it seems that although WFTC and even perhaps its anticipation were not without 
an effect on the employment of lone mothers, the effects have been exaggerated because the
14 Working at the National Minimum Wage of £4.20 for 35 hours with two children under 11.
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lack of attention given to other policies and changes of the 1990s and perhaps differential 
contemporaneous shocks between people with and without children. In addition, we are 
not only interested in whether WFTC increased employment but also in whether the 
government succeeded in increasing the participation and hours of work of their target 
group. By looking at the changes in the hours distribution and the labour market states, 
it is not clear that those with the least labour market attached were encouraged into the 
labour market.
2.8 Conclusion
The increase use of tax credits as a method of "in work benefits" have raised a great deal 
of popular interest in the UK and in many other countries where they have been initiated. 
In particular, the success of the programme was acclaimed to lie mainly with the increase 
in the employment of lone parents. This chapter looks closely at the effectiveness if 
WFTC on employment, hours of work and movements from different labour market states. 
The evidence suggests that once we control for the differential trends in employment 
between lone mothers and single childless women, who are used as the control group, 
the employment effect from WFTC falls considerably. This is confirmed when we look 
at the movements of the coefficients over time. Moreover, we find that the policy does 
not induce people from out of the labour market (i.e. from inactivity) - the main target 
group. Instead, we find that any effect of WFTC is solely borne on those working 30 
hours or more.
Overall, it is apparent that the complexity of WFTC and/or its interactions with other 
taxes and benefits are a good explanation for why the policy did not have a greater impact 
on its target groups.
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2.10 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics - Before WFTC
Variable Single Childless Women Lone Mothers
Age 27.065 23.928
r8.8811 [7.541]
White 0.956 0.922
[0.205] [0.267]
Black 0.021 0.048
[0.142] ro.2141
Asian 0.018 0.024
[0.135] [0.153]
Other Ethnicity 0.005 0.005
ro.0711 ro.073]
High Qualifications 0.195 0.055
[0.396] [0.227
Medium Qualification 0.375 0.300
[0.484] [0.4581
Low Qualifications 0.363 0.516
ro.481] ro.5001
No Qualifications 0.067 0.130
ro.2511 [0.3361
Hours of Work 34.926 25.167
[12.600] [14.4751
Work 0-15 Hours 0.090 0.157
[0.2861 [0.3631
Work 16-29 Hours 0.072 0.114
[0.258] [0.3171
Work 30+ Hours 0.668 0.223
[0.471] [0.416]
Employed 0.828 0.488
[0.378] ro.5001
Unemployed 0.079 0.101
T0.2691 [0.3011
Inactive 0.085 0.341
[0.2781 [0.474]
99
One Child 0.712
[0.4531
Two Children 0.221
T0.4151
Three or More Children 0.068
ro.2511
Youngest Child (0 to 5 years) 0.377
T0.4851
Youngest Child (6 to 11 years) 0.301
[0.4591
Youngest Child (12 to 16 years) 0.314
T0.4641
Observations* 163812 49907
Notes.
1. These are the observations when restricted to being work. When looking at Activity 
rates, there are 197,941 for single women with no children and 102,223 for lone mothers.
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Table 2.2: Employment - Basic Regression Results (1993-2003)*
18 years + 21 years +
Treatment Effect 0.036 0.046
[0.003]** [0.003]**
Age 0.045 0.06
[0.003]** [0.004]**
One Child -0.075 -0.145
[0.004]** [0.006]**
Two Children -0.154 -0.252
[0.006]** [0.008]**
3 or more Children -0.26 -0.389
[0.008]** [0.009]**
Medium Qual -0.035 -0.043
[0.003]** [0.003]**
Low Qual -0.131 -0.141
[0.003]** [0.003]**
No Qual -0.432 -0.434
[0.003]** [0.004]**
Youngest Child 0-5 -0.319 -0.223
[0.005]** [0.006]**
Youngest Child 6-11 -0.103 -0.07
[0.005]** [0.006]**
Black -0.078 -0.062
[0.005]** [0.005]**
Asian -0.111 -0.121
[0.006]** [0.007]**
Other Ethnicity -0.11 -0.106
[0.009]** [0.010]**
Trend 0.006 0.008
[0.000]** [0.000]**
Post 2000 -0.026 -0.036
[0.0031** ro.oo3i**
Observations 367699 297908
Notes. 
1. For Tables 2.2 to 2.9, we also control for region of residence, age squared and age 
cubed and the comparison categories are: No Children, High Qualification, Youngest 
Child 12-16, White.
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Table 2.3: Employment - Differential Trend Control Regression Results (1993-2003)
18 years + 21 years +
No Trend Trend No Trend Trend
Treatment Effect 0.036 0.018 0.046 0.017
[0.003]** [0.005]** [0.003]** [0.006]**
Age 0.045 0.045 0.06 0.06
[0.003]** [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.004]**
One Child -0.075 -0.09 -0.145 -0.172
[0.004]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.007]**
Two Children -0.154 -0.171 -0.252 -0.283
[0.006]** [0.007]** [0.008]** [0.009]**
3 or more Children -0.26 -0.278 -0.389 -0.419
[0.008]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.009]**
Medium Qual -0.035 -0.035 -0.043 -0.044
[0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]**
Low Qual -0.131 -0.131 -0.141 -0.141
[0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]**
No Qual -0.432 -0.432 -0.434 -0.434
[0.003]** [0.003]** i—
i o © o * * [0.004]**
Youngest Child 0-5 -0.319 -0.32 -0.223 -0.223
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
Youngest Child 6-11 -0.103 -0.104 -0.07 -0.07
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
Black -0.078 -0.078 -0.062 -0.061
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]**
Asian -0.111 -0.111 -0.121 -0.121
[0.006]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
Other Ethnicity -0.11 -0.111 -0.106 -0.106
[0.009]** [0.009]** [0.010]** [0.010]**
Trend 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.005
[0.000]** [0.001]** [0.000]** [0.001]**
Post 2000 -0.026 -0.019 -0.036 -0.023
TrendChild
[0.003]** [0.004]**
0.004
ro.oon**
[0.003]** [0.004]**
0.007
[0.0011**
Observations 367699 367699 297908 297908
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Table 2.4: Hours Distribution -  Regression Results (1993-2003)
Work 0-15 Hours Work 16-29 Hours Work 30+ Hours
No Trend Trend No Trend Trend No Trend Trend
Treatment Effect 0.002 -0.002 0.038 -0.001 0.018 0.013
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003]** [0.004] [0.005]** [0.008]+
Age -0.014 -0.014 -0.007 -0.008 0.088 0.088
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.005]** [0.005]**
One Child 0.044 0.041 0.078 0.043 -0.245 -0.249
[0.003]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.008]**
Two Children 0.064 0.059 0.066 0.03 -0.393 -0.396
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.007]**
3 or more Children 0.04 0.036 0.01 -0.017 -0.462 -0.464
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.004]* [0.004]** [0.006]** [0.007]**
Medium Qual 0.003 0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.025 -0.025
[0.001]* [0.001]* [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.003]** [0.003]**
Low Qual 0 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.116 -0.116
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.003]** [0.003]**
No Qual -0.01 -0.01 -0.035 -0.035 -0.397 -0.397
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.003]** [0.003]**
Youngest Child 0-5 0.013 0.013 0.032 0.032 -0.33 -0.33
[0.003]** [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.006]** [0.0061**
Youngest Child 6-11 0.024 0.024 0.048 0.048 -0.167 -0.167
[0.003]** [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
Black -0.006 -0.006 0.006 0.007 -0.057 -0.057
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.003]* [0.003]* [0.005]** [0.005]**
Asian 0.017 0.017 0.001 0.001 -0.129 -0.129
[0.003]** [0.003]** [0.004] [0.004] [0.007]** [0.007]**
Other Ethnicity 0 0 0.001 0.001 -0.106 -0.106
[0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.011]** [0.011]**
Trend 0.001 0 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002
[0.000]** [0.000] [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Post 2000 -0.006 -0.004 -0.017 -0.003 -0.012 -0.011
[0.001]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002] [0.004]** [0.004]*
Trend_Child 0.001
[0.0001
0.007
[0.0011**
0.001
[0.0011
Observations 293868 293868 292088 292088 297969 297969
Notes. 
1. Results for 21 years and over group.
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Table 2.5: Employment - Child Dummy Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Child -0.358 -0.367 -0.365 -0.349 -0.329 -0.343 -0.304 -0.266 -0.268 -0.266 -0.28
[0.007]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]**
Age -0.047 -0.026 -0.026 -0.004 0.01 0.031 0.007 0.008 0.001 -0.011 0.002
[0.010]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]** [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Medium Qual 0.008 -0.01 -0.005 -0.033 -0.053 -0.01 -0.053 -0.055 -0.067 -0.05 -0.044
[0.010] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.008] [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
Low Qual -0.081 -0.103 -0.098 -0.129 -0.164 -0.123 -0.166 -0.184 -0.187 -0.168 -0.171
[0.011]** [0.011]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]**
No Qual -0.362 -0.401 -0.4 -0.428 -0.474 -0.439 -0.48 -0.492 -0.483 -0.484 -0.505
[0.013]** [0.013]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]**
Black -0.118 -0.05 -0.087 -0.109 -0.068 -0.069 -0.076 -0.09 -0.047 -0.067 -0.044
[0.016]** [0.015]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]**
Asian -0.047 -0.051 -0.052 -0.098 -0.084 -0.087 -0.136 -0.086 -0.088 -0.094 -0.077
[0.020]* [0.020]* [0.020]** [0.021]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.018]** [0.017]** [0.016]** [0.016]**
Other Ethn. -0.245 -0.104 -0.076 -0.144 -0.044 -0.087 -0.108 -0.128 -0.032 -0.124 -0.087
[0.043]** [0.042]* [0.035]* [0.038]** [0.034] [0.031]** [0.034]** [0.033]** [0.018]+ [0.020]** [0.019]**
Observations 27322 27534 36615 36975 37539 38224 38382 37654 40047 39137 38258
Table 2.6: Employment -  Age of Youngest Child Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Youngest Child 0-5 -0.486 -0.469 -0.461 -0.434 -0.419 -0.437 -0.385 -0.353 -0.355 -0.357 -0.373
[0.008]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
Youngest Child 6-11 -0.165 -0.183 -0.203 -0.225 -0.218 -0.243 -0.215 -0.194 -0.2 -0.181 -0.222
Youngest Child 12-
[0.014]** [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** ** [0.010]** ** [0.010]** [0.010]**
16 -0.033 -0.038 -0.015 -0.074 -0.094 -0.098 -0.081 -0.052 -0.056 -0.073 -0.083
[0.013]* [0.013]** [0.012] [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]**
Age -0.004 0.018 0.021 0.028 0.04 0.063 0.035 0.04 0.034 0.018 0.035
[0.010] [0.010]+ [0.009]* [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]* [0.008]**
Medium Qual 0.012 -0.011 -0.005 -0.032 -0.052 -0.006 -0.05 -0.054 -0.063 -0.049 -0.038
[0.010] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.008] [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
Low Qual -0.064 -0.092 -0.085 -0.114 -0.15 -0.109 -0.154 -0.172 -0.172 -0.159 -0.16
[0.011]** [0.011]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]**
No Qual -0.349 -0.386 -0.391 -0.417 -0.467 -0.43 -0.47 -0.48 -0.474 -0.479 -0.498
[0.013]** [0.013]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]**
Black -0.118 -0.061 -0.097 -0.12 -0.073 -0.062 -0.074 -0.084 -0.037 -0.055 -0.037
[0.017]** [0.016]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.013]** [0.014]** [0.014]**
Asian -0.054 -0.041 -0.059 -0.13 -0.093 -0.1 -0.142 -0.099 -0.107 -0.104 -0.061
[0.020]** [0.020]* [0.020]** [0.022]** [0.019]** [0.020]** [0.019]** [0.018]** [0.018]** [0.017]** [0.015]**
Other Ethn. -0.251 -0.101 -0.104 -0.145 -0.038 -0.095 -0.115 -0.15 -0.035 -0.132 -0.089
[0.043]** [0.043]* [0.037]** [0.038]** [0.034] [0.032]** [0.034]** [0.033]** [0.018]* [0.020]** [0.019]**
Observations 27322 27534 36615 36975 37539 38224 38382 37654 40047 39137 38258
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Table 2.7: Employment - Number of Children Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
One Child -0.323 -0.314 -0.319 -0.32 -0.305 -0.314 -0.276 -0.234 -0.241 -0.236 -0.249
[0.009]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
Two Children -0.471 -0.531 -0.481 -0.429 -0.421 -0.448 -0.398 -0.361 -0.354 -0.356 -0.374
[0.013]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]**
3+ Children -0.518 -0.547 -0.549 -0.575 -0.532 -0.558 -0.539 -0.487 -0.499 -0.506 -0.55
[0.019]** [0.016]** [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.013]** [0.012]**
Age -0.04 -0.012 -0.014 0.008 0.021 0.047 0.021 0.021 0.013 0.005 0.021
[0.010]** [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]* [0.008]** [0.008]* [0.008]** [0.008]+ [0.008] [0.008]**
Medium Qual 0.009 -0.006 -0.003 -0.031 -0.05 -0.005 -0.05 -0.052 -0.063 -0.046 -0.035
[0.010] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.008] [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
Low Qual -0.079 -0.098 -0.094 -0.124 -0.159 -0.114 -0.158 -0.175 -0.178 -0.157 -0.154
[0.011]** [0.011]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]**
No Qual -0.353 -0.383 -0.385 -0.409 -0.456 -0.417 -0.461 -0.472 -0.464 -0.461 -0.481
[0.013]** [0.013]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.011]** [0.011]**
Black -0.106 -0.042 -0.09 -0.102 -0.064 -0.068 -0.074 -0.084 -0.046 -0.065 -0.041
[0.017]** [0.015]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]**
Asian -0.038 -0.041 -0.051 -0.086 -0.075 -0.078 -0.129 -0.085 -0.083 -0.091 -0.073
[0.020]+ [0.020]* [0.020]* [0.021]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.018]** [0.017]** [0.016]** [0.016]**
Other Ethn. -0.251 -0.107 -0.085 -0.145 -0.035 -0.083 -0.101 -0.131 -0.023 -0.125 -0.09
[0.043]** [0.042]* [0.036]* [0.038]** [0.033] [0.031]** [0.034]** [0.033]** [0.018] [0.020]** [0.019]**
Observations 27322 27534 36615 36865 37391 38092 38245 37449 39791 38881 37996
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Table 2.8: Employment -  Differential Qualifications Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Child -0.14 -0.153 -0.167 -0.178 -0.172 -0.236 -0.238 -0.167 -0.185 -0.168 -0.18
[0.039]** [0.039]** [0.025]** [0.022]** [0.021]** [0.018]** [0.018]** [0.017]** [0.016]** [0.016]** [0.016]**
Medium Qual 0.011 -0.014 -0.008 -0.031 -0.039 -0.004 -0.046 -0.037 -0.052 -0.029 -0.023
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009] [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]**
Low Qual -0.048 -0.065 -0.044 -0.073 -0.105 -0.067 -0.126 -0.135 -0.137 -0.12 -0.118
[0.011]** [0.011]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.009]**
No Qual -0.356 -0.391 -0.38 -0.407 -0.479 -0.453 -0.501 -0.512 -0.514 -0.508 -0.535
[0.014]** [0.014]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.013]** [0.013]**
Med Qual*Child -0.168 -0.138 -0.096 -0.093 -0.123 -0.068 -0.047 -0.095 -0.077 -0.102 -0.102
[0.045]** [0.044]** [0.028]** [0.025]** [0.025]** [0.020]** [0.019]* [0.021]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.019]**
Low Qual*Child -0.276 -0.284 -0.279 -0.248 -0.231 -0.183 -0.114 -0.153 -0.141 -0.149 -0.161
[0.044]** [0.044]** [0.029]** [0.026]** [0.025]** [0.022]** [0.021]** [0.021]** [0.020]** [0.020]** [0.020]**
No Qual*Child -0.191 -0.199 -0.186 -0.158 -0.089 -0.038 -0.002 -0.025 0 -0.018 -0.005
[0.045]** [0.045]** [0.031]** [0.028]** [0.025]** [0.021]+ [0.020] [0.021] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
Age -0.045 -0.022 -0.019 0.003 0.016 0.034 0.01 0.012 0.004 -0.007 0.004
[0.010]** [0.010]* [0.009]* [0.009] [0.008]+ [0.008]** [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Black -0.119 -0.053 -0.089 -0.114 -0.068 -0.071 -0.078 -0.09 -0.045 -0.066 -0.045
[0.017]** [0.015]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]**
Asian -0.051 -0.048 -0.053 -0.102 -0.082 -0.086 -0.135 -0.085 -0.089 -0.094 -0.075
[0.020]* [0.020]* [0.020]** [0.021]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.018]** [0.017]** [0.016]** [0.016]**
Other Ethn. -0.245 -0.109 -0.083 -0.145 -0.046 -0.088 -0.106 -0.131 -0.033 -0.125 -0.088
[0.043]** [0.042]** [0.036]* [0.038]** [0.034] [0.031]** [0.034]** [0.033]** [0.018]+ [0.020]** [0.019]**
Observations 27322 27534 36615 36975 37539 38224 38382 37654 40047 39137 38258
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Table 2.9: Other Labour Market Outcome -  Regression Results (1993-2003)
Unemployment Inactivity
No trend Trend No Trend Trend
Treatment Effect 0.002 -0.017 -0.037 0.006
[0.002] [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.005]
Age -0.023 -0.023 -0.03 -0.029
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.003]** [0.003]**
One Child 0.029 0.013 0.113 0.158
[0.003]** [0.003]** [0.005]** [0.007]**
Two Children 0.023 0.007 0.208 0.263
[0.004]** [0.004]+ [0.007]** [0.009]**
3 or more Children 0.024 0.007 0.32 0.38
[0.004]** [0.004]+ [0.009]** [0.010]**
Medium Qual -0.002 -0.002 0.073 0.074
[0.001] [0.001]+ [0.003]** [0.003]**
Low Qual 0.015 0.014 0.154 0.154
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.003]** [0.003]**
No Qual 0.022 0.022 0.447 0.447
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.004]** [0.004]**
Youngest Child 0-5 -0.009 -0.009 0.225 0.226
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
Youngest Child 6-11 0.015 0.014 0.057 0.058
[0.003]**
**rn1
oooL 
I [0.005]** [0.005]**
Black 0.062 0.063 -0.013 -0.014
[0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]**
Asian 0.054 0.054 0.046 0.046
[0.004]** [0.004]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
Other Ethnicity 0.053 0.052 0.046 0.046
[0.006]** [0.006]** [0.009]** [0.009]**
Trend -0.004 -0.006 -0.001 0.003
[0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.001]**
Post 2000 -0.001 0.007 0.027 0.005
Trend_Child
[0.002] [0.002]**
0.004
ro.oooi**
[0.003]** [0.003]
-0.01
[0.0011**
Observations 297969 297969 297969 297969
Notes. 
1. We restrict the sample to people aged 21 years or more.
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Figure 2.1: Average Income by Family Type
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1. Source- Goodman & Shephard (2002)
Figure 2.2: Cross-Country Lone Parent Employment Rates
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1. Source - Gregg & Harkness (2004), OECD Economic Outlook 2001.
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Figure 2.3: Employment Rate of Single Childless Women and Lone Mothers
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Figure 2.4: Basic Tax Credit Rates, 1999-2003
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Figure 2.5a: Hours Distribution: Lone Mothers
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1. Source - UK Labour Force Survey
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Figure 2.5b: Hours Distribution: Single (Childless) Women
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Figure 2.6a: Proportion Working 0-15 Hours
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Figure 2.6b: Proportion Working 16-29 Hours
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Figure 2.6c: Proportion Working 30+ Hours
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Figure 2.7: Generosity Change from Family Credit to WFTC
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1. Source - Blundell & Walker (2001)
Figure 2.8: Budget Constraint for Lone Parents
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1. Source - Blundell et al (2000)0ne child aged under 11. Hourly wage £4.39 (median for lone parent), rent 
£41.1 Op.w. (median for social renters with children). No childcare costs.
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Figure 2.9: Employment Rates for Lone Mothers
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Figure 2.10: Employment - Child Marginal Effect
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Figure 2.11: Employment - Age of Youngest Child Marginal Effect
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Figure 2.13: Employment - Highest Qual. (Interacted with Child) Marginal Effect
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Figure 2.14a: Work 0-15 Hours -  Child Marginal Effect
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Figure 2.14b: Work 16-29 Hours -  Child Marginal Effect
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Figure 2.15a: Unemployment -  Child Marginal Effect
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Appendix 2.A: Additional Tables & Figures
Table 2.A1: Average Hours Worked (% in each group) (1995-2003)
Lone Mothers Single (Childless) Women
Hours 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Hours 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
0-1 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.01 0-1 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 0 0.02 0.01 0.01
2-3 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.65 0.5 0.45 0.29 0.26 0.17 2-3 0.17 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.05
4-5 2.21 2.95 2.73 2.53 2.45 1.84 1.59 1.67 1.61 4-5 0.44 0.4 0.39 0.32 0.39 0.33 0.28 0.35 0.41
6-7 4.43 3.86 3.33 3.51 2.72 2.33 2.09 2.18 2.17 6-7 0.72 0.68 0.63 0.6 0.6 0.46 0.56 0.54 0.65
8-9 2.36 2.6 2.43 2.34 2.29 2.36 2.06 2.25 2.08 8-9 1.16 1.08 1.13 1.04 0.89 0.98 0.98 0.9 0.98
10-11 2.85 2.85 3.49 2.7 3 2.44 2.29 2.54 2.54 10-11 0.96 0.99 1 1.04 1.07 0.94 0.91 0.96 0.85
12-13 2.97 2.91 2.83 2.69 2.68 2.87 2.33 2.75 2.3 12-13 1.02 0.98 1.03 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.97 1.08 1.23
14-15 1.65 1.76 1.32 1.65 1.63 1.35 1.8 1.6 1.71 14-15 0.55 0.58 0.65 0.61 0.71 0.75 0.65 0.61 0.77
16-17 7.8 8.66 7.64 8.52 9.15 9.35 10.47 10.69 10.16 16-17 1.59 1.69 2.07 1.77 1.97 1.89 1.93 2.19 2.39
18-19 3.54 3.45 3.81 5.27 5.66 4.83 5.13 4.89 5.02 18-19 0.79 0.87 0.89 0.95 0.91 0.98 1.02 0.91 0.94
20-21 6.67 6.65 7.73 7.71 8.47 7.92 8.18 8.51 8.51 20-21 1.52 1.79 1.88 1.93 1.8 2.22 2.04 1.91 2.15
22-23 3.14 3.24 3.94 3.86 4.02 5.01 4.76 5.15 5.18 22-23 0.67 0.74 0.79 1.01 0.89 1.02 0.92 0.98 0.94
24-25 2.26 2.56 3.23 2.88 2.85 3.55 3.02 3.23 4.05 24-25 0.75 0.78 0.86 0.77 0.89 0.76 0.85 0.88 0.89
26-27 3.8 3.96 4.72 3.83 3.99 4.52 4.4 4.64 4.91 26-27 1.74 1.61 1.66 1.75 1.73 1.97 1.75 1.79 1.8
28-29 1.86 2.28 2.58 2.16 2.07 2.32 2.69 2.96 2.63 28-29 1.15 1.17 1.12 1.26 1.17 1.2 1.14 1.03 1.02
30-31 3.94 439 3.96 3.72 4.29 4.55 4.9 5.65 6 30-31 2.88 2.99 2.77 2.64 2.68 2.78 2.67 2.57 3.07
32-33 2.26 2.26 2.04 2.23 2 2.17 2.17 2.46 2.28 32-33 1.76 1.79 1.63 1.82 1.87 2.01 1.69 1.66 1.54
34-35 1.14 1.19 0.82 1.12 1.25 1.16 1.32 1.55 1.36 34-35 1.26 1.24 1.12 0.93 0.95 1.01 0.91 0.88 1.01
36-37 10.19 10.91 9.74 9.24 9.26 9.76 9.85 8.16 9.4 36-37 17.38 17.53 16.51 16.47 16.07 15.57 16.34 16 16.5
38-39 15.92 13.91 14.09 14.77 13.76 13.95 14.07 13.48 13.18 38-39 27.21 26.46 26.99 27.71 27.88 28.16 29.32 29.87 28.82
40-41 11.66 10.24 10.95 11.59 9.95 9.61 9.6 8.77 8.66 40-41 19.68 19.51 19.22 19.11 19.55 19.15 18.96 19.04 19.14
42-43 2.47 2.99 2.7 2.11 2.58 2.48 2.17 1.89 1.79 42-43 5.39 5.63 5.43 5.09 5.22 4.9 4.81 5.06 4.37
44-45 2.02 1.8 1.64 1.39 1.28 1.25 1.28 1.21 1.02 44-45 3.47 3.16 3.38 3.05 3.08 3.17 2.96 2.57 2.47
46-47 2.32 1.99 1.95 1.76 1.92 1.89 1.82 1.57 1.66 46-47 3.65 4.03 3.93 4.43 4.24 4.2 4.07 3.88 3.55
48-49 0.97 1.19 0.99 0.76 1.07 1 0.77 0.93 0.78 48-49 1.92 1.79 1.99 2.11 1.95 1.99 2.04 1.89 2.02
50+ 0.95 0.9 0.82 0.95 1.09 1.03 0.91 1 0.82 50+ 2.16 2.38 2.72 2.47 2.36 2.5 2.12 2.38 2.42
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Table 2.A2a: Work 0-15 Hours- Child Dummy Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Child 0.033 0.039 0.057 0.056 0.05 0.053 0.054 0.054 0.044 0.051 0.041
T0.0041** T0.0041** ro.0031** T0.0031** T0.003]** ro.oo3i** [0.0031** T0.0031** T0.0031** [0.0031** [0.0031**
Observations 27130 27309 36244 36522 37069 37712 37796 37054 39240 38276 37496
Table 2.A2b: Work 0-15 Hours -  Age of Youngest Child Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Age 0-5 0.026 0.036 0.049 0.056 0.052 0.046 0.053 0.063 0.049 0.048 0.039
[0.004]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]**
Age 6-11 0.037 0.071 0.123 0.093 0.083 0.095 0.083 0.081 0.053 0.088 0.074
[0.007]** [0.009]** [0.010]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
Age 12-16 0.028 0.029 0.058 0.034 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.055 0.05 0.053 0.037
[0.0061** [0.0061** [0.008]** ro.oo7i** [0.0071** [0.0071** [0.0071** [0.0071** [0.0071** [0.0071** [0.006]**
Observations 27130 27309 36244 36522 37069 37712 37796 37054 39240 38276 37496
Table 2.A2c: Work 0-15 Hours - Number of Children Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
One Child 0.033 0.039 0.053 0.052 0.047 0.049 0.05 0.048 0.038 0.049 0.033
[0.004]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]**
Two Children 0.046 0.047 0.091 0.094 0.081 0.085 0.083 0.102 0.083 0.084 0.076
[0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.006]**
3+ Children 0.012 0.048 0.072 0.067 0.054 0.067 0.081 0.073 0.044 0.067 0.056
[0.011] [0.0131** ro.0121** [0.0111** [0.0111** [0.0111** [0.0111** [0.0111** [0.0091** [0.0101** [0.0101**
Observations 27130 27309 36244 36412 36921 37581 37661 36849 38986 38021 37235
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Table 2.A2d: Work 0-15 Hours -  Differential Qualification Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Child 0.017 0.028 0.054 0.031 0.061 0.054 0.062 0.07 0.059 0.057 0.063
[0.018] [0.018] [0.014]** [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]**
Med Qual 0.017 0.016 0.032 0.029 0.038 0.037 0.029 0.034 0.041 0.03 0.04
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.005]**
Low Qual -0.015 -0.019 -0.02 -0.019 -0.009 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 0.01 -0.006 0.004
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]* [0.005] [0.005]+ [0.005]* [0.005]* [0.004] [0.005]
No Qual -0.014 -0.027 -0.018 -0.01 -0.006 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 0.004 -0.016 0.006
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.006]+ [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006]** [0.007]
Med Qual*Child 0.007 -0.013 -0.017 0.001 -0.023 -0.014 -0.017 -0.025 -0.023 -0.021 -0.025
[0.018] [0.013] [0.008]* [0.011] [0.007]** [0.007]+ [0.007]* [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
Low Qual*Child 0.021 0.025 0.019 0.053 0.012 0.02 0.015 0.01 0.001 0.02 -0.002
[0.021] [0.020] [0.013] [0.016]** [0.011] [0.011]+ [0.010] [0.009] [0.008] [0.010]* [0.008]
No Qual*Child 0.012 0.025 0.006 0.011 -0.011 -0.005 -0.02 -0.007 -0.003 0.004 -0.026
ro.0201 [0.0221 [0.0131 [0.0131 [0.0101 [0.0101 T0.0081** [0.009] [0.0091 [0.011] [0.007]**
Observations 27130 27309 36244 36522 37069 37712 37796 37054 39240 38276 37496
Table 2.A3a: Work 16-29 Hours- Child Dummy Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Child 0.027 0.032 0.069 0.073 0.088 0.09 0.105 0.114 0.126 0.137 0.139
[0.0041** [0.004]** [0.0041** ro.oo4i** [0.0041** [0.0041** [0.004]** [0.0041** [0.0041** [0.0041** [0.0041**
Observations 26828 27034 35941 36222 36814 37519 37624 36862 39189 38254 37272
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Table 2.A3b: Work 16-29 Hours -  Age of Youngest Child Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Age 0-5 0.015 0.03 0.07 0.075 0.088 0.097 0.111 0.121 0.144 0.148 0.152
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
Age 6-11 0.075 0.067 0.108 0.104 0.153 0.141 0.161 0.183 0.174 0.179 0.208
[0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]**
Age 12-16 0.012 0.03 0.061 0.071 0.08 0.047 0.088 0.088 0.097 0.096 0.093
[0.0071+ [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.0091** [0.0091** [0.0091** ro.oioi** ro.oioi** ro.oo9i** ro.oioi** ro.oioi**
Observations 26828 27034 35941 36222 36814 37519 37624 36862 39189 38254 37272
Table 2.A3c: Work 16-29 Hours - Number of Children Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
One Child 0.036 0.045 0.081 0.081 0.098 0.103 0.122 0.132 0.144 0.157 0.165
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
Two Children 0.014 -0.001 0.066 0.098 0.108 0.107 0.135 0.144 0.158 0.177 0.17
[0.008]+ [0.007] [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]**
3+ Children -0.014 0.013 0.051 0.032 0.048 0.058 0.041 0.084 0.102 0.094 0.086
ro.oioi r o .o in [0.0111** [0.011]** [0.0111** [0.0111** [0.0111** ro.0121** [0.0121** ro.0121** ro.0121**
Observations 26828 27034 35941 36114 36668 37392 37490 36663 38942 38006 37023
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Table 2.A3d: Work 16-29 Hours -  Differential Qualification Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Child 0.032 -0.018 0.103 0.11 0.126 0.104 0.099 0.116 0.136 0.187 0.14
[0.020] [0.019] [0.015]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.013]** [0.012]**
Med Qual -0.018 -0.014 -0.021 -0.003 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.02 0.036 0.04 0.034
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
Low Qual -0.028 -0.028 -0.027 -0.018 -0.006 -0.005 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.027 0.022
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007]** [0.007]**
No Qual -0.03 -0.022 -0.033 -0.032 -0.019 -0.014 -0.018 -0.019 -0.001 0.033 -0.01
[0.005]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.008]+ [0.008]* [0.008]* [0.009] [0.011]** [0.010]
Med Qual*Child -0.003 0.071 -0.014 -0.03 -0.028 -0.007 0.01 -0.001 -0.016 -0.033 0.016
[0.017] [0.035]* [0.010] [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.010]+ [0.009]** [0.012]
Low Qual*Child 0 0.071 -0.023 -0.02 -0.023 -0.007 0.011 0.004 0.012 -0.035 -0.011
[0.017] [0.032]* [0.009]* [0.010]* [0.009]* [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.009]** [0.011]
No Qual*Child -0.012 0.027 -0.048 -0.042 -0.046 -0.043 -0.026 -0.023 -0.038 -0.071 -0.033
ro.oi6i [0.027] [0.0071** ro.oosi** [0.008]** ro.oo9i** [0.0111* [0.0121+ [0.0111** [0.008]** [0.0121**
Observations 26828 27034 35941 36222 36814 37519 37624 36862 39189 38254 37272
Table 2.A4a: Work 30+ Hours- Child Dummy Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Child -0.42 -0.438 -0.489 -0.479 -0.473 -0.489 -0.47 -0.442 -0.445 -0.462 -0.465
[0.007]** [0.007]** [0.0051** [0.0051** ro.oosi** [0.0051** [0.0051** ro.oosi** T0.0051** [0.0051** [0.0051**
Observations 27328 27542 36627 36984 37555 38233 38392 37656 40057 39141 38263
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Table 2.A4b: Work 30+ Hours -  Age of Youngest Child Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Age 0-5 -0.515 -0.518 -0.554 -0.538 -0.532 -0.549 -0.521 -0.507 -0.518 -0.519 -0.522
[0.007]** [0.007]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]**
Age 6-11 -0.258 -0.289 -0.362 -0.357 -0.382 -0.398 -0.386 -0.386 -0.361 -0.376 -0.414
[0.013]** [0.012]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.007]**
Age 12-16 -0.076 -0.093 -0.138 -0.165 -0.209 -0.165 -0.184 -0.175 -0.178 -0.198 -0.186
ro.013]** ro.oi3i** [0.013]** [0.0121** [0.012]** ro.012]** [0.012]** fO.012]** [0.011]** ro .o in * * ro.oin**
Observations 27328 27542 36627 36984 375SS 38233 38392 37656 40057 39141 38263
Table 2.A4c: Work 30+ Hours - Number of Children Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
One Child -0.378 -0.375 -0.418 -0.417 -0.421 -0.425 -0.413 -0.382 -0.391 -0.404 -0.405
[0.008]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
Two Children -0.496 -0.527 -0.546 -0.528 -0.522 -0.542 -0.522 -0.515 -0.504 -0.522 -0.516
[0.009]** [0.008]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
3+ Children -0.487 -0.543 -0.556 -0.564 -0.537 -0.56 -0.549 -0.528 -0.541 -0.547 -0.556
ro.oi4i** [0.009]** ro.oo6]** [0.006]** ro.oo7i** ro.oo6i** [0.0061** T0.007]** ro.oo6i** [0.0061** ro.oosi**
Observations 27328 27542 36627 36874 37407 38101 38255 37451 39801 38885 38001
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Table 2.A4d: Work 30+ Hours -  Differential Qualification Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Child -0.176 -0.133 -0.322 -0.303 -0.332 -0.357 -0.353 -0.321 -0.337 -0.372 -0.339
[0.040]** [0.040]** [0.023]** [0.021]** [0.019]** [0.018]** [0.017]** [0.017]** [0.016]** [0.015]** [0.015]**
Med Qual 0.004 -0.021 -0.023 -0.055 -0.076 -0.046 -0.072 -0.085 -0.118 -0.092 -0.09
[0.011] [0.011]+ [0.010]* [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]**
Low Qual 0.006 -0.001 0.017 -0.021 -0.071 -0.041 -0.095 -0.11 -0.124 -0.119 -0.118
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010]+ [0.010]* [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]**
No Qual -0.287 -0.311 -0.291 -0.323 -0.399 -0.39 -0.414 -0.427 -0.446 -0.45 -0.457
[0.013]** [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]**
Med Qual*ChiId -0.17 -0.188 -0.037 -0.054 -0.062 -0.062 -0.075 -0.077 -0.058 -0.055 -0.13
[0.042]** [0.041]** [0.028] [0.025]* [0.024]** [0.022]** [0.021]** [0.021]** [0.020]** [0.019]** [0.019]**
Low Qual*Child -0.314 -0.397 -0.283 -0.31 -0.271 -0.27 -0.238 -0.235 -0.24 -0.202 -0.228
[0.038]** [0.033]** [0.025]** [0.022]** [0.022]** [0.021]** [0.020]** [0.020]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.019]**
No Qual*Child -0.298 -0.373 -0.254 -0.257 -0.162 -0.166 -0.107 -0.145 -0.102 -0.089 -0.087
[0.040]** [0.035]** ro.0291** [0.026]** ro.0271** ro.0261** r0.0261** [0.0251** [0.025]** [0.026]** _ [0.026]**
Observations 26828 27034 35941 36222 36814 37519 37624 36862 39189 38254 37272
Table 2.A5a: Unemployment - Child Dummy Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Child 0.002 0.005 0.012 0.019 0.019 0.031 0.024 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.018
ro.oo4i
Io©
ro.oo3i** ro.oo3i** ro.oo3i** [0.0031** ro.oo3i** ro.oo3i** o o o N> * ro.oo2i** [0.0021**
Observations 27328 27542 36627 36984 37555 38233 38392 37656 40057 39141 38263
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Table 2.A5b: Unemployment -  Age of Youngest Child Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Age 0-5 -0.001 -0.003 0.006 0.009 0.014 0.022 0.019 0.01 0.006 0.011 0.011
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004]+ [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]* [0.003]** [0.003]**
Age 6-11 0.011 0.029 0.03 0.035 0.042 0.061 0.05 0.036 0.033 0.029 0.04
[0.008] [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]**
Age 12-16 0.008 -0.004 -0.006 0.023 0.016 0.018 0.026 0.006 0.017 0.023 0.027
[0.007] [0.007] [0.0061 [0.0071** [0.006]** [0.0061** [0.006]** [0.0051 [0.0051** [0.005]** [0.0061**
Observations 27328 27542 36627 36984 37555 38233 38392 37656 40057 39141 38263
Table 2.A5c: Unemployment - Number of Children Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
One Child 0.005 0.007 0.015 0.024 0.018 0.036 0.027 0.013 0.015 0.021 0.024
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]**
Two Children -0.007 0.002 0.003 0.015 0.027 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.011 0.012
[0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]**
3+ Children 0.002 0.005 0.014 0.005 0.02 0.039 0.036 0.02 0.008 0.015 0.015
[0.0121 [0.011] [0.0081+ [0.0081 ro.oosi* [0.0081** ro.oosi** [0.007]** (0.006) [0.0061* ro.oo6i*
Observations 27328 27542 36627 36874 37407 38101 38255 37451 39801 38885 38001
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Table 2.A5d: Unemployment -  Differential Qualification Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Child 0.034 0.054 0.017 0.035 0.037 0.04 0.035 0.029 0.023 0.014 0.025
[0.024] [0.024]* [0.014] [0.012]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]+ [0.008]**
Med Qual -0.024 -0.017 -0.022 -0.004 0.003 -0.012 0.008 0 0.004 -0.002 0
[0.006]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.005] [0.005] [0.004]** [0.004]+ [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Low Qual 0.006 0.007 -0.008 0.009 0.016 -0.001 0.018 0.022 0.019 0.023 0.018
[0.006] [0.006] [0.005]+ [0.005]+ [0.005]** [0.004] [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]**
No Qual 0.046 0.066 0.035 0.034 0.062 0.055 0.069 0.058 0.047 0.03 0.034
[0.009]** [0.010]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]**
Med Qual*Child 0.007 -0.023 -0.006 -0.009 -0.01 -0.006 -0.006 0.001 -0.003 0.012 0
[0.024] [0.017] [0.014] [0.011] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.009] [0.008]
Low Qual*Child -0.024 -0.027 0.011 -0.011 -0.008 0.006 -0.001 -0.015 -0.008 -0.001 -0.008
[0.018] [0.016] [0.014] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.007]* [0.007] [0.008] [0.007]
No Qual*Child -0.059 -0.069 -0.038 -0.029 -0.039 -0.035 -0.035 -0.034 -0.022 -0.012 -0.019
[0.0121** [0.0091** [0.0091** [0.0091** [0.007]** [0.0051** [0.0051** [0.004]** [0.0061** [0.0071+ [0.0061**
Observations 27328 27542 36627 36984 37555 38233 38392 37656 40057 39141 38263
Table 2.A6a: Inactivity - Child Dummy Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Child 0.355 0.360 0.344 0.320 0.300 0.304 0.272 0.249 0.250 0.248 0.255
[0.0071** T0.0071** ro.oo6i** [0.0051** ro.oosi** [0.0051** [0.0051** ro.oosi** [0.0051** ro.oosi** ro.oosi**
Observations 27328 27542 36627 36984 37555 38233 38392 37656 40057 39141 38263
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Table 2.A6b: Inactivity -  Age of Youngest Child Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Age 0-5 0.496 0.479 0.453 0.425 0.407 0.415 0.366 0.349 0.353 0.353 0.365
[0.009]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.007]**
Age 6-11 0.167 0.163 0.188 0.207 0.183 0.191 0.17 0.167 0.175 0.157 0.183
[0.013]** [0.013]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]**
Age 12-16 0.033 0.051 0.03 0.047 0.073 0.083 0.044 0.046 0.03 0.047 0.054
[o.oii]** ro.oi2]** ro.oin** ro.om** ro.oin** [0.012]** [0.010]** ro.oioi** [0.009]** ro.oioi** [0.010]**
Observations 27328 27542 36627 36984 37555 38233 38392 37656 40057 39141 38263
Table 2.6c: Inactivity - Number of Children Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
One Child 0.343 0.332 0.323 0.31 0.298 0.291 0.258 0.236 0.237 0.228 0.233
[0.009]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.007]** © © © l-» • [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
Two Children 0.501 0.557 0.502 0.433 0.409 0.439 0.392 0.357 0.348 0.36 0.372
[0.014]** [0.013]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]**
3+ Children 0.542 0.569 0.555 0.593 0.526 0.536 0.506 0.483 0.502 0.506 0.546
ro.0211** o o 00 » » ro.oi4]** ro.oi4i** [0.015]** _ [0.014]** ro.oi4i** [0.0141** [0.0131** [0.014]** [0.013]**
Observations 27328 27542 36627 36874 37407 38101 38255 37451 39801 38885 38001
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Table 2.A6d: Inactivity -  Differential Qualification Marginal Effect (1993-2003)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Child 0.14 0.111 0.207 0.184 0.167 0.219 0.223 0.16 0.184 0.191 0.171
[0.037]** [0.037]** [0.024]** [0.021]** [0.020]** [0.018]** [0.017]** [0.016]** [0.016]** [0.015]** [0.015]**
Med Qual 0.022 0.048 0.061 0.054 0.047 0.034 0.04 0.039 0.052 0.052 0.03
[0.010]* [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]**
Low Qual 0.048 0.074 0.085 0.09 0.11 0.093 0.123 0.13 0.141 0.119 0.119
[0.010]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.009]**
No Qual 0.353 0.392 0.429 0.441 0.487 0.459 0.492 0.515 0.533 0.548 0.56
[0.016]** [0.017]** [0.016]** [0.016]** [0.015]** [0.015]** [0.015]** [0.015]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]**
Med Qual*Child 0.151 0.186 0.058 0.073 0.115 0.061 0.046 0.089 0.073 0.057 0.094
[0.046]** [0.051]** [0.024]* [0.023]** [0.024]** [0.019]** [0.017]** [0.020]** [0.018]** [0.017]** [0.018]**
Low QuaI*ChiId 0.274 0.314 0.18 0.191 0.178 0.124 0.07 0.128 0.101 0.097 0.127
[0.050]** [0.053]** [0.029]** [0.027]** [0.025]** [0.021]** [0.018]** [0.021]** [0.019]** [0.018]** [0.019]**
No Qual*Child 0.126 0.198 0.073 0.066 0.045 0.01 -0.016 0.012 -0.023 -0.03 -0.019
ro.0421** ro.osn** [0.0251** [0.0231** ro.0211* [0.016] [0.014] ro.oi7i [0.014]+ [0.0131* [0.0141
Observations 27328 27542 36627 36984 37555 38233 38392 37656 40057 39141 38263
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Figure 2A1: Employment Rate of Lone Mothers and Single (Childless Low Edu) Women
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Chapter 3
Gender Gaps In Unem ploym ent 
R ates in OECD Countries.
3.1 Introduction
There is an enormous literature on gender gaps in pay and a vast literature on gender 
gaps in labour force participation rates (see Altonji and Blank (1999) for an overall survey 
and Blau and Kahn (2003) for a recent international comparison). Yet, there is very little 
recent literature on gender gaps in unemployment rates. There was a literature on the 
subject in the US in the 1970s and early 1980s (see, for example, Barrett and Morgen- 
stern (1974); Niemi (1974); Johnson (1983)) but few recent papers perhaps because the 
female and male unemployment rates in the US have converged. But this convergence 
has not happened in all OECD countries. Table 3.1 shows that, while the gender gap in 
unemployment rates (measured as the female minus the male) is small (or even negative) 
in some countries, there are others in which it is very large. For example in the UK, the 
prime-age female unemployment rate is 1.1 percentage points below the male while in 
Spain it is 11.8 percentage points above. It should be emphasized that the unemployment 
rates in Table 3.1 are all computed using the standardized ILO definition so are meant to 
be comparable across countries1. One can identify several distinct groups of countries in 
Table 3.1. First, the highest gender gaps in unemployment rates are to be found in the 
Mediterranean countries (Spain, Greece, Italy and France). Next come the Benelux coun­
tries (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg), then the ‘Germanic’ countries (Germany, 
Austria and Switzerland), then the ‘Nordic’ countries (Sweden, Finland and Norway)
lrTo be unemployed according to the ILO definition, one must not be currently in employment, one 
must have looked for work in the last 4 weeks and be available to start work within 2 weeks.
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and, finally the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries (US, UK, Ireland, Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand). In a number of the Mediterranean countries the ‘unemployment problem’ is 
largely a problem of female unemployment2 . For future use we will refer to the countries 
in which the female unemployment rate is much higher than the male as the ‘high-gap’ 
countries and those in which the female-male gap in unemployment rates is small or even 
negative as the ‘low-gap’ countries. Figure 3.1 shows that the cross-country variation in 
the gender gap in unemployment rates has changed over time. Most of the countries that 
now have large gaps used to have small or non-existent gaps and the gap only emerged in 
the 1960s and 1970s whereas some countries like the US used to have a gender gap but 
now do not (although it was always much smaller than seen in some countries today).
The aim of this chapter is to understand the cross-country variation in the gender gap 
in the unemployment rate. One should emphasize that the question we are interested 
in answering is not ‘why are women less likely to be in employment than men?’ (either 
measured as the employment-population ratio or the labour force participation rate) for 
which there are fairly obvious answers in terms of the allocation of domestic responsibilities 
and a large literature on the subject but the question ‘why, once they have decided they 
want a job, are women in some countries much less likely to be in employment than men?’. 
Of course, it may not be so easy to separate participation from unemployment decisions 
in practice as there are likely to be feedback between the two e.g. the expectation of 
higher future unemployment is likely to deter human capital accumulation and discourage 
labour supply in the same was as other anticipated interruptions to market work (see 
Weiss and Gronau (1981)) for a model of this. We do discuss where we think the most 
important linkages might be but, to keep the chapter to a manageable size, we do draw 
some essentially arbitrary lines around the issues we discuss and those we do not.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the next section we discuss human capital, 
institutions and discrimination as the likely determinants of the gender gap in unem­
ployment rates to act as a framework for the empirical evidence that follows. Section 
3.3 investigates the variation in the gender gap in unemployment rates: we find that the 
gender gap in unemployment rates tends to be larger for the young, married women and 
those with young children, a pattern that is consistent with the predictions of human 
capital theory.
Section 3.4 then looks at gender differences in labour market dynamics, the flows into 
and out of employment, unemployment and inactivity. Women have higher flows than 
men into inactivity in all countries but, in the “high gap” countries there are large gender 
differentials in the flow out of employment into unemployment and unemployment into
2 Typically these countries also have very high youth unemployment rates though we do not consider 
this issue here.
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employment. The rest of the chapter then explores these gender differences in flows in 
more detail.
Section 3.5 investigates in more detail flows from employment into unemployment. We find 
evidence that the gender gap in these flows is larger for groups with weaker labour market 
attachment. However, we show that domestic responsibilities (primarily child care) only 
account for a small fraction of job endings that result in unemployment (most job endings 
for these reasons end up in inactivity). The gender gap in the flow from employment 
to unemployment seems to be larger in countries with a two-tier employment structure 
in which the jobs of permanent workers are protected by firing costs and there are large 
numbers of temporary workers with little job protection. Women with low levels of labour 
market attachment are much less likely to be in one of the protected permanent jobs.
Section 3.6 investigates the flow from unemployment to employment. We find no evidence 
that the female unemployed axe less ‘serious’ about wanting work than their male coun­
terparts in the ‘high-gap’ countries. The gender gap in reported search activity seems 
similar in both ‘high-gap’ and ‘low-gap’ countries and the receipt of welfare benefits by 
women in ‘high-gap’ countries is typically quite low.
Section 3.7 considers the hypothesis that the demand for women is relatively low in the 
“high gap” countries. We do find some evidence that wage compression increases the 
gender gap in unemployment rates. But we also find evidence that there is a corre­
lation (even within countries) between attitudes to the employment of women and the 
gender gap in unemployment rates. We present evidence consistent with the view that 
high unemployment makes it easier for employers to indulge any residual discriminatory 
behaviour towards women.
Our overall conclusion is that human capital theory and institutions can explain a large 
part (though probably not all) of the gender gap in unemployment rates. In addition 
there is some evidence that attitudes towards male and female unemployment may be 
important in explaining the gap in countries where unemployment is high.
3.2 Explanations of the Gender Gap in Unemployment Rates
In this section we review a number of possible theories for why there might be a gender 
gap in unemployment rates. There is not much written on this aspect of the differences 
between men and women but a good starting-point is the very large literature on the 
gender pay gap.
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Part of the pay gap between men and women is undoubtedly the result of differences 
in labour market attachment that lead to differences in human capital accumulation. 
There remains some debate about how much of the gender pay gap can be explained by 
differences in human capital but there is no longer any debate (as there once was) that this 
hypothesis has considerable explanatory power (see Altonji and Blank (1999) or Polachek 
(2004)). It is also true that differences in unemployment rates across demographic groups 
other than gender are related to differences in human capital e.g. more education is 
associated with lower unemployment (see, for example, Ashenfelter and Ham (1979)). 
The most plausible reason for this relationship between unemployment rates and human 
capital is that the gap between marginal product when in work and the reservation wage 
is smaller for those with low levels of human capital. There are other reasons for why 
differences in labour market attachment may result in differences in unemployment rates: 
for example, Johnson (1983) suggested that the female unemployment rate is likely to be 
higher than the male because women wanting to move from home production into market 
work are likely to go through a period of intervening unemployment while men who want 
to change jobs are likely to remain in employment.
Hence, human capital theory predicts higher unemployment rates for women than for 
men and, among women, higher unemployment rates for women who are likely to have 
accumulated less human capital like married women and those with children. And, across 
countries, those with lower levels of female labour market attachment would be expected 
to have higher unemployment rates3. And over time we would expect to see rising female 
labour market participation associated with changes in the gender gap in unemployment 
rates4.
The relationship between gender differences in human capital and gender differences in 
unemployment rates is also likely to be influenced by labour market institutions. First, 
institutions that compress the distribution of wages like minimum wage laws and trade 
unions may reduce the incentives to employ workers with lower levels of human capital 
leading to higher unemployment rates for these groups. Blau and Kahn (2003) find that 
these institutions have an important impact on the gender pay gap so we should not be too 
surprised if they also have an important impact on the gender gap in unemployment rates 
(Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2002) find evidence that high gender gaps in unemployment 
rates are associated with wider union coverage).
3 There is one factor that works in the opposite direction. In countries with a low level of female labour 
market participation, it tends to be the higher-skilled women who are in the labour force. This selection 
effect will tend to reduce the measured gender gap in unemployment rates if unemployment rates are 
negatively related to skill.
4 Although this relationship may not be monotonic if increasing female labour market participation 
initially takes the form of the entry of women into the labour market with low levels of accumulated 
experience; see Polachek (2004) for this argument applied to the gender pay gap.
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Secondly, institutions that reduce the turnover of labour like firing costs or those that 
make it difficult for groups of workers who are less firmly attached to the labour force 
to stay in employment (like the widespread use of temporary contracts) are also likely 
to increase the gap in unemployment rates between workers with high and low levels of 
labour market attachment. For example, firing costs seem to reduce the involuntary part 
of the flow out of employment especially for workers with long job tenures but also seem 
to be associated with it reductions in the hiring rate. If women have a higher outflow rate 
from employment than men this will tend to magnify the gender gap in the unemployment 
rate
Finally part of the gender pay gap may be the result of discrimination against women. In 
the presence of equal pay legislation (that all the OECD countries have) the only way for 
employers to exercise any prejudice may be through differential hiring rates, something 
that may be easier when labour markets are slack. Algan and Cahuc (2003) suggest 
that a ‘male breadwinner’ mindset, associated with the Catholic religion, can explain the 
cross-country variation in gender differences in employment-population ratios.
In what follows we will use this discussion as a framework for interpreting the results that 
we find and the hypotheses we investigate.
3.3 Variations in the Gender Gap in Unemployment Rates
For the European countries, the main data used in this chapter comes from the first six 
waves of the European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHPS) that cover the 
period 1994-19995 and, for the United States, we use data from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) from 1996-2000 (to have an approximately comparable period). Description 
of the data can be found in more detail in Azmat, Guell and Manning (2004).
We first check that the pattern of gender gaps in unemployment rates in the ECHPS 
mirrors that presented in Table 3.1. We first estimate a probit model for the probability 
of being unemployed (conditional on being in the labour force so that we are looking at 
unemployment rates) including a dummy variable for being female as the only explanatory 
variable i.e. the estimated model is of the form:
5 For details of the ECHPS see Peracchi (2002) and Nicoletti and Peracchi (2002) who discuss, among 
other things, sample attrition. Because there may be concerns about the representativeness of the ECHPS 
we have checked the results for the UK and Spain using their respective Labour Force Surveys: these results 
are very similar and axe available on request from the authors.
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Pr (U = 1) =  $ (0O +  !31 female) (3.1)
The first column of Table 3.2 reports the marginal effect of being female where coun­
tries are ordered by the gender gap in unemployment rates among prime-age workers as 
reported in Table 3.1 (we also follow this practice in all subsequent Tables). These mar­
ginal effects should be comparable to the gender gaps in aggregate unemployment rates 
presented in Table 3.1. They are similar though not identical, the reason being that the 
data come from different sources and refer to different periods.
The gender gaps in unemployment rates observed in Table 3.1 and the first column of 
Table 3.2 could be explained by gender gaps in characteristics that vary across countries. 
To investigate this hypothesis we simply modified (3.1) to:
Pr(C7 =  1) =  3>(/?o +  Pi female  +  02x) (3-2)
where a; is a variety of characteristics - age, education, marital status, and the presence 
of children in the household. The results are reported in the second column of Table 3.2. 
Although there is a very slight tendency for the gender gap in unemployment rates to 
fall in the ‘Mediterranean’ countries, little of the gender gap that can be explained using 
these characteristics is small and substantial gender gaps in unemployment remain in the 
countries where they exist in the aggregate data6.
The model estimated so far assumes that all the gender gap in unemployment rates 
is constant across all segments of the labour force. But, it may be the case that the 
gender gap varies with characteristics. So, we then estimate a model in which all the 
characteristics are interacted with a female dummy i.e. a model of the form:
Pr(C7 =  1) =  $(00 +  0ifem ale  +  0 2x  +  03female  * x) (3.3)
The marginal effects of these interactions are reported in the third through twelfth column 
of Table 3.2. Because the probit model is non-linear one cannot exactly read off the gender 
gaps in unemployment rates for different sorts of workers from this part of Table 3.2 but, 
to a first approximation, one can work out the gap in unemployment rates between men
6 We do not make any attempt to correct for the selection of women into the labor force. In countries 
where female labour participation is low (like many of the Mediterranean countries), the higer-skilled 
women are more likely to be in the labour force so that the gender gaps in unemployment rates are 
probably understated when we do not correct for selection on observables.
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and women with a given set of characteristics, x , by adding the coefficients that apply to 
them. So, to work out the gender gap for married people with young children one would 
add the marginal effects for having young children and being female, the marginal effect 
for being married and female and the marginal effect for being female. There is obviously 
a lot of information but certain broad patterns emerge.
First the gender gap in unemployment rates is larger for those who are married and those 
who have young dependent children. This is consistent with human capital theory as 
these groups are likely to have larger gender differences in human capital. These results 
also mirror the finding in earnings functions that gender pay gaps are typically larger for 
the married and those with young children. However, the variation in the gender gap in 
unemployment rates over the life-cycle does not seem to mirror so obviously the gender 
gap in pay -  in the ‘high-gap’ countries the gender gap in unemployment rates seems 
highest among the young while the other countries seem to show little consistent pattern 
of variation. It should also be noted that in most of the ‘high-gap’ countries there remains 
a gender gap in unemployment rates for single childless individuals though there are some 
countries where the gender gap in unemployment rates for these groups are very small.
All of the discussion so far has been about whether differences in observed characteristics 
can explain the gender gap in unemployment rates. But, it is possible that differences 
in unobserved characteristics might also be important, especially in countries where the 
female participation rate is low and selection into the labour force by women is an im­
portant question. But, it seems plausible to think that these unobservable characteristics 
related to labour market participation would actually exacerbate the gender gap in unem­
ployment rates, not explain them away. To illustrate this suppose that individuals differ 
in their ‘employability’, denoted by z , and that the unemployment rate is a negative 
function of z (denote it by u(z)). Further, assume that, in the population, z is equally 
distributed across men and women so that the ‘true’ gender gap in unemployment rates 
is zero. If all men participate in the labour market then we will have pm(z) =  1 where 
pm(z) is the labour force participation rate for a man with characteristics z1 . For women 
in countries where female labour force participation is low (e.g. Spain), we have P f ( z }  <  1 
and it seems likely that p/t(z) > 0 so there is a positive relationship between ‘employ­
ability’ and labour market participation. In this example we would observe the female 
unemployment rate to be below that of the male simply because the women in the labour 
force are more positively selected than the men in terms of their employability. This 
means we would tend to underestimate the true gender gap in the unemployment rate 
that, in this example, is zero.
7 The conclusion will also go through if we assume that male participation rates are a function of z  as 
long as the sensitivity to z is weaker than for women.
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A natural next question is whether the gender gap in unemployment rates that we observe 
in some countries is the result of gender differences in flows into unemployment or flows 
out of unemployment: this is the subject of the next section.
3.4 Gender Gaps in Labour Market Dynamics
Most labour economists are familiar with the following formula for the steady-state un­
employment rate:
neu t  /t"ue
where heu is the rate at which workers leave employment for unemployment and hue is 
the rate at which they leave unemployment for employment. But, the formula in (3.4) 
assumes there are only two labour market states- employment and unemployment. Given 
the importance of inactivity for women (and increasingly for men in many countries) using 
this formula to understand gender differences in unemployment rates might be thought 
to be a bit limiting. If one introduces the extra state of inactivity then one can show that 
the steady-state unemployment rate (note -  not the unemployment-population ratio) can 
be written as:
he{
u = ( l - a )  +<*h K i h . (3-5)
f leu nue I let 'He
h iii h in
where
^ _ h i e h u i  + h i u h e i  ^
h ie ( h ui h eu  d- ^ u e )  "f" ( h e i  “I" h eu  -|- h u e )
The interpretation of (3.5) is the following. It says that the overall unemployment rate 
can be thought of as a weighted average of two ‘component’ unemployment rates. The 
first term on the right-hand side of (3.5) is the unemployment rate if there were never any 
flows into or out of inactivity (it is simply the formula in (3.4)). The second term on the 
right-hand side of (3.5) is what the unemployment rate would be if there were never any 
direct flows between employment and unemployment only indirect flows via inactivity8.
8 Note that, for this unemployment rate, it is the relative size of flows from employment/ unemployment
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The weight a  is then a measure of the relative importance of flows via inactivity in 
generating unemployment though it is hard to give an intuition for its exact functional 
form.
If there are gender differences in unemployment rates this must be because of gender 
differences in some (or all) of the hazard rates in (3.5). Which differences are most 
important is likely to be helpful in understanding gender differences in unemployment 
rates. Table 3.3a presents estimates of the hazard rates and computation of the different 
components in (3.5) for men and Table 3.3b the corresponding information for women. 
The data we use for this comes from the retrospective monthly employment history that all 
individuals in the ECHPS are asked to complete and from consecutive monthly CPS files 
matching those individuals who are in the sample in consecutive months9. Our method 
for estimating the labour market transition rates is the following. We have observations 
on the labour market state an individual is in one month (denote this by So that can 
take the values e,u,i)  and then again a month later (denote this by Si). As the interval 
between the two observations is a month it is a reasonable approximation to assume that 
individuals cannot make two transitions in that period. Then the simplest way to estimate 
a hazard rate (heu say) is to note that:
Pr(S, =  e|S0 = e,St ^ i }  =  e ' h^ 1 (3.7)
The left-hand side of (3.7) is readily computed using our data and we take the negative 
of the log to compute the hazard rate10. The hazard rates in Table 3.3 are multiplied 
by 100 so can be interpreted as the percentage of individuals in one labour market state 
moving to another in the course of a month.
As well as the hazard rates, Tables 3.3a and 3.3b also reports the three components of the 
steady-state unemployment rate as presented in (3.5) -  the steady-state unemployment 
rate one would calculate ignoring inactivity (the eighth column), that one would calculate
to inactivity and vice versa that is important. So, if workers flow at a faster rate from employment to 
inactivity than from unemployment to inactivity this will tend to raise the unemployment rate.
9 One noticeable feature of this data is that flows between different labour market states are much 
higher in the US than in the European countries. While this is probably true, the differences are probably 
over-stated in our data as the European data comes from retrospective information that probably tends to 
‘forget’ transitions and the US data is known to have misclassification problems (see Abowd and Zellner 
(1983) or Abraham and Shimer (2002)) that tend to over-state transitions. However, the main interest 
here is not the comparison of the levels of transition rates across countries but the gender differences in 
transition rates across countries. As these are likely to be less affected by measurement issues, we do not 
attempt to correct the data in any way.
10 When the interval between observations is small the estimated hazard rate will be very similar to a 
simple-minded estimate of the probability of moving states. For example heu as defined in (3.7) is the 
probability of moving from employment to unemployment given there is not a move to inactivity.
CHAPTER 3. Gender Gaps in Unemployment Rates 141
ignoring direct flows between employment and unemployment (the ninth column), and 
the ‘share’ of the two components using the formula in (3.5) and (3.6) (the tenth column). 
Finally, the penultimate column presents the steady-state unemployment rate computed 
using the hazard rates and the final column the actual unemployment rate in the data as 
a check on the internal consistency. The last two columns are similar, differences arising 
from the fact that the labour markets are not in a steady state11.
Looking at the results for men in Table 3.3a one can see that the a is small, implying 
that flows into and out of inactivity are relatively unimportant in explaining the male 
unemployment rate. Also, the two component unemployment rates are very similar. This 
implies that the difference in the steady-state unemployment rates computed using the 
formulae in (3.4) and (3.5) are small so that, to a first approximation, one can ignore 
inactivity. Given the high labour force participation rates for men this is probably not 
that surprising.
What might be found more surprising are the results for women in Table 3.3b. It is true 
that ‘a ’ is larger for women than for men, implying a more important role for inactivity 
but, in many countries, it is still very low. This is quite consistent with a low female 
participation rate if inactivity is a very stable state. And, again the two component 
unemployment rates tend to be quite similar with the conclusion that the use of (3.4) 
rather than (3.5) will not lead to seriously misleading conclusions.
Given the results in Tables 3.3a and 3.3b we will, in the interests of keeping the chapter 
to a manageable length, concentrate in the rest of this chapter on gender gaps in flows 
between employment and unemployment and ignore gender differences in flows involving 
inactivity. One must be careful here: the results in Tables 3.3a and 3.3b do not suggest 
that gender gaps in flows involving inactivity are non-existent, it is simply that they (for 
some reason) mirror gender gaps in flows that do not involve inactivity. This needs to be 
borne in mind.
The results in Tables 3.3a and 3.3b can also shed light on the whether the hypothesis of 
Johnson (1983) can explain the cross-country variation in the gender gap in unemployment 
rates. She argued that there is a gender gap in unemployment rates because women 
wanting to move from inactivity to employment often go through a period of intervening 
unemployment. However, the result that ‘turning off’ the flows involving inactivity results 
in very similar cross-country variation in unemployment rates suggests this cannot be the 
whole story. There are sizeable gender gaps in direct flows between employment and
11 It is worth noting that the gap between the computed steady-state and actual unemployment rates is 
noticeably larger for women than for men, especially in the “high gap” countries. This is what one would 
expect when labour market participation of women is increasing markedly as is the case in many of these 
countries.
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unemployment in the “high gap” countries and it is not clear that Johnson’s arguments 
can explain this.
We now estimate the gender differences in hazard rates controlling for other relevant 
variables. As the hazard rates must be non-negative a convenient empirical model is:
heu = (3.8)
where x  is a vector of characteristics (that will include female dummies). Substituting 
(3.8) into (3.7) suggests that a simple way to estimate (3eu is to restrict the sample 
to those who are initially in employment and not subsequently in inactivity and then 
use a complementary log-log model to estimate the probability that the individual is in 
employment. Table 3.4 reports the coefficients on a female dummy when controls for 
personal characteristics are included12.
Note that the coefficient estimates will be the extent to which the hazard rate for a 
particular labour market transition is proportionately different for women. So, when we 
see in the column headed that the coefficient on the female dummy for Germany is 0.067 
this means that women are 6.7% more likely to leave employment for unemployment than 
men13.
There is a lot of information in Table 3.4 but the most important points are the following. 
If we consider direct flows between employment and unemployment, the ‘high-gap’ coun­
tries seem to have large gender gaps in both the flows from employment to unemployment 
and the flows from unemployment to employment than ‘low-gap’ countries (read down 
a column to see this). Both of these gender gaps need to be understood to get a good 
understanding of the source the gender gap in unemployment rates.
If we consider flows involving inactivity, women in all countries tend to have higher flows 
into inactivity both from employment and unemployment. But, as the discussion of (3.5)
12 Because we want a common specification for all the hazard rates, the controls do not include any 
variables that are ‘state-specific’ e.g. characteristics of a job if one is in employment. But, Tables 3.6 and 
3.12 do provide information on the importance of these characteristics. The discussion paper version also 
includes estimates without controls -  these are very similar.
13 One might wonder whether proportionate or absolute differences in hazard rates are the more im­
portant: we think proportionate differences for the following reason. To keep things simple, consider the 
formula for the steady-state unemployment rate in (3.4). Then simple, differentiation shows that:
du _  . . _  du
d]n(heu) U d\n(hue)
so that a proportionate change in heu will have the same impact on unemployment (though with the 
opposite sign) as an equal proportionate change in hue. This means that we can, more or less, compare 
the coefficients on the female dummy for different transition rates.
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above made clear, it is the proportional difference in the hazard rates from employment 
and unemployment to inactivity that is important for the unemployment rate so that one 
should look at the difference between the female dummy on the E l  transition and the 
U I transition in Table 3.4. In the ‘high-gap’ countries there is some indication that the 
gender gap in the flow from employment to inactivity is larger than the gender gap in 
the flow from unemployment to inactivity: this will tend to increase the unemployment 
rate. There is a less systematic pattern in the gender gap in flows from inactivity to 
employment or unemployment.
Given the evidence in Table 3.4 we focus first on the flows from employment to unem­
ployment, then on the flows from unemployment to employment.
3.5 Gender Differences in Flows from Employment to  Un­
employment
As Table 3.4 has shown, women in the ‘high-gap’ countries leave employment for unem­
ployment at a higher rate than do men. The flow from employment to unemployment is 
investigated further in Table 3.5. These regressions are similar to the one estimated in 
Table 3.4 except that, in some specifications, we include some characteristics of the job 
as extra controls14. Also, because the information on the characteristics of the job held 
are only available for jobs held at the annual interview, these equations are estimated on 
annual data.
The first column of Table 3.5 reports estimates of models for the transition from employ­
ment to unemployment that include only a female dummy. The qualitative pattern of 
these coefficients that are based on annual data is the same as those in Table 3.4 (that were 
based on monthly data) with women having higher rates of transition from employment to 
unemployment than men in the ‘high-gap’ countries. The second column then introduces 
personal characteristics as extra controls: this has only marginal effects on the coefficient 
on the female dummy. The next four columns then report results when we interact the 
female dummy with marital status and the number of children to see whether there is sig­
nificant variation in the gender gap in the flow from employment to unemployment. The 
sign of these interaction terms do suggest that married women and women with children 
have higher rates of leaving employment for unemployment (as would be predicted by the 
human capital model) but most of the coefficients are insignificantly different from zero
14 We did not do this in Tables 4a and 4b because we wanted to adopt a common specification for all 
the hazard rates so could only include covariates that are defined in all labour market states.
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and these coefficients are not noticeably higher in the high-gap countries15.
This suggests that domestic responsibilities do not play a big role in transitions from em­
ployment to unemployment. This is not to say that domestic responsibilities do not play 
an important role in women’s flows out of employment, just that women with children 
are more likely to leave employment for inactivity than unemployment. This conclusion 
is consistent with information on the reasons given for why jobs end that is tabulated in 
Table 3.6 both for those who are currently unemployed and those who are currently inac­
tive. With the exception of a couple of countries, reasons connected with ‘caring’ account 
for a very small fraction of jobs ending where the individual is currently unemployed16. 
This is not surprising: most women leaving employment to have children go directly into 
inactivity.
In many countries men are more likely than women to be laid-off. In countries like the UK 
this difference is extreme -  45% of male jobs end because the worker is laid-off compared 
to 23% of women. In the ‘high-gap’ countries, the most striking feature of Table 3.6 is that 
there is not a large gender difference in the fraction of jobs ending in lay-off. A plausible 
explanation of this is that men in the “high gap” countries are much more likely to be 
in long-term permanent jobs in which the right of employers to fire worker sis severely 
restricted. Women are less likely to be in these jobs because they are more likely to have 
had interruptions in their work histories.
This hypothesis is explored further in the final column in Table 3.5 where we report the 
coefficient on the female dummy when job characteristics (industry, occupation, pub­
lic/private size of firm, full-/part-time, permanent/temporary, job tenure) axe also in­
cluded in a model of the transitions from employment to unemployment. Petrongolo 
(2004) has documented how female workers are over-represented in temporary and part- 
time jobs that are generally at more risk of ending. In some of the “high-gap” countries 
notably France and Spain (which are heavy users of temporary contracts) the introduction 
of these variables does significantly reduce the coefficient on the female dummy suggesting 
that the “two-tier” labour market operated in these countries which protects the jobs of 
some workers at the expense of others works to the disadvantage of women.
Now, let us turn to flows in the opposite direction, from unemployment to employment.
15 This result is a little different from that in the literature on education and unemployment where 
the high unemployment rate of the less-educated is primarily due to a higher incidence and not a longer 
duration.
16 In fact, Table 3.7 probably overstates the proportion as women who had children and left employment 
for inactivity but are now trying to get a job again will be included in the ‘currently’ unemployed category.
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3.6 Flows from Unemployment to Employment: The Be­
haviour of Workers
The actions of both individuals and employers are likely to affect the flow from unemploy­
ment to employment. In this section we consider the actions of the unemployed themselves 
and the following section considers the actions of employers.
The unemployment rate is meant to measure the fraction of people who want a job but 
do not have one. The ILO definition of unemployment uses evidence that people have 
looked for work in the recent past and are available to start work in the near future to 
determine whether people without work currently want it. But some economists think 
that, while there is a meaningful distinction between employment and non-employment, 
the distinction between unemployment and inactivity is meaningless. On this view the 
fact that fewer women want paid work (largely because of domestic responsibilities) ‘spills 
over.’ into a higher unemployment rate and does not simply show up in a lower labour 
force participation rate. If this is true then, in some sense, the female unemployed in 
‘high-gap’ countries may be less serious about wanting a job and taking steps to get one 
than the male unemployed. There are a number of ways in which one might test this 
hypothesis.
Whether unemployment and inactivity are distinct labour market states was a question 
first posed by Flinn and Heckman (1983) and subsequently also addressed by Jones and 
Riddell (1999). The basis of their tests is to see whether there is a significant difference 
between the probability of entering employment between those who are unemployed and 
those who are inactive.
Table 3.7 reports results for this exercise for the countries in the ECHPS. The sample is 
those who are either unemployed or inactive in the initial observation and the dependent 
variable is binary according to whether the individual is subsequently in employment or 
not. We report the marginal effect of being in employment in a month’s time of being 
unemployed rather than inactive. We also interact a female dummy with this variable to 
see whether there are significant gender differences. In all countries the unemployed are 
more likely to get a job than the inactive. The extent of this is similar in ‘high-gap’ and 
‘low-gap’ countries. Further, the interaction of the ‘initially unemployed’ variable with the 
female dummy is not noticeably smaller in the ‘high-gap’ countries as one would expect if 
the female unemployed are less serious about getting work than their male counterparts: 
indeed the interaction term is largest in some of the ‘high-gap’ countries. There is no 
evidence here that, in the ‘high-gap’ countries, the difference between the unemployed 
and the inactive is more blurred than in the ‘low-gap’ countries.
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Another way to consider the hypothesis that the female unemployed in some countries are 
less serious about getting work is to look at evidence on job search intensity. Measuring 
search intensity is problematic and the only available evidence is on numbers and types 
of job search methods that the unemployed report using (though it should be noted 
that those who report using more search methods do typically have lower durations of 
unemployment). Table 3.8 presents evidence for the three countries for which we have 
been able to obtain it -  Spain, the UK and the US. There are sizeable and well-known 
differences in the use of different search methods across countries with, for example, the 
unemployed in the US being much less likely to report use of the public employment 
service and to report the use of personal contacts and the UK unemployed report the use 
of more search methods than those in the US and Spain (see Pellizzari (2003), for a cross­
country comparison of search methods used to get jobs and the wage premia associated 
with them)17. In all countries men report using slightly more search methods than women 
but this gap is similar in Spain (a ‘high-gap’ country) and the US/UK (both ‘low-gap’ 
countries). The limited evidence presented provides no support for the view that the 
women in ‘high-gap’ countries are much less serious in their desire for work as evidenced 
by their search effort.
Another variant of this hypothesis is that the level and availability of welfare benefits 
affects exit rate from unemployment through an effect on the reservation wage. Table 
3.9 presents some data on the fraction of the unemployed of different genders who report 
receiving any form of welfare benefit associated with unemployment. In most countries 
women are less likely to receive welfare benefits than men, primarily because their weaker 
employment history makes them less likely to have established entitlement and because 
unemployed women may be living with employed men so are not eligible for means-tested 
benefits. Looking at this table it is very hard to see how it could possibly form the 
basis of an explanation as to why, in some countries, there is such a large gender gap in 
unemployment rates. For example, virtually no-one, male or female, in Italy receives any 
benefits and the proportions of men and women doing so in Spain and the UK are very 
similar even though they have very different gender gaps in unemployment rates.
However, while we might expect reservation wages to be influenced by welfare benefits, 
there are other factors that might be important in determining the minimum level of 
wages acceptable to the unemployed. The ECHPS directly asks the unemployed about 
the minimum acceptable wage at which they would work. The female unemployed unsur­
prisingly report lower reservation wages than the male unemployed18 and a more pertinent
17 One should not make too much of this as the different countries allow respondents a different maximum 
number of search methods to be listed and this may influence responses although very few report the 
maximum allowed. .
18 This gender difference in reservation wages probably reflects the gender pay gap but may also reflect
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question is whether the gap between reservation wages and the average level of wages is 
higher for women than for men. We used the ECHPS to compute gender gaps in both 
wages and reservation wages corrected for personal characteristics (note that to maintain 
comparability with our measure of the gender gap in unemployment rates as the female 
minus the male we measure all gender gaps in this way even though the gender gap in 
wages is normally measured the other way round). We then computed a gender gap in 
the log of the reservation wage minus the log of the wage (we will call this, with some 
abuse of terminology the gender gap in the replacement ratio) and, in Figure 3.2, plot 
this against the gender gap in unemployment rates. The gender gap in the replacement 
ratio is generally positive indicating a smaller gender gap in reservation wages than in 
actual wages. But, there is no indication that the countries with a large gender gap in 
replacement ratios have a large gender gap in unemployment rates: indeed the regression 
line (shown on Figure 3.2) is negatively sloped albeit with a t-statistic of only 1.1.
This section has explored the hypothesis that, for some reason, women in some countries 
who are classified as unemployed are not as serious about wanting work as the male 
unemployed or are more selective about the jobs they will take. But, we have found little 
evidence for this hypothesis.
Another possible hypothesis about why women in the “high gap” countries take longer 
to find a job than men is from the ‘demand’ side. The next section considers this.
3.7 Flows from Unemployment to  Employment: The Be­
haviour o f Employers
There are a number of possible reasons why the demand for women may be lower than for 
men and why such a difference in demand might get reflected in differential unemployment 
durations and not just wages.
The human capital hypothesis predicts that workers with low levels of human capital will 
find it harder to get jobs because it is harder to find jobs paying above the reservation 
wage. If this is the case we would expect to see larger gender gaps in the flows from 
unemployment to employment for groups where the gender gap in accumulated human 
capital is likely to be larger like those who axe married and those with young dependent 
children. Table 3.10 presents estimates from annual data on the transition rates from 
unemployment to employment. The first four columns estimate interactions of the female
the fact that they may attach greater importance to non-wage attributes of jobs.
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dummy with marital status and dependent children. As predicted by the human capital 
hypothesis there is a larger gender gap in flows from unemployment to employment for the 
married and those with dependent children. There is also however a sizeable estimated 
gender gap in this transition rate in the “high gap” countries among the single and 
childless.
This evidence on the importance of human capital is rather indirect so the second part of 
Table 3.10 investigates whether more direct measures also help to explain the gender gap. 
The ECHPS contains limited information on work history but we do include a dummy 
variable for whether the individual has ever worked before and a measure of how long it is 
since the individual last worked. These variables are themselves significant in explaining 
the transition rate but they make relatively little difference to the coefficients on the other 
gender variables as can be seen by comparing the coefficients in the two panels of Table 
3.1019.
As emphasized in the theoretical section it may be that it is the interaction of human 
capital differences with labour market institutions that is important in explaining the 
high gender gap in unemployment rates in some countries. Blau and Kahn (2003) have 
suggested that cross-country differences in the gender pay gap can be explained by gender- 
unspecific labour market institutions like the minimum wage and collective bargaining. 
Figure 3.3 shows that there is a weak positive relationship between the gender pay gap 
and the gender gap in unemployment rates (the t-statistic is 1.2) suggesting that pay 
compression may lead to divergence in unemployment outcomes20. But, this evidence is 
hardly overwhelming and the decision to employ a man rather than a woman may not be 
based on a comparison of wages alone.
One source of a difference in the employment costs of men and women comes from ma­
ternity leave legislation. But, as Table 3.11 shows, the differences in maternity leave 
regulations across EU countries are relatively small and the Nordic countries which have 
generous maternity provisions also have small gender gaps in unemployment rates. Ruhm 
(1998) found that maternity leave was positively associated with female employment to 
population ratios (he did not consider unemployment rates).
Another hypothesis is that differing attitudes towards male and female employment may 
affect the gender gap in unemployment rates (see Algan and Cahuc (2004) for a similar idea 
that these attitudes are associated with Catholicism). Any such link may come from the 
supply side with women in some countries being less concerned about getting jobs or from
19 This is true whether the work history variables are included on their own (as is the case with the 
estimates presented in Table 10) or interacted with gender.
20 These gender gaps come from a regression in which personal characteristics are also included.
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the demand side with employers thinking that women are less deserving of employment 
than men and make their hiring decisions accordingly. We can get some idea as to how 
widespread are discriminatory attitudes from the 1996 Eurobarometer survey that asks 
respondents whether they agree with the statement “when jobs axe scarce, men should 
have more right to a job than women”. In all countries men are more likely than women 
to think that women are less deserving of employment. But, there are also substantial 
differences across countries with, crudely, the Nordic countries being less discriminatory 
and the Mediterranean countries more so. There are also differences across regions within 
countries e.g. Southern Italy is more discriminatory than Northern Italy. Figure 3.4 plots 
the proportion against the gender differential in the unemployment rate at regional level, 
marking the observations with a two-letter code for the country to which they refer. There 
is a clear positive relationship between the two variables that the first column of Table
3.12 shows is significantly different from zero. One might think that all of this is driven 
by differences across countries but, while the inclusion of country fixed effects reduces the 
size of the ‘attitudinaP variable it remains significantly different from zero.
However, a problem with this hypothesis is that the discriminatory attitudes have been 
around for a long time (as can be confirmed by examination of the 1973 and 1986 Euro­
barometer surveys that contain similar questions) but, as Figure 3.1 showed, large gender 
gaps in unemployment rates are a relatively recent phenomenon. One way to reconcile 
this is the following idea. When overall unemployment rates are high and there are many 
applicants for most jobs, employers may be faced with a large number of job applicants 
who are more or less equivalent. In this situation they are more or less free to indulge 
any slight discriminatory preferences they may have without suffering any loss in profits 
from doing so (Becker’s (1957) model of discrimination would predict this). In contrast, 
in tight labour markets, waiting for a male job applicant rather than hiring a female one 
may be a much more costly strategy. Hence, putting prejudices into practice is easier 
when unemployment is high and there are long queues for jobs as has been the situation 
in most of the ‘high-gap’ countries in the 1980s and 1990s21. We investigate this hypothe­
sis in the third column of Table 3.11 including the interaction of the male unemployment 
rate with the attitudinal variable (as well as the level of the male unemployment rate). 
The interaction term is positive and significantly different from zero.
21 This does not mean that the exercise of such prejudice is costless: to the extent that certain groups 
are protected from competition for jobs from other groups, the result is likely to be higher wage pressure 
and a higher natural rate of unemployment. This conclusion is usually derived in the context of prejudice 
against the long-term unemployed (see, for example, the ‘ranking’ model of Blanchard and Diamond, 
1994) but the same principles apply to other sorts of prejudice.
CHAPTER 3. Gender Gaps in Unemployment Rates 150
3.8 M ismatch
The previous two sections have explored the hypotheses that the female unemployed 
in some countries might be less serious about getting work than men (a supply side 
explanation) and that the demand for female workers might be lower (a demand side 
explanation). Another possibility is that there is simply a mismatch between the types of 
jobs wanted by the female unemployed and the jobs that employers are offering. Perhaps 
the most plausible form of mismatch is that women may want part-time jobs but these 
are very rare in some countries.
We do have some way of investigating this mismatch hypothesis as a number of surveys 
ask the unemployed whether they are looking for full- or part-time employment. Table
3.13 presents the raw data. There is not much evidence here that there is a large dis­
parity between the type of jobs that women report they want and the type of jobs that 
are available. For example in Spain the desire for part-time employment among the un­
employed is lower than the incidence of part-time working in the employed population 
(see also Petrongolo (2004) for evidence that, in ‘high-gap’ countries a higher proportion 
of women working part-time report that they would prefer a full-time job which is also 
consistent with this). It seems more likely that, if there is a deficit of part-time jobs in 
some countries, this results primarily in lower female labour force participation and not 
in higher unemployment rates.
3.9 Conclusion
In many of the European countries with high unemployment rates, the female unem­
ployment rate is substantially above the male. This important gender gap has hardly 
been studied: remedying that deficiency is the purpose of this chapter. We show that, in 
the countries with a large gender gap in unemployment rates, there tends to be a large 
gender gap in both flows from employment into unemployment and from unemployment 
into employment. It does not seem necessary to study the flows involving inactivity to 
understand the gender gap in unemployment rates.
There is a tendency for the gender gap in unemployment rates to be smaller in countries 
with higher levels of female labour market attachment, to be larger within countries for 
demographic groups where we would expect the largest gender differences in labour market 
experience and to fall over time in countries with rapid growth in female labour market 
attachment. This points to the importance of human capital differences as an important
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explanation of the gender gap in unemployment rates.
But this is not perhaps the whole story. Gender gaps in unemployment rates have risen 
in the past 20 years in many European countries even as the attachment of women to the 
labour market has risen. It is likely that labour market institutions can explain part of 
the difference. Institutions that compress wages (like minimum wages or trade unions) 
or act to the disadvantage of groups with lower levels of labour market attachment (like 
firing costs and the widespread use of temporary contracts) may magnify the impact of 
human capital differences on unemployment rates. As the overall level of unemployment 
is high in many European countries employers may have long queues of workers for jobs 
and this acts to the disadvantage of women as it makes it easier to indulge any residual 
prejudice against women.
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3.11 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Gender Gaps in Unemployment Rates Among OECD Countries
All Working Age (15-64) Prime-Age (25-54)
Country Male Female Difference Ratio Male Female Difference Ratio
Spain 11 22.91 11.91 2.08 9.2 21 11.8 2.28
Greece 7.56 17.92 10.36 2.37 6.2 15.2 9 2.45
Italy 8.67 15.71 7.04 1.81 6.6 12.7 6.1 1.92
France 9.66 12.96 3.3 1.34 9 12.6 3.6 1.4
Belgium 6.1 9 2.9 1.48
Netherlands 2.74 4.49 1.75 1.64 2.1 3.8 1.7 1.81
Luxembourg 1.77 2.68 0.91 1.51 1.4 2.9 1.5 2.07
Germany 8.15 9.22 1.07 1.13 7.2 8.5 1.3 1.18
Denmark 4.69 6.54 1.85 1.39 3.7 4.9 1.2 1.32
Portugal 3.84 5.05 1.21 1.32 3.4 4.6 1.2 1.35
Finland 9.58 10.73 1.15 1.12 7.9 9 1.1 1.14
Switzerland 2.52 3.68 1.16 1.46 2.2 3.2 1 1.45
Japan 4.82 4.46 -0.36 0.93 3.7 4.4 0.7 1.19
Sweden 7.5 6.76 -0.74 0.9 5.2 5.9 0.7 1.13
USA 4.05 4.33 0.28 1.07 3 3.4 0.4 1.13
Austria 3.69 3.85 0.16 1.04 3.4 3.6 0.2 1.06
Australia 7.13 6.64 -0.49 0.93 5.5 5.3 -0.2 0.96
Canada 7.78 7.25 -0.53 0.93 6.5 6.3 -0.2 0.97
NZ 6.94 6.58 -0.36 0.95 5.5 5.3 -0.2 0.96
Norway 3.36 3.05 -0.31 0.91 2.6 2.2 -0.4 0.85
Ireland 5.9 5.5 -0.4 0.93 5.7 4.8 -0.9 0.84
UK 6.75 5.07 -1.68 0.75 5.4 4.3 -1.1 0.8
New OECD 
Countries
Hungary 7.52 6.26 -1.26 0.83 6.7 5.6 -1.1 0.84
Turkey 7.49 7.5 0.01 1 5.9 5.5 -0.4 0.93
Mexico 1.78 2.58 0.8 1.45 1.6 2.1 0.5 1.31
Czech Rep 7.27 10.5 3.23 1.44 5.9 9.5 3.6 1.61
Notes.
1. Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics (OECD Statistical Compendium), 1999.
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Table 3.2: The Marginal Effects of Characteristics on Gender Gaps in Unemployment Rates
A
Female
B
Female
c
Female
F*Age(15-
24)
F*Age(35-
44)
F*Age(45-
54)
F*Low
Edu
F*High
Edu F*Married F*Div/Sep
F*Kids(0-
12)
F*Kids(13-
15)
Spain
0.087
ro.oon**
0.086
ro.oon**
0.052
ro.oo3i**
0.078
ro.oo4i**
-0.06
ro.oo3i**
-0.017
ro.oo3i**
-0.004
ro.0031
-0.012
T0.0031**
0.075
[0.0031**
-0.075
ro.oo4i**
0.035
ro.oo3i**
-0.013
ro.0041**
Greece
0.112
ro.oon**
0.102
ro.oon**
0.067
ro.oo3i**
0.054
ro.oo4i**
-0.03
ro.0021**
0.004
ro.oo3i
0.002
ro.oo3i
0.002
ro.0021
0.03
ro.oo3i**
-0.011
ro.0051*
0.026
ro.0031**
0.038
ro.0041**
Italy
0.062
ro.oon**
0.056
ro.oon**
0.045
ro.0021**
0.028
ro.oo3i**
-0.06
ro.0021**
0.002
ro.0021
0.025
ro.oo4i**
-0.011
ro.0021**
0.036
ro.0021**
0.006
ro.oosi
0.007
ro.0021**
-0.011
ro.oo3i**
France
0.053
ro.oon**
0.053
ro.oon**
0.042
ro.0021**
0.004
ro.0031
-0.03
ro.002]**
-0.019
ro.0021**
-0.023
ro.0021**
-0.001
ro.0021
0.039
ro.0021**
-0.005
ro.oo3i
0.043
ro.0021**
0.026
ro.oo4i**
Belgium
0.084
ro.oon**
0.079
ro.oon**
0.058
ro.oo3i**
0.017
ro.oosi**
-0.03
ro.0021**
-0.001
ro.0031
-0.066
[0.0021**
0.003
ro.0031
0.058
ro.oo4i**
0.086
ro.oo6i**
0.043
ro.0041**
-0.024
ro.0041**
Netherlands
0.036
ro.0021**
0.033
ro.0021**
-0.004
ro.oosi
0.016
ro.oo9i
0.001
ro.oo6i
0.009
[0.0061
-0.006
ro.oo6i
-0.001
ro.oo4i
0.045
[0.009]**
0.029
ro.oi3i*
0.028
ro.oosi**
0.028
ro.oioi**
Luxembourg
0.007
ro.oon**
0
ro.oon
-0.015
ro.oon**
0.013
ro.0021**
0.02
ro.0031**
0.002
ro.002]
0.014
ro.003]**
-0.004
ro.oon**
0.044
ro.oo3i**
0.014
ro.oo3i**
0.002
ro.002]
-0.009
ro.0021**
Germany
0.035
ro.oon**
0.028
ro.oon**
-0.009
ro.0021**
0.01
ro.oo3i**
0.02
ro.0021**
0.015
ro.002]**
-0.024
ro.0021**
-0.026
ro.oon**
0.05
ro.0021**
0.003
ro.oo3i
0.048
ro.002]**
0.019
ro.oo3i**
Denmark
0.046
ro.oon**
0.045
ro.oon**
0.043
ro.0021**
-0.023
ro.oo3i**
-0.02
ro.oo3i**
-0.023
[0.0021**
-0.022
ro.0021**
0.032
ro.0031**
0.011
ro.0031**
-0.011
ro.oo3i**
0.059
[0.0041**
0.046
ro.oo7i**
Portugal
0.049
ro.oon**
0.053
ro.oon**
-0.008
ro.oo3i**
0.054
ro.oo3i**
-0.01
ro.0021*
-0.008
ro.0021**
0
ro.0051
0.022
ro.0021**
0.043
ro.0021**
-0.013
ro.oo3i**
0.041
[0.0021**
0.01
ro.0031**
Finland
0.019
ro.oon**
0.032
[0.001]**
0.007
T0.003]*
-0.009
ro.oo4i*
-0.01
ro.oo3i**
-0.003
ro.oo3i
0.002
ro.oo3i
-0.007
ro.0031*
0.044
r0.004]**
0.024
ro.0051**
0.021
ro.oo3i**
-0.003
[0.004]
USA
0.002
ro.oooi**
0.002
ro.oooi**
-0.002
ro.oon**
0.004
ro.oon**
-0.01
ro.oon**
0.001
ro.oon
0.007
ro.oon**
-0.001
ro.oon*
0.012
ro.oon**
0
ro.oon
Austria
0.01
ro.oon**
0.005
ro.oon**
-0.006
ro.0021**
0.016
ro.oo3i**
0.01
ro.0031**
0.011
ro.oo3i**
-0.002
ro.oo4i
0.005
ro.0021*
-0.008
ro.0021**
0.023
ro.oo4i**
0.024
ro.0021**
0.031
ro.oosi**
Ireland
-0.049
ro.oon**
-0.035
ro.oon**
-0.006
ro.oo3i*
0.038
ro.oo4i**
-0.04
ro.oo3i**
-0.027
ro.oo3i**
0.021
ro.oo4i**
0.005
ro.oo3i*
-0.042
ro.0021**
-0.06
ro.0021**
-0.027
ro.0021**
-0.019
ro.oo3i**
UK
-0.037
ro.oon**
-0.036
ro.oon**
-0.044
ro.0021**
0.016
ro.0021**
0
ro.002]
0.012
ro.0021**
0.018
ro.0021**
0
ro.0021
-0.004
ro.0021*
0.004
ro.0021
-0.003
ro.oon*
-0.002
ro.0021
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Notes:
1. Data for European countries come from ECHPS, data for US from CPS. The sample is restricted to to those aged 15-54 inclusive. Dependent 
variable is whether individual is unemployed conditional on being in the labour force. The reported coefficients are the marginal effects.
2. Coefficient in Column marked A is that on female dummy in probit model of (1). Coefficient in Column marked B is that on female dummy in probit 
model of (2) where the controls are age, education (high being college graduates, ISCED 5-7, and low being less than second stage of secondary education, 
ISCED 0-2), marital status and number of children aged 0-12 and 13-15. Coefficient in Column marked C and subsequent columns is that on female dummy 
and female dummy interacted with characteristics in probit model of (3).
3. Standard errors in parentheses. ** denotes 1% significance level and * denotes 5% significance level.
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Table 3.3a: Flows between Labour Market States and Implied Steady-State Unemployment Rates (Men)
country E—>U E—>1 U—>E U -d I-»U I—>E
u-rate (no 
inactivity)
u-rate (only 
inactivity) a
Implied Steady-State 
U-Rate
Actual
U-Rate
Spain 1.5 0.37 7.43 0.85 0.72 1.16 16.8 21.3 0.07 17.1 17.8
Greece 0.63 0.21 9.4 0.61 0.44 0.99 6.3 13.4 0.05 6.6 9.4
Italy 0.52 0.32 3.93 0.71 0.64 0.73 11.7 28.6 0.11 13.5 12.6
France 0.61 0.29 8.43 1.85 0.86 1.33 6.7 9.2 0.12 7 10.1
Belgium 0.35 0.23 5.19 0.68 0.46 0.99 6.3 13.7 0.09 6.9 6
Luxembourg 0.21 0.29 10.69 0.72 0.3 1.82 2 6.1 0.06 2.2 2.6
Germany 0.57 0.29 7.42 1.44 0.42 1.72 7.1 4.7 0.13 6.8 6.1
Denmark 0.69 0.38 10.65 1.72 0.81 2.07 6.1 7.9 0.11 6.3 8.7 ;
Portugal 0.43 0.23 7.44 0.84 0.35 1.14 5.5 7.9 0.08 5.7 5.2
Finland 0.92 1.01 9.06 2.63 0.97 3.44 9.3 9.8 0.19 9.3 11.2
USA 1.26 1.37 51.35 29.22 6.11 10.7 2.4 2.6 0.27 2.5 3.4
Austria 0.61 0.37 14.12 1.35 0.31 1.52 4.1 5.2 0.07 4.2 3.1
Ireland 0.57 0.38 4.57 0.54 0.76 2.54 11.2 17.5 0.09 11.7 12.5
UK 0.61 0.25 7.7 1.49 0.96 1.7 7.4 8.8 0.11 7.5 6.7
Notes.
1. Data for European countries are from retrospective monthly work history data in ECHPS. Retrospective monthly data from Sweden 
and Netherlands is missing. US data from successive monthly CPS. Sample restricted to those aged between 25 and 54.
2. Hazard Rates are estimated using the methodology described in (7) and refer to monthly percentage transition rates.
3. U-rate (no inactivity) is the formula of (3.4). U-rate (only inactivity) is the second part of the formula of (3.5). a  is as defined in (6).
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Table 3.3b: Flows between Labour Market States and Implied Steady-State Unemployment Rates (Women)
country E—>U E—>1 U—>E U->I I->U I->E
u-rate (no 
inactivity)
u-rate (only 
inactivity) a
Implied Steady- 
State U-Rate
Actual
U-Rate
Spain 1.9 0.89 5.62 1.49 0.37 0.55 25.3 28.7 0.14 25.8 31.9
Greece 1.05 0.79 5.75 1.1 0.25 0.55 15.5 24.9 0.13 16.7 23
Italy 0.74 0.7 3.62 1.11 0.3 0.45 17 29.5 0.18 19.2 24.2
France 0.76 0.44 6.29 1.99 0.49 0.79 10.7 12.1 0.17 11 16.2
Belgium 0.56 0.65 3.19 0.96 0.33 0.92 14.8 19.3 0.19 15.7 9.7
Luxembourg 0.23 0.66 8.61 2.13 0.09 0.83 2.6 3.3 0.18 2.7 5.9
Germany 0.61 0.45 5.03 1.46 0.23 0.97 10.8 6.8 0.18 10 9.6
Denmark 0.93 0.65 7.11 2.54 0.83 1.97 11.6 9.7 0.2 11.2 9.3
Portugal 0.62 0.43 5.85 1 0.21 0.66 9.6 12.1 0.12 9.8 10.5
Finland 1.14 1.59 8.74 3.45 0.91 3.22 11.5 11.6 0.24 11.5 12
USA 1.09 2.69 51.09 46.41 3.59 7.25 2.1 2.8 0.38 2.4 3
Austria 0.59 0.65 9.23 2.11 0.18 0.77 6 6.6 0.16 6.1 5.4
Ireland 0.62 1.24 8.63 2.32 0.18 1.15 6.7 7.6 0.19 6.9 12.4
UK 0.39 0.85 10.27 4.06 0.39 1.64 3.6 4.7 0.24 3.9 4
Notes.
1. As for Table 3.3a.
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Table 3.4: Gender Gaps in Labour Market Transition Rates (With Controls)
Country E —*U U —>E U — I E—>1 I-> U I—>E
Spain
0.275
T0.0451**
-0.354
[0.0381**
0.575
[0.066]**
0.884
[0.0601**
-0.366
[0.067]**
-0.574
[0.0611**
Greece
0.538
T0.0671**
-0.47
[0.0581**
0.551
[0.1331**
1.312
[0.0671**
-0.002
[0.1031
-0.608
[0.0811**
Italy
0.394
[0.0641**
-0.138
[0.0571*
0.359
[0.0811**
0.849
[0.056]**
-0.263
[0.0661**
-0.641
[0.0801**
France
0.266
[0.0611**
-0.341
[0.0591**
-0.008
[0.0881
0.422
[0.065]**
-0.497
r o .i in * *
-0.525
[0.0851**
Belgium
0.466
ro.iooi**
-0.49
[0.115]**
0.424
[0.1871*
1.059
ro.0951**
-0.245
[0.1581
-0.343
ro.123]**
Luxembourg
-0.189
[0.1281
-0.195
[0.111]
0.94
[0.2871**
0.93
[0.0861**
-0.698
[0.2661**
-0.641
[0.114]**
Germany
0.012
[0.0431
-0.425
T0.0461**
0.05
[0.075]
0.395
[0.0531**
-0.519
[0.1101**
-0.34
[0.059]**
Denmark
0.371
[0.0711**
-0.432
T0.0681**
0.387
[0.116]**
0.609
[0.080]**
-0.064
[0.1141
0.026
[0.075}
Portugal
0.446
T0.0731**
-0.3
[0.0681**
0.16
[0.122]
0.69
[0.0691**
-0.257
[0.111]*
-0.56
[0.0691**
Finland
0.344
[0.0661**
-0.068
[0.060]
0.28
[0.0881**
0.629
[0.0611**
-0.341
[0.0931**
-0.179
[0.0481**
USA
-0.114
[0.0131**
-0.012
[0.0121
0.474
ro.oi4i**
0.474
[0.014]**
-0.463
[0.0151**
-0.436
ro .o in * *
Austria
-0.05
[0.0931
-0.511
ro.1021**
0.578
[0.1681**
0.527
[7.121**
-0.408
[0.176]*
-0.509
ro.0791**
Ireland
0.062
ro.osoi
0.401
[0.0791**
1.058
[0.164]**
1.174
[0.0771**
-0.687
[0.129]**
-0.22
[0.0571**
UK
-0.473
[0.0541**
0.292
[0.053]**
1.019
[0.0781**
1.206
ro.0511**
-0.76
[0.0841**
-0.111
ro.osoi*
Notes.
1. Data as for Table 3 a. Controls are age, education, marital status and
number o f children.
CHAPTER 3. Gender Gaps in Unemployment Rates
Table 3.5: Gender Differences in Flows from Employment to Unemployment
Country
No
Controls
Controls on 
Personal 
Characteristics Controls on Personal Characteristics and 
Interactions
Controls on 
Personal and 
Job
Characteristics
Coefficient
on
Female
dummy
Coefficient on 
Female 
dummy
Coefficient
on
Female
Dummy
Coefficient
on
Female*
married
Coefficient
on
Female*
kidsO-12
Coefficient
on
Female*
kidsl3-15
Coefficient on 
Female 
dummy
Spain
0.222
ro.0521**
0.239
T0.0541**
0.199
[0.0801*
0.01
[0.116]
0.071
ro.i4ii
0.167
[0.1941
0.141
T0.0601*
Greece
0.531
[0.0741**
0.549
[0.0761**
0.516
[0.114]**
0.01
[0.1691
0.061
[0.2141
0.364
[0.2851
0.554
[0.0841**
Italy
0.056
[0.0701
0.136
[0.0711
0.1
[0.0981
-0.134
[0.1601
0.254
[0.1951
0.205
ro.2771
0.018
[0.0771
France
0.357
[0.0961**
0.432
[0.0971**
0.158
[0.1521
0.394
[0.2071
0.358
[0.2321
-0.393
T0.4221
0.279
[0.1181*
Belgium
0.717
[0.1321**
0.803
[0.1341**
0.449
ro.2071*
0.348
[0.2841
0.677
[0.3911
0.039
[0.657]
0.729
T0.1621**
Netherlands
0.597
T0.1331**
1.007
[0.1181**
0.168
ro.202]
0.527
[0.3051
0.172
[0.353]
0.592
[0.443]
1.152
ro.isoi**
Luxembourg
0.334
T0.2961
0.28
[0.3021
-0.43
[0.515]
1.511
[0.6881*
-0.069
[0.796]
-0.014
ri.4911
0.149
[0.3941
Germany
0.153
[0.0531**
0.083
[0.054]
-0.374
[0.0901**
0.486
ro.i 151**
0.289
[0.1351*
0.468
ro.2131*
0.108
[0.0651
Denmark
0.612
[0.1181**
0.636
[0.1201**
0.238
[0.1731
0.206
[0.249]
0.586
[0.3231
13.362
[363.5311
0.502
ro.i4oi**
Portugal
0.448
[0.0781**
0.543
ro.osoi**
0.243
[0.1361
-0.006
[0.1691
0.681
[0.1911**
0.427
[0.2751
0.49
[0.0861**
Finland
0.358
[0.1241**
0.435
T0.1271**
0.204
[0.2141
0.405
ro.2711
0.011
[0.2901
-0.071
[0.4211
0.451
[0.1531**
Sweden
0.014
T0.0931
0.205
[0.125]
0.117
[0.1691
0.095
[0.196]
-0.36
[0.2111
-0.02
[0.2801
0.367
[0.1511*
Austria
0.29
T0.1221*
-0.011
[0.111]
0.271
T0.1971
-0.691
[0.260]**
0.712
[0.2791*
0.211
T0.4981
-0.202
[0.1311
Ireland
-0.103
[0.1081
-0.223
[0.0891*
0.12
T0.1751
-0.232
[0.235]
-0.048
[0.2711
-0.521
T0.4131
-0.234
ro.1031*
UK
-0.188
[0.0891*
0.028
[0.0941
-0.211
[0.1311
-0.129
T0.1871
0.091
[0.2451
0.314
[0.3411
0.032
[0.1041
Notes.
1. Data is from ECHPS. The sample is all those who are employed at one 
interview and employed or unemployed subsequently. Model estimated is 
a cloglog model where the dependent variable takes the value one if  the 
individual is still employed.
2. Standard errors in parentheses.
3. The ILO main activity status is used for Sweden as the Self-Defined main 
activity status question, used for the other countries, is not asked.
4. Controls are age, education, marital status and number o f children.
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Table 3.6: Reasons for leaving Previous Job (%)
Country
Sex
Currently Unemployed Currently Inactive
Obliged
by
Employer
End of 
Contract
Child
Birth/
Care
Sick/
Disabled
/Retired/
Other
Obliged
by
Employer
End of 
Contract
Child Birth/ 
Care
Sick/
Disabled
/Retired/
Other
Spain
M 22 63 0 15 20 20 0 60
F 17 64 5 14 12 30 16 41
Greece
M 38 37 0 26 10 5 0 85
F 38 39 5 18 16 13 22 49
Italy
M 39 36 1 23 16 6 0 78
F 28 46 4 22 13 12 21 53
France
M 41 44 0 15 33 5 1 60
F 34 44 6 17 17 11 21 51
Belgium
M 55 18 0 27 37 2 0 61
F 43 22 8 26 21 8 16 55
Netherlands
M 30 15 2 53 8 4 1 86
F 12 12 42 35 7 8 38 47
Germany
M 59 20 0 21 46 10 0 45
F 54 22 1 23 27 8 19 47
Denmark
M 42 26 1 31 10 11 0 79
F 36 29 7 29 12 14 5 70
Portugal
M 24 40 0 37 4 5 0 91
F 24 44 4 29 6 12 11 71
Finland
M 28 57 0 14 10 31 0 58
F 22 60 4 14 9 34 9 48
Austria
M 43 10 1 47 12 2 0 86
F 33 15 18 34 9 3 36 53
Ireland
M 41 33 1 25 18 7 1 73
F 26 33 3 38 11 10 36 43
UK
M 45 18 1 37 22 6 4 68
F 23 16 16 45 12 6 36 46
Notes:
1. Data from ECHPS. Question only asked of those who have worked within the 
last two years.
2. Other reasons includes: Marriage, Move for partner's job, Closure o f own 
business & Study/National service.
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Table 3.7: Are the Unemployed More Likely than the Inactive to Get a Job?
Female
Female&
Unemployed
int=0
Unemployed 
in t=0
Spain
-0.124
T0.1641
0.418
[0.0691**
1.702
[0.047]**
Greece
-0.302
T0.253T
0.426
[0.1051**
1.985
[0.0741**
Italy
-1.04
[0.324]**
0.611
ro.iooi**
1.452
[0.0701**
France
-0.269
ro.i96i
0.19
[0.1001
1.557
ro.0771**
Belgium
-0.836
[0.347]*
-0.513
[0.169]**
1.396
[0.131]**
Luxembourg
-0.203
[0.325]
0.317
[0.159]*
0.793
[0.1121**
Germany
-0.093
[0.157]
0.094
[0.070]
1.392
ro.0511**
Denmark
-0.428
T0.219]
-0.434
[0.104]**
1.78
ro.o8ii**
Portugal
-0.346
[0.227]
0.289
[0.097]**
1.724
[0.0701**
Finland
0.059
[0.1961
0.137
[0.0781
0.911
[0.0591**
USA
-0.035
[0.026]
0.266
ro.oi6i**
1.145
[0.012]**
Austria
-0.45
[0.303]
0.171
[0.1291
2.149
[0.092]**
Ireland
-0.341
[0.265]
0.491
[0.1041**
0.972
[0.0671**
UK
-0.179
[0.138]
0.235
[0.0731**
1.579
[0.0551**
Notes.
1. The sample is all those who are not in employment in an initial month and 
the dependent variable is whether they are still not in employment a month 
later. The other controls included are: age, education level, gender, 
presence and age o f children and the gender dummy interacted with the 
other controls.
2. Data for European countries from ECHPS retrospective work history data; 
data for US from successive monthly CPS files.
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Table 3.8: Methods o f Job Search Among the Unemployed (%)
US (CPS) 
method mentioned
UK (LFS) 
method mentioned
Spain (LFS) 
method mentioned
Men Women Men Women Men Women
contacted public 
employment service 
or other public body
22.2 19.9 83.9 63.0 88.6 86.0
applied directly to 
employers 66.2 62.8 57.4 49.1
25.4 20.0
placed or answered 
advertisements 16.5 16.4 65.0 60.6
14.2 16.7
sent out 
resumes/applications 39.0 44.4 47.1 45.2
5.7 7.1
looked at 
advertisements 20.9 21.6 90.9 91.7
14.8 17.4
contacted friends/ 
relatives/unions 19.8 13.9 70.1 60.4
51.2 48.0
private employment 
agency 6.5 6.5 24.1 18.4
3.2 4.0
other 8.6 9.0 9.3 7.5 5.1 7.1
Average number of 
search methods
2.00 1.94 4.70 4.08 1.98 1.96
Number of 
observations 92,001 92,001 117,941 70,152 284,684 328,296
Notes.
1. Data from the CPS is from the period 1/97-12/98; from the UK and Spanish 
LFS is for 3/1992-2/2003.
2. The classification o f search methods is different in the three countries and 
some re-classification has been done.
3. For Spain, data on the method “looked at advertisements” is only available 
after 1999.
4. For Spain, until 1998, the maximum number of methods respondents could 
answer was 3. From 1/1999 to 3/2002, the fraction of unemployed answering 
“4 or more methods” was 15.9% for males and 15.7% for females.
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Table 3.9: Benefit Receipt Among the Unemployed
Country Male Female
Spain 34.56 15.86
Greece 13.62 9.41
Italy 4.29 3.28
France 51.01 40.55
Belgium 79.85 73.99
Luxembourg 22.22 17.86
Germany 68.7 69.44
Denmark 85.8 83.72
Portugal 26.92 23.37
Finland 79.66 75.43
Austria 59.45 43.5
Ireland 87.86 44.9
UK 33.25 17.21
Notes.
1. Source: ECHPS. The question asked is “Do you receive unemployment
benefit or assistance?”
165
CHAPTER 3. Gender Gaps in Unemployment Rates
Table 3.10: Gender Differences in Flows from Unemployment to Employment
Controls on Personal Characteristics and 
Interactions
Controls on Personal Characteristics, Work History 
and Interactions
Country
Coefficient
on
Female
Dummy
Coefficient
on
Female*
married
Coefficient
on
Female*
kidsO-12
Coefficient
on
Female*
kidsl3-15
Coefficient
on
Female
Dummy
Coefficient
on
Female*
married
Coefficient
on
Female*
kidsO-12
Coefficient
on
Female*
kidsl3-15
Spain
-0.24 -0.066 -0.195 0.048 -0.206 -0.139 -0.148 0.062
T0.0641** [0.1011 [0.1151 [0.1621 [0.0641** [0.1011 r o .ii6 i [0.1631
Greece
-0.412 -0.123 -0.455 -0.239 -0.401 -0.117 -0.445 -0.243
T0.0891** [0.1501 T0.1921* [0.2301 [0.0891** [0.1501 [0.1931* [0.2301
Italy
-0.34 -0.059 -0.17 0.13 -0.328 -0.06 -0.234 0.081
[0.0721** [0.1471 [0.174] [0.2161 [0.0731** [0.1481 [0.175] [0.2161
France
-0.213 -0.015 -0.438 -0.057 -0.211 -0.051 -0.323 -0.072
[0.1301 [0.199] [0.2221* [0.3991 [0.130] [0.199] [0.2221 ro.4001
Belgium
-0.349 -0.367 0.076 0.022 -0.396 -0.325 0.125 -0.175
ro.1901 [0.289} T0.3431 [0.6271 ro.i9n* [0.289] [0.3441 [0.632]
Netherlands
-0.284 -0.164 -0.819 0.742 -0.31 -0.158 -0.708 0.668
[0.1651 [0.2231 [0.2511** ro.4001 [0.1641 [0.2231 [0.2531** ro.4041
Luxembourg
-0.051 - 0.111 -0.238 -0.128 -0.053 - 0.111 -0.241 -0.125
[0.0981 [0.1251 [0.1481 [0.2371 [0.0981 ro.1251 [0.1481 [0.237]
Germany
-0.521 0.245 0.336 0.437 -0.506 0.245 0.381 0.385
T0.1731** [0.2461 [0.305] [0.6291 [0.1741** [0.247] [0.3061 ro.630]
Denmark
-0.241 0.043 -0.123 0.191 -0.227 0.025 -0.107 0.19
[0.1101* [0.1481 [0.1701 [0.2481 [0.1111* [0.1491 [0.1701 [0.2481
Portugal
0.04 -0.159 -0.058 0.192 -0.047 -0.105 0.064 0.063
[0.1941 [0.2561 [0.2671 [0.4461 [0.1961 [0.2581 [0.2691 [0.4481
Finland
-0.21 -0.098 0.194 0.244 -0.21 -0.098 0.194 0.244
[0.1381 [0.2691 T0.2671 T0.3991 [0.138] [0.2691 [0.2671 ro.399]
Sweden
0.638 -0.108 -0.836 -1.164 0.655 -0.223 -0.627 -0.888
[0.2141** [0.3111 [0.3171** [0.5751* [0.2181** [0.3121 [0.320] [0.5871
Austria
0.103 0.811 0.311 0.218 0.121 0.433 0.353 0.312
T0.1311 [0.2551** T0.2221 [0.3621 T0.1321 [0.2581 T0.2241 [0.3691
Ireland
0.244 0.473 0.473 0.076 0.179 0.437 0.416 0.074
[0.1191* [0.1931* [0.2381* [0.3631 [0.1211 [0.1951* [0.239] [0.3661
UK
-0.24 -0.066 -0.195 0.048 -0.206 -0.139 -0.148 0.062
[0.0641** [0.1011 [0.1151 ro.1621 [0.0641** [0.1011 r o .ii6 i T0.1631
Notes.
1. Data is from ECHPS. The sample is all those who are unemployed at one
interview and employed or unemployed subsequently. Model estimated is
a cloglog model where the dependent variable takes the value one if  the 
individual is still unemployed.
2. Standard errors in parentheses.
3. The ILO main activity status is used for Sweden as the Self-Defined main
activity status question, used for the other countries, is not asked.
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Table 3.11: Maternity Leave Legislation, 1999-2000
Maternity Leave Parental Leave
Country Length
(weeks)
Payment 
(% earnings)
Continuation of 
payment by 
employer
Length
(months)
Maximum 
child age 
(years)
Payment
Austria
Netherlands
Spain
Luxembourg
Germany
Greece
Italy
France
UK
Portugal
Denmark
Finland
Belgium
Ireland
Sweden
USA
16
16
16
16
14
14
18
16-26
14
12.5 
18
17.5
15
14
12
12
100
100
100
100
100
80
84
90
100
67
66
82 first month, 
75 rest
70
80
unpaid
low wage workers 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes
No 
No
No
3-24
6
3.5 
10
3.25
6
2-12
6.5
3.5
18
2 
8 
r 3 
5 
3
3.5
3
3
5
3
8
3
4
410 euros/month 
unpaid 
unpaid 
1487 euros/month 
306 euros/month 
unpaid 
30%eamings 
461 euros/month 
unpaid 
unpaid 
920 euros/month 
10 euros/day
505 euros/month
5 unpaid
8 80%eamings
Notes.
1. The Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 sets a minimum of period of 14 weeks 
(including the two weeks before and after birth) of maternity leave. The amount of maternity pay 
is fixed by the national legislation of the country and should be at least equal to the value of sick 
pay.
2. There is no EU regulation regarding paternity leave. In most countries this is, at most, just a few 
days after birth.
3. Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 sets a minimum period of 3 months of parental leave. 
Both parents have a three months entitlement, but one parent cannot transfer the right to parental 
leave to the other. Payment is legislated at country level. Directive 97/75/EC extends the scope of 
Directive 96/34/EC to the United Kingdom.
4. For the USA, maternity leave is regulated within the Family and Medical Leave Act (1993). It 
allows eligible employees (tenure >lyear) of a covered employer (number of employees> 50) to 
take unpaid leave (or to substitute paid leave if the employee has earned or accrued it) because 
birth/care of a child as well as for health conditions of the employee or family member.
5. In Denmark, payments are based on unemployment benefits.
6. In the UK, only employees with tenure of more than 26 weeks are eligible for maternity pay. 
Employees with more than 1 year of employment with the same employer have the right of 
“additional” maternity leave.
7. In France, parental leave is paid only for workers having 2 or more children.
8. In Germany, parental leave is paid until the child is 2 years old and for workers below a certain 
household income.
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Table 3.12: The Impact of Attitudes on the Gender Gap in Unemployment Rates
(1) (2) (3)
Preference for male employment 11.91 5.71 5.76
[2.56] [1.99] [1-99]
Preference for male employment* 1.29
(male unemployment rate-9.6) (0.27)
male unemployment rate -0.16
(0.12)
constant 0.43 2.47 2.47
[0.92] [0.69] [0.69]
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes
Number of observations 139 139 139
NOTES:
1. The dependent variable is the gap between female and the male unemployment 
rate. Each observation is a region in a country in 1996.
2. The variable ‘preference for male employment’ is the fraction agreeing with the 
statement “when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” -  this 
comes from a 1996 Eurobarometer survey.
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Table 3.13: Part-time Employment
Female Male
Unemployed 
wanting PT 
work (%)
Employed
Working
Part-Time
(%)
Unemployed 
wanting PT 
work (%)
Employed
Working
Part-Time
(%)
Spain 7.8 16.5 1.3 2.6
Greece 6.8 5.7 0 2.6
Italy 34.4 12.4 3.7 2.8
France 23.2 30 2.7 5.3
Belgium 20.1 34 2.1 3.2
Netherlands 72.4 68.7 15.3 16.7
Luxembourg 36.1 18.1 0 1.3
Germany 23.7 33.6 3.2 3.3
Denmark 16.3 35.1 0 11.4
Portugal 0 8.3 0 1.6
Finland 7.1 15.2 0 6.5
Sweden 19.4 42.6 2.9 8.3
Austria 44.8 28.7 3.8 3
Ireland 47.2 22.2 0 5.7
UK 55.1 44.2 5.2 7.5
Notes.
1. Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey, 1996.
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
R
at
e
169
CHAPTER 3. Gender Gaps in Unemployment Rates
Figure 3.1: Unemployment Rates by Gender Over Time
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Figure 3.2: The Gender Gap in Unemployment Rates and Reservation Wage/Wage
Ratios
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Notes.
1. The gender gaps in unemployment rates come from the coefficient on a female 
dummy in a probit regression for being unemployed where personal characteristics are 
included as controls (this is column B o f Table 3.2). The gender wage gaps come 
from a similar regression where the dependent variable is the log o f the hourly wage 
and the gender gap in reservation wages from a similar regression where the 
dependent variable is the log of the hourly reservation wage.
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Figure 3.3: The Gender Gap in Unemployment Rates and in Wages
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1. Data sources as for Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.4: Prejudice and the Gender Gap in Unemployment Rates
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Notes.
1. The vertical axis is the average of the gap between female and male 
unemployment rates over the period 1996-2000 inclusive.
2. The horizontal axis is the fraction agreeing with the statement “when jobs are 
scarce, men should have more right to a job than women”.
Chapter 4
Is Privatisation Behind the Rise 
in the Profit Share? A  Cross 
Country Industry Panel D ata  
Analysis.
4.1 Introduction
It is unusual to see a leader in the Economist Magazine declaring “Capitalist are grabbing 
a rising share of national income at the expense of workers”1. But it is a fact that the 
share of profits in national income in the Eurozone area and Japan are at their highest for 
25 years. After tax profits are at their highest share in the US for 75 years. The Economist 
attributes these changes to globalisation, but (as we show below) these changes have taken 
place in many non-traded sectors of the economy2. By contrast economists have tended to 
attribute the fall in the labour share to deregulation in both labour and product markets.
The deregulation of product and labour markets has been a mantra of economic pol­
icy advice for many years and has been taken up in earnest over the last two decades. 
Supporters claim two main benefits. First, deregulation may have benefits in lowering 
unemployment which has remained high in many of the large European countries since the 
early 1980s (e.g. Nickell (2003)). Second, deregulation has more recently been advocated 
as a way of spurring European productivity growth in the light of recent evidence that
1 “Breaking Records” The Economist Februray 12th 2005.
2 Although there could be general equilibrium effects that affect the non-traded sectors.
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the United States ended its 20 year productivity slowdown sometime in the mid 1990s 
(e.g. Stiroh (2002)). Much discussion focuses on labour market regulation but there is a 
growing feeling that product market regulation may be equally important and this chap­
ter focuses on the impact of two aspects of product market regulation, privatisation and 
barriers to entry.
Since there is no ‘standard’ way in which to think about the effect of privatisation, we 
consider three possibilities: first, the affect it has on competition in the product market. 
Second, the changes in the objective function of the employer. Third, the effect that 
privatisation has on the bargaining power over wages of workers. The theoretical model in 
the chapter includes all three elements and although there are contrasting predictions, we 
find that when we consider a change in the objective function of the employer, specifically 
a reduction in the extent to which they value employment, this lead to a reduction in the 
wage bill share, an increase in wages and a reduction in employment. In particular, it is 
likely that productivity will increase as the private sector is assumed to more aggressive in 
seeking out cost reductions and because of the impact of more competition. With regard 
to wages, it is likely that as private firms find it more difficult to indulge in preferences 
for jobs by over-employing unskilled workers, leading to a higher average wage.
When considering the theoretical reductions in barriers to entry in the product market, 
we would expect there to be an impact in reducing price cost margins and therefore to 
increase the share of labour in value added. If there is any bargaining over the wage then 
wages will partly be a function of the quasi-rents earned in the industry. Falling barriers 
to entry reduces the availability of these rents and therefore the nominal industry wage is 
likely to fall (in the long-run aggregate prices will also fall so the real wage in the economy 
as a whole will increase from a reduction in the entry barriers throughout the economy).
We focus on testing the effects that deregulation have on the wage bill share, employment 
and wage which come directly out of most models with imperfect competition in the 
product and labour markets. The mechanisms are germane to models which predict 
improvements in employment as a result of product market deregulation.
Despite this interest in deregulation, the empirical work in the area is rather disappointing. 
Most authors work with aggregate data of one sort or another using cross-country panel 
regressions (Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003a,b), Nickell (2003)). Results tend to be rather 
fragile (see Baker et al (2003)). In our view the main reason for this fragility is that 
there are many events occurring simultaneously at the macro-level and disentangling the 
impact of product market deregulation from these other events is a formidable task.
This problem can be illustrated with a simple example from our dataset. There is a clear
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theoretical prediction from most models that reducing public ownership and barriers to 
entry in the product market should increase the share of labour in value added (price 
costs margins are squeezed because of increased competition arising from actual or po­
tential entry). This in turn should lower the long-run equilibrium rate of unemployment. 
Consider an aggregate cross country panel OLS regression of the SH A R E  of the wage bill 
in GDP. In our data estimating this equation delivers the following encouraging results 
(standard errors in brackets):
SH A R E  =  0.006(0.001)PO — 0.029(0.003)BTE  +  timedummies.
(Observations =  327, H2=0.35)
Consistently with the theory an increase in the barriers to entry (BTE) index is associated 
a fall in the labour share of value added. This is significant at the 1% level. Similarly 
an increase in the public ownership index (PO) is associated with a significant increase 
in the share of labour in value added. Unfortunately, using a fixed effect estimator by 
including a set of country dummies completely destroys the results.
SH A R E  =  —0.001(0.164)PO — 0.001(0.2Q6)BTE +  time dummies +  country dummies.
(Observations =  327, R2=0.93)
Both variables have standard errors with orders of magnitude larger than the point es­
timates. Some researchers respond to these findings by attempting to control for the 
unobserved country effects by including observed country-wide variables instead of fixed 
effects. But this is likely to be difficult because of the wide range of other unobserved 
nation-specific factors. Other researchers attempt to estimate much more sophisticated 
models including country-specific time trends, longer lags, interactions between policies 
and so on. But this is likely to make the identification problem worse, not better (see 
Baker et al (2003), for a strong criticism of the robustness of the empirical cross country 
unemployment and regulation literature). Our proposal in this chapter is to use some of 
the inter-industry variation within countries (and over time) to identify the effects. We 
find that better data helps a lot.
A second problem with the existing literature on the macro-effects of regulatory change 
is that product market deregulation tend to be focused in particular sectors so a sector 
specific approach is more attractive. There is a significant line of research focusing on 
single sectors3. Although enlightening, the disadvantage of this very micro approach is 
that it is hard to generalise to other sectors or across the economy as a whole. In this
3For example, Rose (1987) on trucking; Roller et al (2003) on Airlines or Olley and Pakes (1996) on 
telecommunications equipment.
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chapter we take an intermediate approach using panel data from sectors across several 
OECD countries. These are the “network industries” that have seen the greatest degree 
of regulatory reform -  telecoms, post, gas, electricity, airlines, railways and roads. The 
timing of reform and the extent of reform vary significantly between countries. We exploit 
this differences as quantified in some new OECD data on public ownership and barriers 
to entry to explicitly test some key economic mechanisms4. First, does public ownership 
matter? Second, do falls in entry barriers change labour’s position? Finally, what is the 
role of labour market institutions?
Our results suggest that disaggregation and controls for unobserved heterogeneity are 
vital in order to find results that are consistent with the economic theory of imperfect 
competition in product and labour markets. We find that falling public ownership is 
associated with a higher wage bill share and this is driven by the positive effect of public 
ownership on employment. Thus strongly suggests that privatisation is an important 
reason for the falling wage bill share in the network industries in the OECD. Barriers to 
entry also appear to matter, in that higher barriers to entry are generally associated with 
lower labour share. This result is, however, less robust than the public ownership result.
These findings that privatisation tended to reduce labour’s share helps to answer the 
question of why labour’s share tended to fall in the OECD despite falling entry barriers 
(see Torrini (2005) or Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)). The impact of privatisation does 
exert a strong downward pressure on labour’s share and this is only partially offset by the 
increase in product market competition. As a consequence labour’s share has fallen. Other 
things equal, the fall in public ownership may account for a majority of the fall in labour’s 
share in our sample. An alternative explanation may be that deregulation on the labour 
market side could labour’s share through declines in worker bargaining power. However, 
in our analysis we do not find support for the labour market deregulation hypothesis.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 4.2 lays out some basic theory and 
Section 4.3 details the econometric modelling approach. Section 4.4 describes our data 
and Section 4.5 discusses our results. We offer some concluding remarks in Section 4.6.
4.2 Basic M odel
This section will present some simple models to enable us to think about the likely impact 
of barriers to entry and privatisation on the variables of interest. In modelling the impact
4 The only other paper that uses regulation data in a cross country industry level panel setting is 
Alessini et al (2003). They find evidence that entry barriers reduce investment.
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of barriers to entry we simply follow others (e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)) and 
think about it as a change in competition in the product market.
However, there is no ‘standard’ way to think about the effect of privatisation and we 
discuss a number of possibilities here. First, it may affect the degree of competition in 
the product market. Secondly, it may change the objective function of the employer from 
whatever it is that a public-sector firm maximizes to profit-maximization. Thirdly, it may 
affect the bargaining power over wages of workers -  it is common to hear the view that 
public-sector unions are more powerful than their private-sector counterparts. We present 
a model which has all three elements.
First consider the specification of the preferences of a public-sector employer. We assume 
that the public sector firm cares not only about profits (n )  but also about total employ­
ment (N ). This may be due to political pressure, or to the desire of (weakly monitored)
managers to build empires. Whatever the cause we assume that the value function of the
dU dUfirm is U(H, N ) where > 0, > 0 and U is a concave function. In this case we can
write the first order condition as:
,dU  ,dU x xV M P L  = W - ( M / m ) (4.1)
where V M P L  is the value of the marginal product of labour. This implies that, for a 
given wage, the firm will have an employment level higher than would be the case if the
firm simply maximized profits. In what follows we assume that the utility function of the
public-sector employer has the particular functional form:
U =  n  i - tN *  (4.2)
where 0 < <f> < 1. Privatisation can be thought of as a reduction in <f>.
To give more intuition over the determinants of the wage bill share we consider some
specific functional forms. A representative organisation has surplus
n  = P Q -  W N  (4.3)
where P  is price, Q is value added, W  is the wage rate and N  is employment. The product 
market is imperfectly competitive so the firm faces the inverse demand curve
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P = BQTv (4.4)
where B  is a demand index. Output is produced with the production function
Q =  C N a (4.5)
Substituting (4.3)-(4.5) into (4.2) we have that:
log (7 =  (1 -  4>)log[BC1- r)N a(1- ’>'> -  W N\ + 4>\ogN (4.6)
If we choose N  to maximize this given the wage this leads, after some re-arrangement to 
the following expression for log employment:
that does not depend on the wage. The easiest way to understand this is to think about 
the case where the employer only cares about employment (<f> =  1). Then employment 
will be chosen to make profits zero, but the higher is the wage the lower the level of 
employment that delivers zero profits.
One can also derive a simple expression for the labour share from this maximization. One 
can write V M P L  as:
[ -  log W  +  logB  +  logC 1 v + log(a(l 4>) + <f>] (4.7)
There are several points worth noting about this ‘labour demand curve’. First, the 
stronger the preference of the employer over employment the higher will be employment 
for a given wage. Secondly, the ‘labour demand curve’ slopes downwards with an elasticity
V M P L  = a P (l -  t))Q  v ' N (4.8)
Substituting these into the first order condition (4.1) gives
(4.9)
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Re-arranging and solving for the wage bill share:
s =  =  <*(1 -  7?}(1 -  0) +  <}> (4.10)
So that the wage bill share is independent of the wage -  of course, this derives from the 
assumption that all functions are iso-elastic. (4.10) shows the key relationships we will 
focus on in the chapter. In the standard case of perfect competition (i.e. <j> =0 and tj 
= 0), equation (4.10) shows that the wage bill share will be equal to the technological 
parameter, a. However, if there is some degree of public ownership then as <f> >0 the 
wage bill share will be higher all else equal. Second, the greater the degree of monopoly 
power (a lower rj) the lower will be the wage bill share all else equal. We focus on higher 
barriers to entry (BTE), such as those caused by legal or bureaucratic rules as a source 
of market power.
One further result that will be useful in what follows is the elasticity of employer utility 
with respect to the wage. By differentiating (4.6) and using the envelope condition we 
can show that the elasticity of utility with respect to wages is:
dlogU  . s _  a ( l - 7 ?) ( l - 0 )  +  0
£ U W  Q 1  TTT ( I  r j  ,  1 / f  \  \ 4 » H )o log W  1 — s 1 — a ( l  — 77)
Note that this elasticity is increasing in so that an employer who cares a lot about em­
ployment will find their utility reduced more by a given wage increase than one who does 
not. The simplest way to understand this is to think of the two extreme cases <f> = [0,1] 
in which the employer either only cares about employment or profits. If it only cares 
about employment, a rise in the wage then reduces employer utility as it reduces employ­
ment with an elasticity that is the elasticity of the labour demand curve which, with the 
assumptions made is greater than the elasticity of profits with respect to the wage5.
Now consider the determination of the wage. We consider Nash bargaining between the 
workers which has the form:
Q = /3 log F  +  (1 -  0) log U (4.12)
Where V  is the utility of the workers and /? is the bargaining power of workers. We
assume that the preferences of the workers can be written as:
5 Note this result may not be robust to alternative assumptions about technology so should be thought
of as a possibility rather than a certainty.
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log V = \og(W -  A) + 7  log N  (4.13)
where A is the present value of the alternative “outside” wage and 7  is the union’s 
preferences over employment. Differentiating £1 with respect to wages and re-arranging 
delivers the “wage equation”:
Where:
W  = J ^ Uw A  =  (1 +  n)A  (4.14)
(3j £Nw + (1 — P)£Uw ~ P
fi can be thought of as a wage mark-up over the outside option. With these results we 
can develop our predictions about the effects of various changes on the wage bill share, 
wages, employment, and productivity.
First consider an increase in product market competition, modelled as a lower sensitivity 
of price to output i.e. a reduction in rj . This will raise the wage bill share -  from 
(4.10), reduce wages -  from (4.14) (as it makes the labour demand curve more elastic) 
and increase employment.
Second, consider a decrease in worker bargaining power. This will reduce wages, raise 
employment but leave the labour share unchanged6.
Third, consider a change in the objective function of the employer, specifically a reduction 
in the extent to which they value employment per se. From (4.10) this will lead to a 
reduction in the labour share, from (4.14) this will lead to an increase in wages, and a 
reduction in employment.
These predictions are summarized below:
[1] [2] 13)
Labour Share + 0/- -
Employment + + -
Wages - - +
6 This result obviously depends on the assumptions of an iso-elastic
technology.
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Where [1] is the increase in Product Market Competition, [2] is the decrease in Worker 
Bargaining Power and [3] is the decrease in Employer Concern about Employment.
We will use these contrasting predictions to try to understand the empirical effects of 
privatisation that we find.
This analysis is solely in partial equilibrium and there are other effects present in general 
equilibrium settings as described by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).
There are other possible important effects at work. For example, Andrews and Simmons 
(1995) argue that one can understand the experience in large unionized workplaces in the 
UK in the 1980s which had big reductions in employment but modest changes in wages 
as the result of a model in which unions negotiate wages and effort but their influence 
over effort declined. One would get similar results if one assumed that the nature of 
bargaining changed from an “efficient bargain” over both wages and employment to a 
right-to-manage model in which only wages are negotiated.
Another extension is to heterogeneous labour. Assume that there are two types of labour, 
skilled (denoted by a subscript “S”) and unskilled labour (denoted by a subscript “U”). 
They have different market wages but we still assume that it is total employment that the 
public sector cares about. In this case the relative marginal product can still be written
I V  ( d U  ! d U \V M P L . W. -
V W P L u . . .  , d U d U  { W >
Wu ~ {d N / d H)
In the public sector there will be an over employment of unskilled workers relative to 
skilled workers (as it is cheaper to indulge the preference for larger employment size 
by employing more low-wage workers). If we consider the case of total privatisation (a 
change to 0=0) this will lead to a reduction in the employment of unskilled workers. 
Consequently privatisation will lead not only to a fall in employment to an increase in 
the observed average wage as there is a compositional shift to the more skilled.
In summary, models of imperfect competition suggest that increased barriers to entry 
(BTE) will decrease the wage bill share of labour but increase wages and reduce employ­
ment.
The effect of public ownership depends on how one’s view of the consequences of public 
ownership for product and labour markets and the objectives of the employer. We have 
shown how different views have different predictions about what should happen to the
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labour share, wages and employment. Hence, the empirical study can shed light on the 
mechanisms at work.
4.3 Econometric Models
Our basic equation of interest is
SH AREijt =  a f  POijt +  (3f BTEijt +  rjfj *f vft +  £jt 4- ufjt (4-17)
where SH A R E  is the share of the wage bill in value added for industry i in country j  at 
time t. PO  is an index of the degree of public ownership and B T E  is an index of barriers 
to entry. There are two key predictions from the theory. First, labour’s share should 
be increasing in the importance of public ownership (a f  > 0). Second, that high entry 
barriers will reduce labour’s share of value added (/?f < 0).
We consider a number of additional controls to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. First 
we include a full set of industry-country fixed effects (vfj) which turn out to be very 
important control variables. Second, we include industry-specific time trends (vft) -  these 
are generally significant. Thirdly, we consider country-specific time trends (£jt) as  a 
robustness test. The final error term is taken to be uncorrelated with the regressors 
(ufjt) although we allow it to be non-spherical. In our basic regressions we will pool over 
industries setting a f= a s  and {3f=f3s  but in our extended regressions we look separately 
by industry and allow BTE and PO to have industry-specific coefficients.
Our models also have predictions over the behaviour of employment and wages. Conse­
quently we decompose the effects of PO and BTE on the wage bill into the wage and 
employment effects. To be precise we estimate employment equations of the form:
In (Nat) = a ?  POijt +  $ B T E ^t +  »# +  »£ +  4  +  (4.18)
Our basic model clearly predicts af^>0 and Pi <0.
Finally, we consider using average wages, WAGES, as the dependent variable
\n(W AG E)ijt =  c t f  POtjt + P ?  BTE,jt + (4.19)
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Under the extension of the model where we allow for heterogeneous workers we would 
expect o tf  <0 as the public firm finds it easier to indulge its preference for jobs by over- 
employing unskilled workers leading to a low average wage. Under the extension of the 
basic model where we allow for wage bargaining we would expect fiY  >0 because workers 
in protected industries can capture some of the monopoly rents in the form of higher 
wages.
4.4 Data
4.4 .1  G eneral T tends
In order to understand the declining share of labour’s share, we need to highlight where 
the changes are taking place. By focusing on the business sector, where most of the change 
took place in the 1980s and 1990s, we can decompose the total change in share for each 
of the (groups of) industries into the “within industry” and “between industry” changes.
To be precise, for any country j  denote the wage bill share as 5* for industry i. For this 
exercise we divided the business sector into four broad industries -  network industries, 
manufacturing, financial and wholesale, retail and hotel -  but in the main empirical work 
we focus on sub-sectors within the network industries (Where there has been significant 
time series variation in public ownership and entry barriers). The total change in the 
aggregate share can be decomposed into two components, one due to reallocation of 
production between industries with different levels of wage bill share and the other due 
to changes in the level of share within industries:
AS' = £ i AUiSi + £ i ASii>i
Where Vi denotes the value added of industry i as a fraction of the total value added in 
the business sector and Si and Vi represent a simple average of the wage bill share and 
value added for industry i over time, respectively.
Table 4.1 reports the results for the change in the business sector between 1980 and 
2000 for each country. We only report the results for the countries for which we have 
continuous data from 1980 onwards7. Column (1) shows the stylized fact that has been 
noted elsewhere: the share of value added going to workers has fallen in every country we
7 Although we use STAN for most of the analysis, here we use the data from the Gronnigen Industry 
Productivity Database since it has a continuous dataset from 1980. The datasets are explained in more 
detail in Section 4.4.2.
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consider, on average by over five percentage points (or 8 percent of the 65% share in 1980). 
This ranges from an 8.83% point fall in the US to a 1.85% point fall in (West) Germany. 
Given the historical stability of the wage bill share, this represents a substantial change 
and demands an explanation.
In the Appendix, Table 4.A1 gives the complete between and within changes for each 
industry included in the business sector. In Table 4.1 we report the results for the two 
most important contributions: the between changes in manufacturing and the within 
changes in the network industries. It can be seen that the fall in manufacturing share, 
weighted by the deviation of the initial period wage bill share from the average, can 
account for a great deal of the fall in the wage bill share. Figure 4.1 shows this more 
clearly. This is interesting by itself as it suggests that the decline of manufacturing is an 
important factor in the fading wage bill share. Part of the greater fall is in the US rather 
than in Germany, therefore, is due to the faster rate of de-industrialization in America 
relative to Germany.
Nevertheless, Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 also show that a substantial component of the 
aggregate fall in the wage bill share is attributable to changes occurring within the network 
industries. These include telecom, post, gas, electricity, airlines and roads and we focus on 
these industries in the empirical analysis. On average, changes in the network industries 
account for a quarter of the aggregate change in the wage bill share (even though they 
contribute, on average, only 17 percent of aggregate value added).
The impact of the network industries in further highlighted in Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 
4.5. Figure 4.2 plots the time series variation of the wage bill share in these industries, 
Figure 4.2 plots the time series variation of the wage bill share in the network industries, 
Figure 4.4 plots the change in the (mean) public ownership index and Figure 4.5 plots 
the mean barriers to entry variables in these industries. Although there is variation 
across countries at the macro-level, only a few selected industries, namely the network 
industries, have time series variation at the industry level. The network industries have, in 
some countries, witnessed substantial regulatory reform over the last two decades in many 
OECD countries. For this reason we focus on these sectors in the chapter. Figures 4.2 
through 4.5 shows that there is substantial heterogeneity between countries and industries 
in the change in the wage bill share and the pace of reform.
4.4 .2  D a ta  Sources
We obtained our data on product market data form the OECD’s regulation database 
version (see Data Appendix 4.A). These were kindly supplied at a greater degree of
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disaggregation than is available in the standard OECD publications by Giuseppe Nicoletti 
(for an in depth discussions see Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000), (2003)). The main variable 
of interest to us is Public Ownership (PO) which is scaled between 0 (no public sector 
involvement) to 6 (complete public ownership and control). This captures a combination 
of government ownership, control and interference in the running of the industry. These 
measures area developed from in-depth analysis of the country specific regulation working 
with the relevant departments in each OECD country. Barriers to Entry (BTE) which is 
an index on the scale of 0 (lowest barriers to entry) to 6 (highest barriers to entry).
The second dataset we draw on is the OECD’s STAN database (STAN has been used 
by many authors -  e.g. Machin and Van Reenen (1998)). This includes information on 
wage bills (including all employer costs) and value added that we use to calculate SHARE 
(the proportion of wages in industry GDP). It also includes information on employment 
that we use to calculate average wages (wage bills divided by employment)8. There are 
some missing values on employment in STAN and we drew on a third database, the 
Gronnigen Industry Productivity Database (downloaded from http://www.euklems.net/) 
to supplement STAN. STAN also has information on gross output, investment and R&D 
(ANBERD dataset) that we drew on for the production function analysis.
In combining the datasets we had to aggregate somewhat to obtain consistent series. 
This left us with five sectors across eighteen countries between 1970 and 2001 (it is an 
unbalanced panel -  see Table 4.A2). The Data Appendix gives more information and 
descriptive statistics on the construction of the database. Table 4.2 gives some basic 
descriptive statistics of the key variables used in the dataset. All values are expressed in 
real US 1996 dollars evaluated at PPPs from the OECD.
We also draw on two datasets to obtain sociopolitical variables, which are used as in­
strumental variables for deregulation. The first is the World Values Survey (WVS) and 
the second is Database of Political Institutions (DPI). WVS is a worldwide investigation 
of sociocultural and political change. It is conducted by a network of social scientists 
at leading universities all around the world and provides a broad range of variables for 
analysing the impact of the values and beliefs of mass public on political and social life. 
For the purpose of our study, the variables of most interest are: (1) Self positioning in the 
political scale (which ranges from 1 (Left) to 10 (Right), (2) Private vs state ownership 
of business (1 (Private ownership increased) to 10 (Government ownership increased)),
(3) Government responsibility to provide for all (1 (People take more responsibility) to 
10 ((Government take more responsibility)).
8In a few cases this can exceed unity (if the industry is making losses). We “windsorized” the variable 
to take a maximum value of unity in these cases, but the results are robust to using the raw data.
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The DPI provide details about elections, electoral rules, types of political systems, party 
compositions of the opposition and government coalition and the extent of military influ­
ence on the government. For the purpose of our study we look at the cross-country time 
series of the party orientation (See Data Appendix 4.A for more details).
A drawback of the dataset is that we do not have detailed information on the human 
capital characteristics of the workers. We attempt to capture these in the empirical work 
by including fixed effects specific to an industry-country pairing (e.g. the German airlines 
industry has a separate dummy), time dummies, industry specific time trends and, in 
some specifications country specific time trends. We also turn to looking at some micro 
datasets from the Labour Force Surveys particular countries where there have been large 
changes in a later part of the analysis.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 M ain  R esu lts
Table 4.3 contains our main results from pooling the sectors across industries and coun­
tries. We divide the results into three panels. Our main results are for the wage bill share 
(panel A) and we consider employment in Panel B and wages in panel C
The first two columns of each panel include just public ownership (and the controls), the 
third and fourth columns include just barriers to entry and the final two columns include 
both public ownership and barriers to entry. For each dependent variable we first present 
results without fixed effects then results with a full set of fixed effects (industry*country) 
in the next column. All specifications include a full set of time, country and industry 
dummies and separate time trends for each sector.
Turning first to the wage bill share regressions in Panel A we find that the two key 
predictions of the basic model appear to be strongly supported by the data. Public 
Ownership (PO) has a positive effect on the share of value added accruing to labour. This 
relationship is stronger when we include the fixed effects (e.g., the coefficient increases 
from 0.11 to 0.65 between columns (1) and (2)). The magnitude suggests the results 
(with fixed effects) are economically as well as statistically significant. Moving from the 
highest to the lowest PO (i.e. from 6 to 0) is predicted to reduce the wage bill share by 
six percentage points (note that the entire average time series change in labour’s share 
between 1980 and 2000 was 5.3%).
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The barrier to entry (BTE) variable appears to have a negative and statistically signifi­
cant impact on the wage bill share as theory predicts. When we also control for public 
ownership the BTE variable coefficient rises to -0.87 but is insignificant at the 5% level.
Panel B of Table 4.3 show the ln(average employment) regression results. The coeffi­
cient on PO in the first column is very negative (which is contrary to our theoretical 
predictions). When we include fixed effect in column (2), however, the effect of public 
ownership (PO) becomes positive and highly significant as we would predict from our 
model, privatisation is predicted to reduce employment, as is consistent with other evi­
dence (See Green & Haskel (2004)). A one point increase in the public ownership index 
is predicted to increase employment by 4% in column (2). The BTE variable is negative 
(but insignificant) which is consistent with our theoretical model.
The final panel looks at average wages. Wages appear to be significantly lower in industries 
that are more subject to public ownership whether or not we control for fixed effects. In the 
final column, for example, a one point increase in PO is associated with a 2% fall in average 
wages. This is consistent with our model when we allow for heterogeneous workers, but 
inconsistent with a model where public sector workers are, on average, earning significant 
wage rents. In the preferred model of the final column the BTE variable is negative which 
is inconsistent with our model where workers gain rents from the firm’s market power. 
This coefficient is not significant at conventional levels, however.
Table 4.4 breaks down the results by the four network industries. As before, the main 
wage bill share results are in Panel A. The employment equations are in Panel B and the 
average wage results in panel C. Note for roads the database has information on BTE, but 
not public ownership so we include a dummy variable for roads in the Table 4.3 results. 
All estimates include a full set of fixed effects and time dummies.
Looking at the share equations in Panel A, PO has a positive impact on the wage bill 
regressions in all sectors, although this is not significant for telecoms. The point esti­
mates are largest in transport and smallest in telecoms. We find a negative association 
between wage bill shares and BTE in every industry except transport (although this is 
only significant in electricity and gas at 10% level).
The middle panel (B) has the employment regressions. Public ownership is positive and 
significant at the 10% level in all sectors. In magnitude the largest effects are in electricity 
and gas and the smallest effects are in telecom which is consistent with the wage bill share 
results. The barriers to entry results do not show a consistent picture across sectors, one 
is significantly negative (roads) consistent with theory, two are insignificant and one is 
significantly positive (electricity) which is inconsistent with the theory.
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Finally, the lower panel (C) of Table 4.4 contains the ln(wage) regressions. There is a 
consistent picture for the public ownership coefficient that is negative in all industries 
(except for transport). This is consistent with the heterogeneous workers version of the 
model and consistent with the findings in the pooled results. The BTE variable is positive 
in two of the four industries as predicted by the extended model with wage bargaining, 
but is not significant at conventional levels.
In summary, the results in Table 4.4 when we disaggregate by industry show a very clear 
pattern for the public ownership variable, which is similar to that in the pooled results of 
Table 4.3. PO is associated with a higher wage bill share and this is driven by the positive 
effect of public ownership on employment (since the wage effect is actually negative). This 
strongly suggests that privatisation is an important reason for the falling wage bill share 
in the network industries in the OECD and (given their importance as shown in Table 
4.1) for the business sector as a whole. Barriers to entry also appear to matter -  in the 
higher BTE is generally associated with lower labour shares.
4.5 .2  Instru m ental Variable R esu lts
In the econometric section we discussed reasons why there may be endogeneity bias for 
the privatisation (and barriers to entry) indicators. We investigate this issue in Table 
4.5 where we use sociopolitical variables as instrumental variables. Note that these are 
country and time period specific (we show below that there is not evidence for country 
specific time trends conditional on our covariates). First, column (1) shows the baseline 
OLS results in the preferred specification of column (6), Panel A Table 4.3. The sample 
is slightly smaller because we have a few missing observations on the political variables, 
but the results are very similar to those reported for the full sample.
Column (2) presents the first stage where we regress public ownership on the four instru­
ments (and the other exogenous covariates including fixed effects) simultaneously. In the 
Appendix we show the results are qualitatively similar when we just use each instrument 
one by one so that the second stage equation is just identified. Three of the instruments 
are individually significant and the four instruments are jointly significant as indicated in 
Table 4.5. The signs of the variables are as expected. Countries whose median voters are 
more likely to position themselves as right wing on a political scale, who believe in private 
rather than state ownership and that “people rather than government” should take more 
responsibility are more likely to subsequently introduce privatisation than those who do 
not. Furthermore, right wing governments are, unsurprisingly, more likely to introduce 
privatisation.
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The third column presents the IV results. The public ownership variable remains statis­
tically significant with a larger coefficient than those in Table 4.1. This is reassuring as 
it suggests that the results reported earlier are robust and not due to a spurious endo­
geneity bias . The next three columns allow barriers to entry to also be endogenous. We 
present the new reduced forms for PO (column (4)) and BTE (column (5)). The pattern 
of coefficients is not so clear for the first stage BTE regressions as they are for PO. The 
IV results in the final column support the interpretation under the OLS results -  both 
PO and BTE and correctly signed and significant.
4.5 .3  R ob u stn ess
We also conducted a variety of other robustness tests on the results.
First, we investigated in some detail whether labour market regulations could also play 
a role in understanding the falling share of labour in value added. We augmented our 
specifications to include various OECD measures of the regulation of labour markets such 
as hiring and firing costs, replacement rates, bite of the minimum wage, the coverage 
and co-ordination of collective bargaining, etc. These were all statistically insignificantly 
different from zero (see Appendix).
A disadvantage of the labour market measures compared to the product market measures 
is that they have do not have variation at the industry level over time (only at the country 
level over time). Consequently, it may be hard to identify their effect separately from the 
time and country dummies. An exception is union density that does have within industry 
variation - we include union density in Table 4.6 as an additional regressor. Our key 
results remain robust, but the union variable is insignificant in specifications with or 
without fixed effects. Indeed in the fixed effects specification the coefficient is negative, 
suggesting that, if anything, the fall in union power should have lead to an increase in 
the wage bill share of workers.
Second, we allowed some longer dynamics on the policy variables by including an extra 
lag of public ownership and barriers to entry (see Appendix). There does not some to be 
additional dynamics of adjustment as the additional lags were statistically insignificant.
4.5 .4  Q uantification
Table 4.7 examines how well our simple model performs in accounting for some of the 
trends in wage bill shares between 1980 and 1998 in the network industries as a whole.
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The first column shows the empirical fall in the wage bill share between these years, which 
were, on average, over ten percentage points -  much larger than the change for the whole 
business sector as shown in Table 4.1 (5.3 percentage points). Although every country 
experienced some fall in labour’s share of value added in the network industries, it was 
obviously much more rapid in some countries than in others. The large fall in Italy is 
mainly post 1995 (the 1980-1994 fall was 16 percentage points) which coincided with a 
major utility privatisation in 1995.
These falls in the wage bill share have coincided with a fall in barriers to entry and public 
ownership in every country. We make a back of the envelope calculation of how much 
privatisation can account for the change in the wage bill of the network industries. Using 
our preferred estimates of the effect of privatisation (-.0099) and the empirical fall in 
public ownership (on average the index fell by 1.583 points) we account for, on average 
16% of the fall. This is a significant, although not overwhelming fraction of the change. 
Note though, that there is much heterogeneity by country. Whereas we can only account 
for 2% of the change in the US (which had very little privatisation) we can account for 
almost 60% of the change in France and Britain. In addition, the IV estimates suggest 
that we may be under-estimating the importance of privatisation.
In the absence of any changes in PO we predict that labour’s share should have risen in 
every country due to the decrease in barriers to entry enabling stronger competition to 
erode firm margins. Column (5) shows that BTE fell on average by 2.2 points.
Therefore, our story is essentially that falls in BTE were outweighed by the role of pri­
vatisation in accounting for some of the fall in labour’s share. However, this still leaves a 
lot of the story unexplained in some of the countries with large falls in labour’s share.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we show that there is robust empirical evidence that privatisation has 
been a cause of the fall of labour’s share of value added over the past two decades. 
We set up a simple model that showed how privatisation might do just this because of 
the preference for employment over profits displayed in the objectives of publicly owned 
firms. By contrast, falling barriers to entry should increase the wage bill share of income 
as competition erodes profit margins.
We exploit a number of policy experiments across several “network” industries in many 
OECD countries in order to identify these effects. These relationships are very difficult to
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estimate from solely macro-economic data as the product market deregulations are very 
industry specific and the aggregate data will be swamped by many events that are taking 
place simultaneously in the economy.
We find evidence that after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity that, consistently 
with theory, falling entry barriers increase labour’s share of value. On the other hand, 
declining state control tends to reduce labour’s share. These results are robust to a 
number of controls including adding a full set of fixed effects and using sociopolitical 
variable to tackle the endogeneity problem.
Quantitatively, we find that the wave of privatisation in OECD countries is part of the 
story of the declining share of labour in the network industries -  accounting for only 16% 
on average, but up to 60% in Britain and France. However, the within sector change 
of the network industries only accounts for a quarter of the overall fall in the wage bill 
share. Consequently, privatisation does not seem to be the dominant factor in explaining 
what is going on at the macro level. A caveat to this is that there are many other forms 
of privatisation -  public sector outsourcing, manufacturing privatisation, quasi-market 
reforms in health and education, etc. -  that we are not considering.
If not privatisation, then what are the other factors that could account for the fall in 
labour’s share? Labour market liberalisation is an obvious culprit, but we did not find 
compelling evidence that this was a major factor. “Globalization” may be a possibility 
but this may be difficult to tackle with micro-economic data. Indeed a large component of 
the change (See Table 4.1) may simply be the shift of the economy out of manufacturing 
which may be related to trade, but may also be driven by technology and tastes.
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4.8 Tables and Figures
Country
Change in
Business
Sector
Wage Bill 
Share 1980
Wage Bill 
Share 2000
Within
Network
Industries
Change
Between
Manufacturing
Change
All Other 
Components
Austria -4.02 60.87 56.86 -0.269 -1.890 -1.856
6.70% 47.07% 46.23%
France -5.60 65.71 60.11 0.323 -5.645 -0.277
-5.77% 100.81% 4.96%
Germany -1.85 69.17 67.32 -1.908 -4.330 4.389
103.19% 234.20% -237.39%
Italy -6.22 65.75 59.53 -4.077 -5.904 3.758
65.52% 94.87% -60.39%
Netherlands -7.02 62.54 55.52 -1.016 -3.528 -2.476
14.47% 50.26% 35.27%
Spain -4.37 54.07 49.70 -1.164 -8.418 5.210
26.63% 192.55% -119.18%
USA -8.83 70.17 61.34 -1.234 -6.544 -1.052
13.98% 74.11% 11.91%
United
Kingdom -4.34 69.45 65.12 -1.572 -8.308 5.544
36.25% 191.60% -127.85%
Average -5.28 64.72 59.44 -1.365 -5.571 1.655
25.84% 105.50% -31.34%
1980-2000
Notes.
1. Data from Gronnigen Industry Productivity Database.
2. Coefficients are multiplied by 100.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observations Mean
Standard
Deviation Min Max
Barriers to Entry 1160 4.2867 1.816085 0 6
Aggregate PO 1160 3.424 2.27364 0 6
Wage Bill Share of Value added 1160 0.5378 0.1922786 0.195 0.958
Employment 1442 251,475 485,425 1,000 ; 2,834,000
Value Added($m) 1160 20,767 39,759 52 299,851
Wage Bill ($mi) 1160 10,475 21,091 23 176,899
Wages($) 1085 34,322 9,736 11,362 91,747
Notes.
1. Means and standard deviations from sample (see Data Appendix for a full 
description).
2. The Barriers to Entry, Aggregate PO, Wage Bill and Value Added are all 
restricted to when Value Added is not missing. Employment is restricted to when 
it is not missing. Wages are restricted to when real wages are not missing.
3. Employment data comes from Gronnigen Industry Productivity Database due to a 
large number of missing values in STAN. Although for most part the STAN and 
Groningen data on employment is compatible, there are three discrepancies for 
UK in the late 1990s, which we drop from our analysis.
4. The number of observations for real wages falls because we calculate real wages 
using the wage bill divided by employment and there are missing values in each.
5. All values are expressed in real US 1996 dollars evaluated at PPPs from the 
OECD.
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Table 4.3: Pooling Over Industries
Panel A - Wage Bill Share
[1] [2] T31 T41 [5] [6]
Dependent variable Wage Bill Share
Public Ownership 0.111 0.648 0.335 0.992
[0.382] [0.321]* [0.384] [0.340]**
Barriers to Entry -0.940 -0.741 -1.002 -0.870
[0.363]** [0.314]* [0.368]** [0.325]
Trend*Telecom -0.825 -0.765 -0.833 -0.732 -0.839 -0.774
[0.163]** [0.109]** [0.162]** [0.107]** [0.162]** [0.108]**
Trend*Electricity -0.057 -0.086 0.010 0.008 0.007 -0.015
[0.153] [0.082] [0.155] [0.087] [0.155] [0.086]
Trend1,1 Roads 0.884 0.622 0.893 0.690 0.863 0.600
[0.258]** [0.189]** [0.255]** [0.184]** [0.256]** [0.187]**
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1160 1160 1160 1160 1160 1160
Number of fixed effects 69 69 69 69 69 69
Panel B - Employment
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Dependent variable Ln(Employment)
Public Ownership -11.763 3.562 -10.020 4.038
[1.883]** [1.001]** [2.012]** [1.090]**
Barriers to Entry -7.579 -0.631 -5.415 -1.184
[1.783]** [0.910] [1.910]** [0.943]
0.437 -0.271 0.345 -0.173 0.473 -0.273
Trend*Telecom [0.928] [0.154] [0.941] [0.157] [0.928] [0.155]
0.402 -0.670 0.523 -0.462 0.797 -0.594
Trend*Electricity [0.934] [0.198]** [0.954] [0.227]* [0.953] [0.219]**
-0.361 -2.474 -1.286 -2.133 -0.445 -2.506
Trend*Roads [1.070] [0.382]** [1.023] [0.377]** [1.058] [0.379]**
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1442 1442 1442 1442 1442 1442
Number of fixed effects 76 76 76 76 76 76
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Table 4.3: Pooling Over Industries (Continued)
Panel C -  Wages
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Dependent variable Ln(Wage)
Public Ownership -5.653 -2.032 -5.845 -2.018
[1.336]** [0.793]* [1.485]** [0.819]*
Barriers to Entry -0.482 -0.319 0.732 -0.033
[0.891] [0.478] [1.017] [0.488]
Trend*Telecom 0.102 0.821 -0.002 0.725 0.108 0.820
[0.592] [0.235]** [0.612] [0.233]** [0.588] [0.236]**
T rend* Electricity 0.745 0.767 0.612 0.711 0.701 0.769
[0.510] [0.197]** [0.574] [0.202]** [0.533] [0.199]**
Trend*Roads 0.527 0.494 0.029 0.294 0.541 0.493
[0.607] [0.378] [0.649] [0.365] [0.605] [0.381]
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1085 1085 1085 1085 1085 1085
Number of fixed effects 69 69 69 69 69 69
Notes.
1. All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100.
2. The coefficients are from separate OLS regressions.
3. The sample is pooled across four industries (electricity/gas, telecom, roads and 
transport). There is no data on public ownership on the roads in the OECD 
database and so we include a dummy variable for it.
4. “Share” is the Wage Bill Share of Value Added.
5. We include a full set of time dummies and time trends interacted with industry 
dummies (the base trend is Trend*Transport).
6. The Newey-West standard errors (in parentheses under coefficients) correct for 
first order serial correlation.
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Table 4.4: Results Separately by Industry 
Panel A: Wage Bill Share of Value Added_________________
Sector
[1]
Electricity and Gas
[2]
Telecom and Post
[3]
Transport
[4]
Roads
Public Ownership 0.889 0.427 1.870
[0.469] [1.186] [0.521]**
Barriers to Entry -1.313 -0.858 0.068 -1.268
[0.719] [0.536] [0.231] [0.955]
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 372 268 304 216
Panel B: ln(Emplovmenf)
Sector Electricity and Gas
[2]
Telecom and Post
[3]
Transport
[4]
Roads
Public Ownership 4.949 1.749 2.901
[1.633]** [1.199] [1.106]*
Barriers to Entry 3.993 1.086 -0.193 -6.512
[1.421]** [0.781] [1.165] [2.222]**
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 372 328 370 372
Panel C: ln(Wages)
Sector
[1]
Electricity and Gas
[2]
Telecom and Post
[3]
Transport
[4]
Roads
Public Ownership -3.424 -2.451 1.074
[0.959]** [2.289] [1.202]
Barriers to Entry 0.152 0.787 -0.238 -0.747
[1.096] [0.962] [0.853] [1.169]
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 319 257 297 211
Notes.
1. Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100; these are coefficients and standard errors (in 
brackets) for separate OLS regressions for each specified industry.
2. There is no data on public ownership on the roads in the OECD database and so we include a dummy 
variable for it.
3. We include a full set of time dummies in all regressions. The Newey-West standard errors (in 
parentheses under coefficients) correct for first order serial correlation
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Table 4.5: Wage Bill Share Regressions -  Instrumental Variable Estimates
[1]
OLS
[2]
First Stage OLS
[3]
IV
[4]
First Stage OLS
[5]
First Stage OLS
[6]
IV
Dependent variable Wage Bill Share Public Ownership Wage Bill Share Public Ownership Barriers to Entry Wage Bill Share
(lagged) IV1 Positioning on the political scale -10.776 -3.99 45.859
[6.205] [5.62] [14.221]*
(lagged) IV2 support for public ownership 12.359 12.826 3.152
[5.498]* [4.543]** [14.403]
(lagged) IV3 Government responsibility 10.348 10.474 0.856
[3.965]** [4.17]** [6.595]
(lagged) IV4 Right party in power -7.416 -7.888 -3.185
[2.252]** [2.372]** [4.452]
Public Ownership 0.97 4.851 4.818
[0.348]** [1.664]** [2.15]*
Barriers to Entry -0.914 14.798 -1.428 -1.482
[0.331]** [3.133]** [0.386]** [1.643]
Trend*Telecom -0.749 4.199 -0.917 4.348 1.012 -0.915
[0.109]** [0.977]** [0.139]** [0.968]** [1.856] [0.15]**
Trend*Electricity -0.011 2.141 -0.1 3.446 8.82 -0.094
[0.089] [1.162] [0.113] [1.077]** [1.71]* [0.227]
Trend*Roads 0.606 9.026 0.247 9.142 0.786 0.251
[0.19]** [0.793]** [0.261] [0.808]** [2.335] [0.315]
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120
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Notes.
1. These regressions estimate IV versions of the wage bill share regressions using socio-political variables as instruments. The first three 
columns consider treating PO as endogenous whereas the last four columns treat PO and BTE as endogenous.
2. The first stage results are in columns (1), (4) and (5).
3. IV (1), IV (2) and IV (3) are obtained from the World Value Survey and IV (4) is obtained from the Database of Political Institutions,
4. We collapse the data by the median (applying sampling weights).
5. The scaling of each variable is as follows: IV (1) Self positioning in the political scale, which ranges from 1 (Left) to 10 (Right); IV (2) 
Private vs state ownership of business, which ranges from 1 (Private ownership increased) to 10 (Government ownership increased), IV 
(3) Government responsibility to provide for all, which ranges from 1 (People take more responsibility) to 10 (Government take more 
responsibility), (4) where Left=l, Centre=2 and Right=3.
6. All coefficients are multiplied by 100.
7. The Newey-West standard errors correct for first order serial correlation.
202
CHAPTER 4.1s Privatisation Behind the Rise in the Profit Share?
Table 4.6: Role of Labour Market Institutions?
(Union Density)
[1] [2]
Dependent variable Share
Public Ownership 0.285 1.225
[0.458] [0.361]**
Barriers to Entry -1.203 -1.128
[0.409]** [0.339]**
Union Density 1.322 -3.656
[1.903] [3.234]
Trend*Telecom -0.744 -0.751
[0.193]** [0.132]**
Trend*Electricity 0.080 0.099
[0.172] [0.097]
Trend*Roads 1.036 0.598
[0.281]** [0.204]**
Fixed Effects No Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 989 989
Number o f fixed effects 60 60
Notes.
1. All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100.
2. The coefficients are from separate OLS regressions.
3. The sample is pooled across four industries (electricity/gas, telecom, transport, 
roads). There is no data on public ownership on the roads in the OECD 
database and so we include a dummy variable for it.
4. “Share” is the Wage Bill Share of Value Added.
5. We include a full set o f time dummies and time trends interacted with industry 
dummies (the base trend is Trend*Transport).
6. The Newey-West standard errors (in parentheses under coefficients) correct 
for first order serial correlation.
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Table 4.7: Quantification of the Role of Privatisation in Changing Labour’s Share in
the Network Industries, 1980-98
Country
[1]
Actual 
Change in Share
[2]
APO
[3} 
apo *APO
[4]
Proportion
[3]/[l]
[5]
ABTE
[6]
a BiE*ABTE
Austria -0.062 -0.75 -0.008 0.122 -2.424 0.019
France -0.018 -1.053 -0.011 0.589 -2.25 0.018
Germany (1991-98) -0.057 -0.898 -0.009 0.156 -2.58 0.021
Italy -0.269 -1.873 -0.019 0.07 -1.885 0.015
Italy (1980-1994) -0.161 -0.65 -0.007 0.04 -0.81 0.006
Netherlands -0.143 -1.645 -0.016 0.115 -3.112 0.025
Spain -0.085 -1.523 -0.015 0.179 -1.99 0.016
USA -0.094 -0.173 -0.002 0.018 -1.44 0.012
United Kingdom -0.084 -4.747 -0.047 0.563 -2.063 0.017
Unweighted Average -0.102 -1.583 -0.016 0.156 -2.218 0.018
Notes.
1. These are calculations taken over 1980-1998 using actual empirical changes in 
shares, BTE and PO. Coefficients are taken from Table 2 (-0.008 on BTE and
0.0099 on PO).
2. There is no data on public ownership on the roads in the OECD database and 
so we include a dummy variable for it.
3. Although there are more countries included in the analysis, here we report the 
results for the countries for which we have the most consistent set o f data from 
1980-1998.
4. Note that there are big privatization-related labour cost reductions in 
telecommunications and other utilities in Italy in 1995 and this is why we see 
such big changes in the share for network industries.
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Figure 4.1: Changes in the Wage Bill Share, 1980-200
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Notes.
1. This figure is derived from the results in Table 1
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Figure 4.2: Change in the Aggregate Wage Bill Share Across OECD Countries
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Notes.
1. These are country level values of the wage bill share o f value added from the OECD, 
1980-2001
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Figure 4.3: Change in the Wage Bill Share Across OECD Countries for Network
Industries
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
0 Share - Medi an bands
Notes.
1. These are country level values of the wage bill share of value added from the OECD, 
1980-2001
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Figure 4.4: Average Public Ownership Index Across OECD Countries for Network
Industries
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Notes.
1. These are country level averages of the public ownership index, 1980-1998.
2. Product market data are drawn from the OECD’s regulation database (Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta (2000,2003).
208
CHAPTER 4.1s Privatisation Behind the Rise in the Profit Share?
Figure 4.4: Average Barriers to Entry Index Across OECD Countries for Network
Industries
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Notes.
1. These are country level averages of the public ownership index, 1980-1998.
2. Product market data are drawn from the OECD’s regulation database (Nicoletti 
and Scarpetta (2000,2003))
CHAPTER 4. Is Privatisation behind the Rise in the Profit Share? 209
4.9 Appendix 4.A: D ata Appendix
4.9 .1  O E C D  R egulation  D atab ase
First we used the OECD Regulation database developed by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000, 
2003a,b). There are overall country-wide indicators of regulation, barriers to entry and 
public ownership for 21 countries. There are also specific industry time series for barriers 
to entry and public ownership for 7 non-manufacturing industries. All of these are on a 
scale of 0 to 6 (from least to most restrictive).
Entry barriers cover legal limitations on the number of companies in potentially com­
petitive markets and rules on vertical integration of network industries. The barriers to 
entry indicator takes a value of zero when entry is free (i.e. a situation with three or 
more competitors and with complete ownership separation of a natural monopoly and a 
competitive section of the industry) and a value of 6 when entry is severely restricted 
(i.e. situations with legal monopoly and full vertical integration in network industries or 
restrictive licensing in other industries). Intermediate values represent partial liberalisa­
tion of entry (e.g. legal duopoly, mere accounting separation of natural monopoly and 
competitive segments).
Public Ownership measures the share of equity owned by municipal or central governments 
in firms of a given sector. The two polar cases are of no public ownership (PO =  0) and 
full public ownership (PO =  6). Whenever data are available intermediate values of the 
public ownership indicator are calculated as an increasing function of the actual share of 
equity held by the government in the dominant firm.
The construction of the indicators takes the following steps. First the separate indicators 
are constructed at the finest level of industry disaggregation. Second, these indicators 
are then aggregated at the industry level using revenue averaged weights. Thirdly, for 
the country-wide aggregators the industry indices are aggregated using revenue weights 
again.
For information on the construction, properties and descriptive statistics of this data see 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000) or Alessini et al (2003).
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4 .9 .2  S ociop olitica l A ttitu d es
4.9.2.1 World Value Survey
The World Values Survey (WVS) is a worldwide investigation of sociocultural and political 
change. It is conducted by a network of social scientists at leading universities all around 
the world. Interviews have been carried out with nationally representative samples of the 
public of more than 80 societies in at least one wave of the survey. A total of 4 waves have 
been carried out in 1981, 1990-91, 1995-96 and 1999-2001. The coverage has increased 
over the surveys.
WVS provides a broad range of variables for analysing the impact of the values and beliefs 
of mass public on political and social life. For example, it is possible to examine cross-level 
linkages, such as that between public values and economic growth; or between political 
culture and democratic institutions.
For the purpose of our study, the variables of most interest are: (1) Self positioning in the 
political scale (which ranges from 1 (Left) to 10 (Right), (2) Private vs state ownership 
of business (1 (Private ownership increased) to 10 (Government ownership increased)), 
(3) Government responsibility to provide for all (1 (People take more responsibility) to 
10 ((Government take more responsibility)).
The dataset is complete for most of the countries in our sample, however for Greece the 
first available data points are in 1999 for these questions.
The interviews were conducted with a representative sample of at least 1,000 people from 
each country of adults aged 18 and over. To ensure that the variables that we use are 
nationally representative we apply the provided sampling weights. When merging this 
data with other data we collapse the variables at the median (appropriately weighted). 
We repeated the analysis by collapsing at the mean, standard deviation and interquartile 
range and the results do not vary much.
For most countries we only have data for IV (1) in years 1981, 1990 and 1999 and for IV 
(2) and IV (3) in 1990 and 1999. We therefore interpolate over the period 1975-1998. We 
do not have data for Greece until 1999 and so it is dropped from the data.
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4.9.2.2 Database of Political Institutions: A World Bank Database
The Database of Political Institutions (DPI) contains 106 variables for 177 countries over 
the years 1975-2004. The variables provide details about elections, electoral rules, types 
of political systems, party compositions of the opposition and government coalition and 
the extent of military influence on the government.
For the purpose of our study we look at the cross-country time series of the party orien­
tation. To identify the party orientation with respect to economic policy, they use the 
criteria: (1) Right: for parties that are defined as conservative, Christian democratic or 
right-wing, (2) Left: for parties that are defined as communist, socialist, social demo­
cratic or left wing, (3) Centre: for parties that are defined as centralist or when the party 
position can best be described as centralist , (4) 0: for all those cases which do not fit 
into the other mentioned categories or when there is no information.
4 .9 .3  Labour M arket R egu la tion s
Our labour market regulation measures are drawn from the OECD, Nickell et al (2002), 
Nickell (2003) and Baker et al (2004). For the union density information we drew on the 
work of Visser (2003).
4 .9 .4  O th er D a ta
The main data source for investment, value added, wage bill and employment comes from 
the OECD STAN database for Industrial Analysis, based on the International Standard 
Industrial Classification Revision 3 (SIC Rev. 3). We had to aggregate the regulation 
data to the most disaggregated STAN level available. These were the following five 
industries: Electricity and Gas; Telecommunications and Post; Airlines; Railways and 
Road Freight. We supplemented STAN with information on the capital stock from the 
OECD’s International Sectoral DataBase (ISDB). We used ISDB to allocate the capital 
stock to STAN in the first year and then used the perpetual inventory method to build 
up the capital stock using gross investment flows from STAN. We used depreciation rate 
of 8%
We also drew on the Gronnigen Database to supplement employment series that were 
sometime missing in STAN and ISDB for particular industries in particular years. Table
4.A1 gives the final balance of the panel on the non-missing observations.
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Appendix 4.B: Additional Tables & Figures
Table 4.A1: Change in the Wage Bill Share, 1980-2000
Country
Change
in
Business
Sector
S
Network Industries 
V  Within Between S
Manufacturing 
V  Within Between
Wholesale, Retail & Hotels 
S V  Within Between S
Financial Share 
V  Within Between
Austria -4.02 62.53 16.98 -0.27 -0.37 62.55 40.02 -5.77 -1.89 55.41 30.94 3.42 0.29 49.80 12.06 -0.96 1.54
France -5.60 56.25 17.08 0.32 0.21 63.31 46.74 -3.45 -5.65 67.36 26.26 -2.10 4.00 60.60 9.92 -0.52 1.58
Germany -1.85 57.17 16.01 -1.91 0.04 71.87 50.81 -0.54 -4.33 68.57 24.35 0.18 3.15 66.03 8.84 0.65 0.91
Italy -6.22 59.19 15.03 -4.08 2.41 64.63 44.84 0.22 -5.90 66.25 29.38 -0.88 2.41 52.56 10.75 -1.15 0.75
Netherlands -7.02 53.38 17.63 -1.02 -0.21 61.67 39.10 -3.89 -3.53 58.99 31.66 -1.07 2.11 58.21 11.61 -0.89 1.47
Spain -4.37 46.90 17.22 -1.16 1.23 62.19 42.09 0.12 -8.42 38.93 31.48 0.46 3.66 59.10 9.21 -1.16 0.89
USA -8.83 56.48 18.63 -1.23 -0.20 70.67 38.31 -2.91 -6.54 70.37 31.18 -0.96 1.46 54.33 11.88 -2.54 4.09
United Kingdom -4.34 61.27 17.97 -1.57 1.55 74.41 43.35 -2.42 -8.31 66.97 27.52 -1.75 6.26 50.79 11.15 2.27 -0.36
Unweighted Mean -5.28 56.64 17.07 -1.36 0.58 66.41 43.16 -2.33 -5.57 61.61 29.10 -0.34 2.92 56.43 10.68 -0.54 1.36
Notes. Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100; S is the average wage bill share (for each sector) between 1980 and 2000 and V  
is the average value added (for each sector) between 1980 and 2000. The data from Gronnigen Industry Productivity Database.
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Table 4.A2: Balance of Panel by Country and Industry
country
Electricity 
and Gas
Post and 
Telecom Transport Railroads Total
Australia 32 22 22 0 76
Austria 26 26 26 5 83
Belgium 16 17 17 5 55
Canada 30 20 20 20 90
Denmark 32 32 32 32 128
Finland 32 27 27 9 95
France 31 23 23 23 100
Germany 11 10 10 10 41
Greece 7 7 7 4 25
Italy 32 22 22 20 96
Japan 32 19 19 17 87
Netherlands 32 22 22 0 76
Norway 32 11 11 20 74
Portugal 23 16 16 0 55
Spain 17 15 15 15 62
Sweden 30 20 20 20 90
USA 32 32 32 21 117
United
Kingdom 31 9 9 21 70
Total 478 350 350 242 1,420
NOTES: This is the unrestricted sample without controlling for missing values in share, 
employment and wages.
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Table 4.A3: Aggregate Union and Employment Protection Measures
Dependent variable
[1] [2] 
Share
Public Ownership 1.572 0.58
[0.323]** [(0.426]
Barriers to Entry -1.468 -0.698
[0.427]** [0.316}*
Union Density -3.321 18.094
[2.310] [7.263]*
Employment
Protection -0.135 -1.227
[1.139] [3.689]
Trend*Telecom -0.84 -0.771
[0.216]** [0.124]**
Trend * Electricity 0.017 0.02
[0.198] [0.096]
Trend*Roads 0.888 0.65
[0.374]* [0.216]**
Fixed Effects No Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 959 959
Number of fixed
effects 64 64
Notes.
1. Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100.
2. Labour market regulation measures are drawn from the OECD (Nickell et al 
(2002)). The base trend is Trend*Transport.
3. There is no data on public ownership on the roads in the OECD database and 
we include a dummy variable for it.
4. The Newey-West standard errors correct for first order serial correlation.
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Table 4.A4: Dynamic Specification
[1]
SHARE
[2]
Ln(Emp)
[3]
Ln(Wages)
[4]
SHARE
[5]
Ln(Emp)
[6]
Ln(Wages)
Public Ownership 0.825 2.208 -1.280
[0.613] [1.116]* [1.237]
Lagged PO 0.217 2.177 -0.490 0.967 4.194 -1.570
[0.606] [1.412] [1.242] [0.354]** [1.183]** [0.765]**
Barriers to Entry -0.367] -0.183 -0.083
[0.359] [1.039] [0.608]
Lagged BTE -0.639 -1.286 0.059 -1.017 -1.404 -0.208
[0.395] [1.141] [0.641] [0.360]** [0.997] [0.532]
Trend*Telecom -0.749 -0.278 0.836 -0.745 -0.277 0.832
[0.109]** [0.157] [0.236]** [0.109]** [0.157] [0.236]**
Trend*Electricity -0.009 -0.580 0.786 -0.006 -0.570 0.790
[0.090] [0.221]** [0.200]** [0.090] [0.219]** [0.201]**
Trend*Roads 0.602 -2.545 0.498 0.604 -2.523 0.501
[0.190]** [0.382]** [0.384] [0.189] [0.379] [0.383]
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1138 1435 1081 1151 1454 1095
Notes.
1. All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100.
2. The coefficients are from separate OLS regressions. The sample is pooled across 
four industries (electricity/gas, telecom, transport, roads). There is no data on 
public ownership on the roads in the OECD database and so we include a dummy 
variable for it.
3. “Share” is the Wage Bill Share of Value Added. The base trend is 
Trend*Transport.
4. The Newey-West standard errors correct for first order serial correlation.
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Table 4.A5: Individual Instrumental Variables
la. IV (1) = Self Positioning in Political Scale (1 to 10)
[3]
OLS
[1]
1st Stage
[2]
IV
Dependent variable Wage Bill Share
IV(1)_1 -25.974
[5.170]**
Public Ownership 4.318 0.977
[2.228] [0.340]**
Barriers to Entry 14.839 -1.312 -0.878
[3.241]** [0.406]** [0.325]**
Trend*Telecom 3.983 -0.914 -0.772
[0.964]** [0.154]** [0.108]**
Trend * Electricity 2.376 -0.087 -0.013
[1.168]* [0.112] [0.086]
Trend*Roads 9.315 0.301 0.605
[0.747]** [0.262] [0.187]**
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1144 1144 1144
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lb. IV (2) = Privatisation vs State Ownership of Business
[1]
1st Stage
[2]
IV
[3]
OLS
Dependent variable Wage Bill Share
IV(2)_1 23.664
[4.624]**
Public Ownership 7.161 0.977
[2.454]** [0.340]**
Barriers to Entry 13.760 -1.681 -0.878
[3.118]** [0.422]** [0.325]**
Trend*Telecom 4.067 -1.036 -0.772
[0.964]** [0.162]** [0.108]**
Trend*Electricity 1.929 -0.150 -0.013
[1.206] [0.135] [0.086]
Trend*Roads 9.005 0.042 0.605
[0.805]** [0.314] [0.187]**
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1144 1144 1144
lc. IV (3) = Government Responsibility
[1]
1st Stage
[2]
IV
[3]
OLS
Dependent variable Wage Bill Share
IV(3)_1 14.538
[3.438]**
Public Ownership 4.024 0.977
[2.103] [0.340]**
Barriers to Entry 13.733 -1.274 -0.878
[3.153]** [0.454] [0.325]**
Trend*Telecom 4.351 -0.902 -0.772
[0.975]** [0.146]** [0.108]**
Trend*Electricity 2.143 -0.081 -0.013
[1.169] [0.111] [0.086]
Trend*Roads 8.804 0.327 0.605
[0.776]** [0.303] [0.187]**
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1144 1144 1144
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Id. IV (4) = World Bank Survey -  Govt (L, C, R)
[1]
1st Stage
[2]
IV
[3]
OLS
Dependent variable Wage Bill Share
IV(4)_1 -7.090
[2.336]**
Public Ownership -0.928 0.985
[3.992] [0.348]**
Barriers to Entry 12.964 -0.652 -0.905
[3.082]** [0.657] [0.331]**
Trend*Telecom 4.334 -0.669 -0.751
[0.996]** [0.208]** [0.109]**
Trend*Electricity 2.374 0.031 -0.013
[1.199] [0.128] [0.090]
Trend* Roads 9.260 0.778 0.601
[0.766]** [0.433] [0.190]**
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1136 1136 1136
Notes.
1. These regressions estimate IV versions of the wage bill share regressions using 
socio-political variables as instruments.
2. IV (1), IV (2) and IV (3) are obtained from the World Value Survey and IV (4) is 
obtained from the Database of Political Institutions,
3. We collapse the data by the median (applying sampling weights).
4. The scaling of each variable is as follows: IV (1) Self positioning in the political 
scale, which ranges from 1 (Left) to 10 (Right); IV (2) Private vs state ownership 
of business, which ranges from 1 (Private ownership increased) to 10 
(Government ownership increased), IV (3) Government responsibility to provide 
for all, which ranges from 1 (People take more responsibility) to 10 (Government 
take more responsibility), (4) where Left=l, Centre=2 and Right=3.
5. All coefficients are multiplied by 100.
6. The Newey-West standard errors correct for first order serial correlation.
Conclusion
This thesis has sought to evaluate the impact of institutional reforms on labour market 
performance. This is done in two parts: firstly, we show the impact of a particular policy 
change in the UK on both wages and employment and secondly, we offer some insight 
into the disparities in performance across OECD countries, which have different forms (or 
levels) of regulations.
In Part 1, we take the policy change in the late 1990s of the introduction of the WFTC 
in the UK and show that the impact of such a policy is not without externalities. We 
highlight the importance of the care needed in both the policy design and policy evaluation 
when trying to evaluate the success of the programme.
In particular, Chapter 1 shows that if it is the case that an employer has some knowledge 
as to who is claiming the tax credit then there is an incentive for her to share in the 
incidence of the tax credit. In addition, we show that (given the substitutability between 
the claimant and other workers) there is a spillover effect which reduces the wage of both 
the eligible and similarly skilled ineligible workers.
These finding have not been addressed in the previous literature on tax credit evaluation. 
It is typically assumed that the claimant worker (and claimant household) is fully incident 
of the tax credit. However, analysis in Chapter 1 incorporates the general equilibrium 
framework needed to evaluate the effect of the tax credit on the economy as a whole and 
not solely on the claimant. The results of this analysis are of critical policy importance as 
we can no longer assume that the person eligible for such a tax credit is the sole beneficiary. 
Moreover, increase in generosity does not explain the shift in incidence, indicating that 
the change in payment method played an important role.
Chapter 2 then takes the well known literature, which relates tax credits to labour supply 
responsiveness and shows that without close inspection of the suitability of the control 
groups in the difference-in-differences methodology, the effect of WFTC is overestimated. 
In particular, we show that the observable and unobservable differences between these
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groups have important consequences when they are not controlled for properly. Moreover, 
we highlight the importance to look closely at the hour’s distribution and activity states 
to observe where change is happening and to see if the target groups have been correctly 
identified.
In Chapter 2, we show that once we control for group specific differential trends, the effect 
of WFTC falls dramatically. Moreover, the only effect remaining is on those who work 
30 hours or more. More importantly, the policy is not successful in drawing people from 
inactivity. The results of this chapter are important in showing that the policy was not as 
successful as it is accredited for being. It did not target the least attached to the labour 
market, i.e. the inactive. Overall, we show that the success of WFTC has been overstated 
and that interactions with other policies introduced in the 1990s need to be taken into 
consideration.
In Part 2, we take two different empirical observations and then use time varying cross­
country data to disentangle the differences in regulation.
In Chapter 3 we highlight that in many European countries the female unemployment 
rate is considerably higher than male counterparts. Using transitional analysis we show 
that in countries with a large gender gap in unemployment rates, there tends to be a large 
gender gap in both flows from employment into unemployment and from unemployment 
into employment.
We find that although there is a tendency for the gender gaps in unemployment rates 
to be smaller in countries with higher levels of female attachment, pointing to the im­
portance of human capital differences as an important explanation of the gender gaps in 
unemployment rates, this is not the whole story. Since we also observe gender gaps in 
unemployment rates in countries where the attachment of women has risen, it is likely 
that labour market institutions can explain part of the differences. In particular, insti­
tutions that compress wages or act to the disadvantage of groups with lower levels of 
labour market attachment may magnify the impact of human capital differences in un­
employment rates. In addition, as the overall levels of unemployment is high in many 
European countries, employers may have long queues of workers for jobs, and this acts 
to the disadvantage of women, as it makes it easier to indulge in any residual prejudice 
against women.
Finally, in Chapter 4 we find robust empirical evidence to show that privatisation has 
been a cause of the fall of labour’s share of value added over the past two decades. 
We set up a simple model that showed how privatisation might do just this because of 
the preference for employment over profits displayed in the objectives of publicly owned
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firms. By contrast, falling barriers to entry should increase the wage bill share of income 
as competition erodes profit margins. We exploit a number of policy experiments across 
several “network” industries in different OECD countries in order to identify these effects. 
These relationships are very difficult to estimate from solely macro-economic data as the 
product market deregulations are very industry specific and the aggregate data will be 
swamped by many events that are taking place simultaneously in the economy.
We find evidence that after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity that, consistently 
with theory, falling entry barriers increase labour’s share of value. On the other hand, 
declining state control tends to reduce labour’s share. These results are robust to a 
number of controls including adding a full set of fixed effects and using sociopolitical 
variable to tackle the endogeneity problem. Labour market liberalisation, however, does 
not seem to have had a substantial effect one way or the other.
